FUEL MISMGMNT.
Synopsis
FUEL MISMGMNT.
Narrative
WHILE IN CRUISE WE BECAME AWARE THAT #2 (CTR) FUEL QUANTITY HAD DECREASED TO 1500 LBS WHILE #1 AND #3 TANKS HAD APPROX 10000 LBS EACH. THIS IS APPROX 6500 LBS BELOW OPERATOR SPECIFIED LIMIT FOR BOEING 727 ACFT. THIS WAS DUE TO #2 TANK PUMPS OVERRIDING #1 AND #3 PUMPS AND XFEEDS LEFT OPEN PER INITIAL FUEL MGMNT PROCS. XFEED VALVES SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLOSED WHEN ALL TANKS INDICATED EQUAL QUANTITY. FUEL MISMGMNT ERROR WAS DETECTED WHEN 1 OF 4 BOOST PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. ALL #2 PUMPS WERE TURNED OFF TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER LOSS OF FUEL FROM #2 TANK. WE CONSULTED WITH CARRIER SYS MAINT CTLR. HE ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NO OPERATIONAL RESTR AND WE PROCEEDED WITH A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WITH THE FUEL PANEL IN THIS CONFIGN. AT BLOCK ARR; #2 TANK STILL INDICATED 1500 LBS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THIS FLT WAS PRECEDED BY MAX DUTY DAYS OF APPROX 15 HRS EACH AND 2 SHORT (LESS THAN 12 HR) LAYOVERS CONTRIBUTING TO CREW FATIGUE AND LESS THAN OPTIMUM ATTN. 2) LACK OF PROCEDURAL CHK (RECENTLY DELETED) TO CALL CREW'S ATTN TO RECONFIGURE FUEL FOR FLT AFTER TKOF. 3) INFREQUENT NECESSITY FOR THIS FUEL MGMNT PROC. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) FEDERAL REGS SHOULD NOT ALLOW CREW MEMBERS TO PERFORM EXCESSIVE (OVER 12 HR) DUTY PERIODS (IN THE ACTUAL OP) CONSECUTIVELY WITHOUT SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY FOR REST (16 HRS MINIMUM). 2) RE-INSTITUTE CHK. 3) EACH CREW MEMBER SHOULD INCREASE VIGILANCE OF FUEL MGMNT.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.