A320 HAS WARNING LIGHTS ACTIVATE DURING CLB. LOSS OF HYD SYS. SPOILERS AND REVERSER INOP.

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WHILE IN CLB THROUGH FL 180; WE RECEIVED A MASTER WARNING AND CLASS I ECAM MESSAGE F/CTL SPLR FAULT FOR SPOILER 4. STATUS SHOWED SPOILER 4 INOP. RIGHT AFTER THAT; MASTER WARNING AND CLASS I ECAM MESSAGE HYD Y RSVR LO LVL. FO WAS FLYING WITH THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT. I TOLD FO TO FLY AND HANDLE ATC WHILE I DID THE ECAM PROCS. I FOLLOWED THE LISTED ECAM PROCS; TURNING OFF THE PTU AND YELLOW ENG #2 HYD PUMP; AND VERIFYING THAT THE YELLOW SYS ELECTRICAL PUMP WAS OFF. ABOUT THIS TIME; OUR 4TH FLT ATTENDANT CAME INTO THE COCKPIT TO TELL ME THAT A PAX HAD TOLD HER `THERE IS A FLAP UP ON THE L WING WITH FLUID RUNNING BACK.' THE FLT ATTENDANT LOOKED OUT AND SAW THE SPOILER UP; AND CAME TO TELL US. I THANKED HER; TOLD HER WE KNEW; AND THAT WE WOULD GET BACK TO HER. THE FLT ATTENDANT WENT TO THE CABIN WHERE SHE TOLD OUR FIRST FLT ATTENDANT THAT WE `WERE BUSY.' OUR FIRST FLT ATTENDANT TOLD ME LATER THAT AT THIS POINT; THEY ALL GOT OUT THEIR MANUALS. FO AND I REVIEWED THE ECAM FLT CTRL PAGE AND THE HYD PAGE TO ASSESS ACFT CONDITION. THEN WE REVIEWED THE STATUS PAGE FOR INOP ITEMS. FROM THIS WE CONCLUDED THAT WE STILL HAD GOOD ACFT CTL; AS SPOILERS 2 AND 4 WERE THE ONLY FLT CTLS LOST. FO RPTED NO APPARENT PROB WITH THE AP CTLING THE ACFT. I LOOKED AT OUR POS; WHICH ON OUR ATC ASSIGNED 310 HDG WAS NOW NEARLY BTWN IAD AN JFK. I TOLD FO TO ADVISE ATC THAT WE WERE GOING TO DIVERT AND I WOULD CHK WITH COMPANY AND ADVISE AS TO WHERE. FO PULLED WX FOR IAD AND JFK WHILE I INITIATED A PHONE PATCH TO SAM THROUGH ARINC. WHILE WAITING; I CALLED OUR FIRST FLT ATTENDANT AND TOLD HER WE HAD A FLT CTL PROB AND I WAS GOING TO DIVERT. I ALSO TOLD HER THAT; AS A PRECAUTION; I WANTED THE CABIN PREPARATION FOR EVAC DONE. SAM CAME ON THE RADIO. WE BOTH AGREED THAT; BARRING ANY FURTHER FAILURES; THE ACFT WAS QUITE CTLABLE. SAM PATCHED ME TO DISPATCH. I TOLD THEM I WANTED A LONG RWY AS ECAM INDICATED LNDG DISTANCE TIMES 1.1; WITH #2 REVERSER INOP; #2 AND #4 GND SPOILERS; AND ALTERNATE BRAKES INOP. ATC HAD TURNED US TO A 190 HDG. WE WERE POINTED R AT IAD; WHERE THEY WERE LNDG S. WE ADVISED ATC AND STARTED A DSCNT. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER; BUT ASKED FOR THE EQUIP TO BE STANDING BY. THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT CAME UP AND I TOLD HER SHE HAD 1/2 HR TO PREPARE. I TOLD HER THE ACFT WAS CTLABLE; WE WERE GOING TO A LONG RWY; AND THAT MY MAIN REASON FOR THE CABIN PREPARATION WAS IN CASE WE ENCOUNTERED ANY UNFORSEEN DIFFICULTIES IN STOPPING THE ACFT. I TOLD HER IF I REQUIRED A BRACE; I WOULD RING THE CABIN CALL BUTTON RAPIDLY. I MADE A PA TO THE PAX SAYING THAT WE HAD LOST 1 HYD SYS; BUT THE ACFT HAD 2 OTHERS AND WAS FLYING JUST FINE. I TOLD THEM WE WERE DIVERTING TO DULLES; AND AS A PRECAUTION THE FLT ATTENDANT WOULD PREPARE THEM FOR AN EVAC AND TO FOLLOW THE FLT ATTENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS. I CALLED DISPATCH AND SAM TO ADVISE THEM THAT IF WE WENT STRAIGHT IN; WE MAY BE AS MUCH AS 4000 LBS OVERWT. AT 150000 LBS AT IAD; STOPPING DISTANCE AND PERFORMANCE WERE NOT A PROB. BOTH DISPATCH AND SAM APPROVED THE OVERWT LNDG. FO AND I COMPLETED THE APCH DSCNT AND OVERWT LNDG CHKLIST. OUR FIRST FLT ATTENDANT SAID THE CABIN PREPARATION WAS COMPLETE. SHE ASKED ME TO EMPHASIZE TO THE PAX THAT THEY SHOULD STAY IN THEIR SEATS UNTIL THEY HEARD FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS OR MYSELF. AT 5 MINS BEFORE LNDG; I MADE A PA TO THE PAX. FO FLEW THE APCH WHILE I MONITORED. I WANTED FO TO FLY FROM OUTSIDE THE MARKER IN; SO WE COULD EASILY DETECT CTL PROBS. THE LNDG WAS FIRM WITH A SLIGHT BOUNCE. THE FLT ATTENDANT'S YELLED `BRACE' ON LNDG. ONCE I DETERMINED WE HAD A NORMAL ROLLOUT; I IMMEDIATELY CAME ON THE PA AND TOLD THE PAX TO `REMAIN SEATED;' THAT WE WERE FINE. TURNOFF WAS NORMAL; AND WE TOLD ATC THEY COULD RELEASE THE EQUIP AND WE WOULD TAXI TO THE GATE. OUR CREW OF FLT ATTENDANTS DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF PREPARING A FULL ACFT. BOTH THE INFLT SUPVRS WHO MET THE ACFT AND MYSELF RECEIVED SEVERAL FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON THEIR PERFORMANCE. THEY WERE GREAT. ONE FINAL NOTE; ABOUT 2 HRS LATER; WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOROFFICIAL DISPOSITION OF THE FLT; I RECEIVED A CALL FROM CUSTOMER SVC. THEY SAID ONE PAX WAS NOW COMPLAINING OF A NECK INJURY; AND ASKED IF I WAS WRITING A RPT. I TOLD THEM I WAS; BUT I RECEIVED NO FURTHER INFO ON THE PAX. EVEN A RELATIVELY MINOR FAILURE LIKE THIS IS A BUSY TIME IN A 2 MAN ELECTRONIC ACFT. IN RETROSPECT; AN EARLIER TURN WOULD HAVE MADE JFK A CLOSER ALTERNATE THAN IAD. HOWEVER; HOLDING WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY. THERE WAS NO SENSE IN RUSHING THE CABIN PREPARATION; AND I NEEDED TO GET THE ACFT WT DOWN. HAD THERE BEEN A LARGE DIFFERENCE IN FLYING EXPERIENCE BTWN FO AND I IN THIS ACFT I WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED FLYING MYSELF FROM THE MARKER INBOUND. HE HAD DONE A FINE JOB UP TO THIS POINT; SO I ELECTED TO LET HIM CONTINUE.