Air carrier flight crew reported descent below glide path on final approach resulting in a CFTT event.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported descent below glide path on final approach resulting in a CFTT event.
Narrative
I was Pilot Monitoring (PM) during a morning arrival into a high traffic environment at ZZZ. The airport was landing on parallel runways XXR and XY with departures on XXL. The airspace congestion level was evidently high as we listened to an aircraft ahead of us respond to a TCAS Resolution Advisory during their approach. Once we were given our turn to intercept final at approximately 4000ft; we received a TCAS TA for traffic parallel to us off our right wing. During this time the pilot flying (PF) was configuring to slow the aircraft as we were slightly fast for this segment of the approach. As I shifted my attention back to the instruments after verifying the Traffic Advisory; I noticed we were going above glideslope and recommended descending to a lower altitude. The PF commenced the descent and configured for landing. Upon completion of the landing checklist; I scanned the instruments to verify we had gotten back on gludeslope and decelerating toward final approach speed. At 500 ft; the aircraft remained within stabilized approach criteria. The glare from the sun was intense; making visibility of both the runway environment and instruments more difficult. Around 200-300ft; I had shifted my scan outside noticed the PAPI was indicating 3 red and 1 white; shortly followed by 4 red. At this point I called out Four Red which the PF responded to and corrected the flight path. Simultaneously; just as we observed the 4 red lights on the PAPI; we received the glideslope alert. I was able to immediately and unequivocally determine that obstacles were not a factor on final as the PF corrected for glideslope and an uneventful landing ensued.Looking back on the approach; I feel I could have been more forthcoming with my recommendations as I felt we were fast; and would be challenged to achieve stabilized approach criteria this morning. Additionally; I should better understand that the outside distractions of traffic and sun glare can affect my scan and ability to provide critical PM backup to the PF. In the future to mitigate these challenges I will need to be more assertive with flight parameters that I feel would lead to an unstable approach; and better prepare the flight deck for environmental factors (by using sun shades in this case).
Second reporter narrative
We were arriving into ZZZ during the morning arrival/ departure push; it was extremely busy. We were on the ZZZZZ arrival and told to expect runway XY. We were vectored for a visual to runway XY and were cleared for the visual just prior to intercepting the localizer at 4000ft and 190 kts. As we were intercepting the localizer; we received a traffic advisory from an aircraft on the parallel. While distracted with the TA; we intercepted the localizer but did not arm the approach mode. We intercepted the localizer but I did not set a lower altitude in the window and became high. I disengaged the autopilot and manually flew to get back on the glide path. We were a very lightweight 757 and once back on the glide path we were about 25 knots fast but quickly trending down at 1000 ft. At 500 ft; we were on speed and glide path flying directly into the sun. The glare from the sun made it difficult to see the instruments and I transitioned to the PAPI. At about 200 ft we went below the glide path and I saw all red. I immediately leveled off and heard glide path; glide path. We reestablished the glide path and landed uneventfully.In retrospect; I realize that we should have gone around at a thousand feet and tried the approach again with full automation due to the difficulty with the glare. I had also forgotten how difficult it can be to slow down a very lightweight 757. It was the last leg of the day and we both just wanted to get to the hotel and rest. Postflight we reviewed our actions and determined that a go around would have been the best course of action. We also determined that the FO could have been more assertive in announcing my deviations. I have learned what not to do and will be more attentive to lightweight aircraft and stabilized approach criteria;as well as reinforcing during the safety brief to speak up about deviations from SOP.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.