Air carrier flight crew reported unstable approach and CFIT alert. They performed a go around and landed uneventfully.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported unstable approach and CFIT alert. They performed a go around and landed uneventfully.
Narrative
We were descending via the ZZZZZ.ZZZ and then provided vectors to join the visual for Runway XX. Vectors included a descent to 3000' and towards ZZZZZ1. As we approached ZZZZZ1 from the east at ~ 3000 and 250 KIAS; we were cleared the visual XX. Due to the non-ideal direction to ZZZZZ1; pilot monitoring (PM) suggested direct ZZZZZ2; and I concurred. Autopilot started the turn to ZZZZZ2 and I input a decent to 2600 with 1500fpm (as we were still high); but due to airspeed the Autopilot overshot and had us on the east side of the river. I decided to correct manually so I disconnected the Autopilot and hand flew the remainder of the approach. I failed to request to have the Flight Director (FD) turned off and fixated outside to fly the runway. As a result; we descended to ~1;000'; prior to ZZZZZ3. Being off the anticipated glide path with FD on the Autothrottles added power resulting in increasing airspeed. I elected to disengage Autothrottles at that time. As we were low; a terrian cation annuciation was activated. A couple seconds later; the PM directed a go around (GA) as we descended through 800'. At that time we were configured flaps 20 and gear down. The GA was non-standard as it was initiated at 800'; as such I incorrected did not apply standard GA procedures. Instead; I pushed the throttles up (not to TOGA) and started a climb. PM reported the GA and we were immediately given a heading and altitude to fly. With positive rate I directed Gear UP and Flaps 1 passing F speed and directed the PM to bug 200 KIAS. At that time I engaged the Autothrottles. We then received vectors for the visual XX which was flown without event.Cause: Over-reliance on Automation; leading to decay in hand flying skills and scan. I try to handfly with Autothrottles off at least on approach per trip. They are always non-challenging ILS approaches. Last leg and 2 members of crew (1 P and 1 FA) had tight connections. This was discussed in the Arrival Brief.Suggestions: The chain of errors started on the arrival. As pilot flying (PF); I was flying faster than standard in order to give the crewmembers with tight commutes a better chance to make it. Approaching ZZZZZ1; we were still at ~250 KIAS; and as soon as we were cleared the visual; I should have immediately slowed to below flap extension speeds. I also should not have descended at 1500fpm approaching ZZZZZ2; but should have stayed level; slowed and configured prior to descending. On the GA; as we were below 1000' I should have applied SOP
Second reporter narrative
We were set up for a left-turn to ZZZZZ1 on the visual XX at ZZZ. We were number 1 for the approach; and the pilot flying had his speed at 250kts. We turned inside of ZZZZZ1 to ZZZZZ4 and the PF tried to slow the aircraft; configure flaps; and fly the visual approach procedure. As the PM; I was heads-down monitoring our flap speeds as I knew we were fast and it was going to be a challenge to configure. Approaching the waypoint ZZZZZ2; the Airbus did not execute the required right turn to the next point; I think it did not hack the turn because we were too fast. We might have had flaps 1 out at this point. The PF kicked off the Autopilot and intervened. He started flying the approach visually; but the approach mode was no longer engaged; so the PF did not have any vertical guidance to go with his visual lateral guidance. I looked up and noticed we were low. I am not sure how low; but based on my experience; probably 200-300 feet low. as the PM and Captain; I told the PF we were low and to climb or level off. We continued to descend with flaps in setting 2 now. The PF called for flaps 3 at 800'; I directed a go-around at this point as we were not stable on the approach. We executed a normal go-around and returned for an uneventful 2nd approach. There were several causal factors: 1. Perceived pressure by the PF to land quickly. We were both commuters and had talked about that we had a tight timeline to make our commutes. However; as the Captain; I never explicitly said; 'let's keep your speed up' or anything like that. In my own review of the event; it was clear to me the PF felt pressure to be 'fast' when it was not required or requested. 2. Energy management was poor. The PF had too much speed as we started our turn towards ZZZZZ1. It was salvageable if we configured early to bleed the speed off; however; as a crew we did not; and the excess energy led to time compression and eventually an unstable approach. 3. Flight Mode Awareness. The PF kicked off the Autopilot; but in the course of the events; also lost the approach mode; which provides vertical as well as lateral guidance. Without the vertical guidance; we carried too-high of a rate-of-descent and ultimately were low on the approach. At one point; the PM had to tell the PM to level off or climb based on visual cues that we were too low. 4. Get-there-itis. The PF continued to press the approach; calling for Flaps 3 below 1000' (unstable) and most-likely cause was trying to hack the approach because if we did a go-around; he might have been concerned we would miss a commute. There was never any direction to 'make the commute' but in retrospect; the PF seemed to internalize perceived pressure and this led to a decision to continue a bad approach in order to not do a go-around. Suggestions: A clear discussion about expectations during the arrival brief that there is no pressure at all to get the aircraft on deck 'quickly'. Second; as the Captain and PM; I could have directed the PF to control his energy better on downwind; to get to Flaps 1 prior to the turn towards the approach. Thirdly; if you are unstable; and we were low which is unstable; then execute the go-around then.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.