AWOS XMITS INACCURATE WX.

Date: 1995-01 · Aircraft: B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence|other-unspecified

Synopsis

AWOS XMITS INACCURATE WX.

Narrative

ON JAN/XX/95; FLT X; A B727; DEPARTED FROM IAH TO HDN. UPON ARR OVER HDN; AWOS (AUTOMATIC) WX WAS GIVEN AS 20 SCATTERED 30 BROKEN 43 OVCST; WIND FROM 230 DEGS; 16 KTS GUSTING TO 24 KTS; VISIBILITY 10 MI. AN ILS APCH TO RWY 10 WAS BEGUN WITH PLANS TO CIRCLE TO RWY 28 FOR LNDG. AT MINIMUMS WHEN THE MISSED APCH WAS STARTED; CREW REQUESTED FROM HDN PERSONNEL WHAT THE ACTUAL WX WAS. WE WERE THEN TOLD THE WX WAS 300 OVCST; 1/2 MI VISIBILITY IN BLOWING SNOW. THE AWOS WX WAS IN ERROR AND IN FACT WE WERE NOT LEGAL TO BEGIN THIS APCH. AS THE WX WAS NOT IMPROVING; WE DIVERTED TO DEN. IN DEN; WE TALKED TO A DISPATCHER (NOT THE ONE WHO HAD DISPATCHED ACFT) AND HE AGREED WE WERE NOT ONLY ILLEGAL TO DO AN APCH BUT WERE ILLEGAL TO BE DISPATCHED INTO HDN WITH THE PRESENT WX. HAD THIS INCIDENT RESULTED IN AN ACCIDENT; THE INVESTIGATION WOULD HAVE GONE INTO THE GRAY AREA (BLAME THE CREW IF AT ALL POSSIBLE); WHEN IN FACT THE CREW WAS USING THE AWOS WX INFO WHICH WAS IN GROSS ERROR. NO ONE MONITORED OR UPDATED THE AWOS. IT WASN'T UNTIL THE MISSED APCH WAS STARTED THAT THE CREW REALIZED THEY WERE WAY BELOW THE RPTED WX CONDITIONS. WHO IS AT FAULT FOR NOT UPDATING THE AWOS? WHY WAS THERE NO REAL PERSON GIVING ACTUAL WX CONDITIONS AT HDN? ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION A REASON FOR AN ACCIDENT. TRICK IS; CORRECT THE PROB BEFORE THE ACCIDENT!

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.