Air carrier flight crew reported during initial climb Landing Gear; Auto Thrust and Auto Pilot ECAMs resulted in a return to the airport. While hand flying; the Captain temporarily lost control of the aircraft resulting in a Ground Proximity Warning.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported during initial climb Landing Gear; Auto Thrust and Auto Pilot ECAMs resulted in a return to the airport. While hand flying; the Captain temporarily lost control of the aircraft resulting in a Ground Proximity Warning.
Narrative
WX conditions: low ceilings in icing Conditions; IMC until short final on return. Terrain in vicinity of airport. Runway condition:wet 5/5/5.Channelized AttentionShortly after takeoff; after gear retraction was commanded; ECAM alerted on L/G (Landing Gear) Right Shock Absorber followed by L/G Door and A/THR (Autothrust) Off. L/G ECAMs required speed less that 220kts. A/FLT ECAM also alerted requiring CA to hand fly. At this time CA became fixated on airspeed which resulted in a very steep decent rate greater than 3500 fpm below 1800' MSL in vicinity of terrain while still well below Minimum Safe Altitude. Both a sink rate and don't sink call were observed from GPWS. Airspeed accelerated due to the dive; which led to a L/G overspeed. To prevent further overspeed; CA reduced throttles to near idle; but failed to recognize dive. FO called climb; climb; climb" and directed at least 15 degree nose up to CA. During the attempted climb; FO noticed throttles were still near idle and called "TO/GA" while pushing throttles to TO/GA from base of throttles. CA responded to "TO/GA" as well; placing throttles to TO/GA and resuming climb to 4000'; a Minimum Safe Altitude we remembered from our approach brief the previous night. Upon reaching 4000'; CA attempted to re-engage A/FLT and A/THR however neither seemed to operate properly and CA resumed hand flying. FO ran L/G ECAM procedures and recycled gear to down position. Upon noting down and locked; FO suggested that we leave them down and return to ZZZ. CA approved of that plan and FO coordinated with ATC and [advised ATC]. FO passed required information to ATC; who then vectored us to ILSXX. FO gave a very short ILSXX brief to cover highlights; then CA commanded for Descent Checklist while FO ensured FMS was reprogrammed for the return. As we were turning toward final; CA requested a landing assessment; FO responded with "runway is 5/5/5 braking action is good; so standard assessment should apply. I selected MED auto brakes for you so I don't have to think about it". In hindsight; FO could have double checked and noticed the slightly overweight condition; but after the near-CFIT event; getting on the ground was the driving factor. After completing configuration for landing; FO EMER CANC the L/G ECAM messages in order to display the LDG ECAM so we could complete the checklist. Upon landing; CA stopped on Runway XX while FO coordinated with ATC and emergency vehicles to inspect aircraft. After initial inspection was complete; CA cleared Runway XX while emergency vehicles followed us to gate. After shutdown; due to the GPWS event; CVR and RCDR (Recorder) circuit breakers were pulled at the request of safety.Cause: L/G malfunction; A/THR & A/FLT malfunction; Channelized attention; Spatial Disorientation.None of the malfunctions had obvious early indicators of possible failure to flight crew.Hand flying and crosscheck skills need to remain as emphasis items practiced inflight and in training simulators. Additionally; reminding PMs of 'keywords' that can be used as commands to trigger PF muscle memory to breakthrough channelized attention. If FO had not commanded "TO/GA"; this event could have ended very differently."
Second reporter narrative
On climb out from ZZZ we received a landing gear shock absorber fail message; followed by a landing gear door open message. We recycled the gear per ECAM guidance and lowered it; indicating three green lights for safe gear. We left the gear down; [advised ATC]; and got vectored back to the airport. Somewhere in there; I was hand flying; having trouble controlling speed below the 220 kts mandated by the ECAM. Thrust levers were still in TOGA; I'd missed that cue somewhere. Set the thrust levers to climb and engaged auto thrust; which had become disconnected. Auto thrust failed to engage. With this sorted; auto pilot was selected but would not engage. Subsequent attempts only spawned further ECAM warnings about auto flight not working and were abandoned.The FO; (the hero in this story); noticed we were descending; TOGA thrust was applied and escape maneuver initiated. The GPWS was activated at some point. Landing in ZZZ was uneventful but overweight.The casual factor was my micro concentration on speed and little else--credit to FO for pulling me out of my stupor. As mitigation; I would greatly appreciate a sim session to practice hand-flying.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.