Air carrier flight crew flying CRJ-900 aircraft reported loss of hydraulic system 2 in cruise flight.

Narrative

We experienced a full failure of HYD SYS 2 nearing TOD (Top of descent). I was PF (Pilot flying) when we received HYD 2 LO PRESS as well as IB FLT SPLRS and IB SPOILERONS caution messages. The autopilot was deferred so we were already handflying the airplane at this point. I asked the first officer if he would be comfortable flying the airplane and operating the radios despite the fact that he would be handflying which is obviously abnormal. He said he was comfortable with this and I gave him control of the aircraft and radios; transferring the FCP (flight control panel) and transponder to his side. I then ran the QRH for HYD 2 LO PRESS and completed the associated items. I did this deliberately slowly and methodically to ensure I could complete each task within it while keeping a good scan and SA (situational awareness) now as PM (Pilot monitoring); as my FO (First Officer) was handflying the aircraft while operating the radios. After it became apparent that we had lost the system due to the quantity readout depleting to 5% and the pressure decreasing under 1800PSI we elected to land at the nearest suitable airport per the QRH. We at this point [requested priority handling] with ATC. I contacted dispatch to attempt to notify them and speak to maintenance about the issue as the pressure readout had bounced around a bit during the early stages of running the QRH. I eventually got through to dispatch but after only two transmissions in which I told them our plan to continue to ZZZ and asked them to patch me through to maintenance; I was told by the radio operator that they were having communication issues with our dispatcher. Knowing that they received my first transmission alerting them to the situation and our plan of action I decided not to waste any more time waiting for them to respond; as it had already taken up a considerable amount of time. At this point I briefed the flight attendants to inform them of the situation; with an estimated landing time and an emphasis on the fact that we expected a normal landing. I made a PA to the passengers at this point as well briefly advising them of the situation and emphasizing a normal landing and taxi to the gate was expected. I then briefed the approach and landing which we conducted on runway XXL with significantly more distance than our calculated landing distance which I obtained utilizing the QRH. During this time I assisted my FO in responding to several radio calls; as he was a bit loaded up" flying the aircraft and manipulating the FCP. This is obviously non-standard but we were dealing with a multiple failure situation; so we backed each other up using CRM as best as possible to minimize both of our workloads. His work flying the aircraft and operating the FCP and radios was invaluable in allowing me to run the QRH; and communicate with all necessary parties. After running both the descent and approach checklists and verifying that we were both happy with the setup; I took control of the aircraft and made an uneventful landing on runway XXL and taxied without incident to the gate.It was difficult to reach our dispatcher via commercial radio. After a long wait to get them 'on the phone' we had two transmissions back and forth after which the operator informed us they were having 'communication difficulties' with our dispatch. This is obviously not optimal; especially in a [priority handling] scenario."