RWY INCURSION PROVOKES ABORT AT NIGHT.

Date: 1994-08 · Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|ground-incursion-runway|other-unspecified

Synopsis

RWY INCURSION PROVOKES ABORT AT NIGHT.

Narrative

PUSHED BACK FROM DFW AT XA57 ON LAST LEG HOME. APCHING SPOT 29 I MADE GND AWARE OF OUR READINESS TO TAXI AND THEY INSTRUCTED TO TURN LEFT ON THE OUTER AND TAXI TO RWY 17R. TAXI TFC WAS LIGHT AS WE WERE ONE OF THE FIRST TO LEAVE. I DON'T RECALL IF THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE TAXI CHK OR IF I JUST INITIATED; BUT IN ANY EVENT THE TAXI CHK WAS IN PROGRESS WHEN I SENSED THAT WE HAD MISSED OUR L TURN TO THE OUTER. I IMMEDIATELY SAID SOMETHING QUESTIONING OUR PROGRESS. AS THE CAPT WAS APPLYING BRAKES; I WAS LOOKING FOR VISUAL CUES TO CONFIRM OUR POS. AT THAT POINT GND MADE THE CALL TO STOP WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED INDICATING THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE SIT. WE HAD STOPPED WELL SHORT OF THE RWY HOLD LINE; BUT HAD TAXIED TOO FAR TO MAKE THE L TURN ONTO THE OUTER. AT THIS POINT WE BECAME AWARE OF A 737 THAT WAS ABORTING DUE TO OUR ENCROACHMENT ON THE RWY. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF FACTORS AT WORK IN THIS SIT. IT WAS OUR LAST LEG AND EVERYONE WAS ANXIOUS TO GET HOME. TFC WAS LIGHT AND WE WERE ANTICIPATING AN EXPEDITED DEP. THE CAPT IS VERY COMPETENT; DFW IS A FAMILIAR ARPT AND VISIBILITY WAS EXCELLENT. THUS I WASN'T MONITORING OUR PROGRESS AS I MIGHT HAVE IF CONDITIONS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT. IN FACT AS WE LEFT THE RAMP THE CAPT COMMENTED ON HOW OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS DIFFERED FROM THE STANDARD (L ON THE INNER; R AT 26 LEFT ON THE OUTER). I COMMENTED ON THE ONGOING MAINT BEING DONE ON THE INNER AND ACTUALLY LOOKED DOWN THE INNER AS WE CROSSED IT AT THE LIGHTS IN THE MAINT WORK AREA. AT THIS POINT THE TAXI CHK WAS STARTED. THE TAXI CHK IS A DISTR FOR THE CAPT AND CERTAIN ITEMS ARE WORSE THAN OTHERS. THE CALL TO CHK AIRSPD BUGS IS THE BIGGEST DISTR. OUR PROCS CALL FOR THE CAPT TO RESPOND TO THIS CHK BY VERBALLY STATING EACH BUG SETTING. TO DO SO HE MUST LOOK AT THE FMS TO CONFIRM THE V1; VR; V2 NUMBERS; LOOK AT HIS AIRSPD INDICATOR TO VERIFY PROPER SETTINGS AND THEN TRY TO REMEMBER WHAT THE VREF 30 PLUS 40 AND VREF 30 PLUS 80 NUMBERS ARE AND VERIFY THEIR SETTINGS. ALL OF THIS WILL TAKE THE CAPT OUT OF THE TAXI LOOP FOR SEVERAL SECONDS; AND ON THIS NIGHT WE ROLLED THROUGH OUR TURN AND TOWARD THE RWY. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT OUR TAXI CHKLIST PROCS NEED TO BE CHANGED. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DISTR IS INEVITABLE TO GET THE JOB DONE. THE LESSON LEARNED IS A REINFORCEMENT OF CURRENT PROCS TO NOT INITIATE THE TAXI CHK UNTIL CONDITIONS WARRANT. FO'S SHOULD NOT CALL FOR ITEMS UNLESS THE CAPT IS IN A POS TO RESPOND. CAPTS SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO RESPOND UNTIL THEY ARE IN A POS TO DO SO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 279340: WE HAD BEGUN THE TAXI CHKLIST AND A MOMENTARY DISTR CAUSED ME TO TAXI THROUGH OUTER AND ENTER 15-20 FT INTO RWY EXIT 29. A DEPARTING 737 FLT INITIATED AN ABORT AS A RESULT.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.