Air carrier Captain reported a gate return to correct improper DG gate departure procedures. After correcting multiple issues the flight departed safely.
Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a gate return to correct improper DG gate departure procedures. After correcting multiple issues the flight departed safely.
Narrative
I met the First Officer; whom had arrived first and begun cockpit preparations; at the aircraft and was made aware that we were without ACARS. Knowing that maintenance records indicated it was not an aircraft issue; I recalled with the First Officer that it was a long standing problem associated with the particular gate; at ZZZ. He explained to me that he had already reached out to our dispatcher and made arrangements takeoff performance details to be delivered to both of us via company email. We utilized IPAD for ATIS; [verified] our current Maintenance Release; and acquired our departure clearance via VHF; during pre-departure set-up. What we didn't do was to call operations prior to pushback to determine if we were planned to carry any DG (Dangerous Goods); assuming the known ACARS issues associated with the gate would trigger proper DG paper fallback procedures. With no paper Final DG Summary delivered to us; a gate agent final check and delivery of paper reports; and a ready call from our push crew; we initiated pushback unaware that we were carrying any dangerous goods. It wasn't until after engine starts and initial taxi that ACARS messages began arriving and those did not include notification of planned DG; nor any Final DG Summary. What we did receive was a message that read as follows: Notification Form Warning ZZZ ZZZZ SENT: XA:47:13Z Pilot in command must acknowledge receipt of final notification form Message using ACARS dangerous goods acknowledgement code prior to aircraft movement". I recognized the message was associated with DG and had the First Officer contact operations for assistance. Upon initial contact with ZZZ Operations we were told that we would need to return to the gate in order to rearrange things in our aft loading pit; and only after a couple more queries did we first become aware that we were carrying DG. We now understood that we were carrying dry-ice and that it had been determined it was not packed properly in the aft pit. Consequently; we returned to the gate and shut down both engines. I had the flight attendants keep the doors armed as the jet-bridge was back and no gate agent was visible. Our aft cargo pit was opened for a short time and I questioned operations about proper DG notification plans. Operations indicated they would look into it and that there were known ACARS issues at the gate. Our aft cargo pit door was closed and we heard from the push crew indicating they were ready to push. I asked to speak with the Ramp Lead to determine plans for DG notification and explained to him that we had no DG notifications of any sort and asked if there were plans to deliver paper copy to the cockpit. We were told to expect it via ACARS and that our loading issues had been resolved. At this point I now noticed a gate agent was positioning the jet-bridge next to our aircraft and I attempted to wave her off while asking the First Officer to call Ops again to determine what was going on. Operations explained that the gate agent was not fully aware of plans and that there were no plans to deliver anything to the flight deck via the jet-bridge.We completed Pre-Flight and Push checklists again prior to our second pushback of the evening with the expectation of receiving a DG summary report once clear of the Gate. After pushback and engine starts we then elected to taxi clear of the ramp area while still awaiting our Final Weight Manifest and the final DG summary. This hadn't happened approaching the runway so we made arrangements to delay in the adjacent holding pad area. After approximately 10 minutes utilizing ACARS and additional calls to operations in an effort to receive required data and documents; I then elected to call Dispatch via personal cell-phone. The Dispatcher got the Load-Planner on the connection and she informed us that the required DG Summary had been sent to the aircraft 3 separate times. When I told her that we had not got it; she said she would send it again. We talkedbriefly about having it sent to personal email when it finally arrived at the aircraft.With everything we needed after what seemed a great deal of extra effort; we departed one hour after initial push back. The remainder of the flight was mostly normal; other than conflicting OFF; ON and IN time data that never seemed to sync across the multitude of wifi applications."
Second reporter narrative
In addition to ACARS/DG (Dangerous Goods) complications I reported on via report approximately 48 hours ago; I received the following email from our dispatcher yesterday. While his concerns and experiences add additional issues to this flight; I suspect all of it is somehow related to ACARS connectivity at and around ZZZ Gate and the way the system buffers data in an electronic cache. ZZZ ZZZZ irregular takeoff weight. I the dispatcher for flight ZZZ ZZZZ. I just wanted to let you know that I have filed a report for takeoff weight issues that occurred during the generation of the second release. At the time of the second release it appears as though it reduced our max allowable takeoff weight from 169700 to 165800ish. Release number 2 was issued about 20-30 min after takeoff but the maintenance computer system did not recognize that you guys were in the air till I had the desk update your FOB and off time (XB41z FOB 35.7). The actual takeoff weight 165519; so based off the initial release there was around 4000 lbs buffer. Both the planned zfw and fuel on board had decreased by the time of takeoff. In terms of legality; we were legal off of release 1 since takeoff occurred before release 2 was generated. Due to the issue with acars; numbers were initially sent through email and it appeared there were no issues there. I believe a Takeoff gross of 169.7 was requested. The only thing that I can think of that would have affected the max takeoff weight would be a change in the atmospheric conditions at the time of release 2. That's assuming that the runway for takeoff was the same as the runway that was planned; or some kind of maintenance computer system anomaly occurred since the maintenance computer system still thought the aircraft was on the ground.Load planning called after release 2 was sent and informed me that we were 300 lbs overweight. I told them that you were already in the air for about 20-30 minutes. We spoke for a while; and it appeared as though everything was fine. I called back a few times to verify that everything was recorded correctly because at the time of release number 2; your off time and FOB had not been recorded yet. I was assured that everything was ok; but later I went back to check some of the other releases; and I saw the change in allowable takeoff weight and what they were alluding to earlier on release number 2. I had a dispatch chief look into it for me and he agreed that the allowable takeoff weight should not have changed that much. I also completed another takeoff calculation while I was talking to the chief dispatcher and there appeared to be no issues at that time.Normally once an aircraft takes off and a flight is recalculated; weights are locked but; in this situation; release 2 was generated with a different allowable takeoff weight and a position report but no off time or FOB. From the people that I talked to; it appears that it was most likely an error due to the fact the flight was enroute and both unimatic and the maintenance computer system thought the aircraft was still on the ground. I decided to just submit a report because there are just too many unknowns as to what actually went wrong with the generation of release 2 and only some assumptions of what could have caused the adjustment in take off weight. The only thing that was changed in the maintenance computer system was an assumed off time and a standard recalc.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.