COMPUTER ANOMALY WITH LNAV IN USE TURNED ACFT OFF COURSE AFTER PASSING WAYPOINT. FLC WAITED TO SEE IF IT WOULD CORRECT AND WHEN IT DID NOT; USED HDG SELECT TO RETURN TO COURSE.
Synopsis
COMPUTER ANOMALY WITH LNAV IN USE TURNED ACFT OFF COURSE AFTER PASSING WAYPOINT. FLC WAITED TO SEE IF IT WOULD CORRECT AND WHEN IT DID NOT; USED HDG SELECT TO RETURN TO COURSE.
Narrative
WE WERE IN CRUISE; AT FL390; AND PASSING LRP. WHEN THE COMPUTER SEQUENCED LRP; THE AUTOPLT BEGAN A TURN TO THE L EVEN THOUGH THE NEXT WAYPOINT WAS ESSENTIALLY STRAIGHT AHEAD. THE PF ALLOWED THE TURN TO CONTINUE FOR A LITTLE TO SEE IF THE COMPUTER/AUTOPLT WOULD CORRECT ITSELF; AND WHEN IT DIDN'T; HE SELECTED A HDG TO RESUME THE PROPER COURSE. CTR INQUIRED; AND I BELATEDLY REALIZED THAT I SHOULD HAVE SAID SOMETHING TO HIM EARLIER. THE COMPUTER DISPLAYED AN ANOMALY EVEN THOUGH THE MAP PRESENTATION WAS ENTIRELY NORMAL. THE COMPUTER ANOMALY WAS THE 'TO' WAYPOINT BEARING WAS 100 DEGS IN ERROR; ALTHOUGH WITH ONE EXCEPTION -- THE ACFT HAD BEEN CORRECTLY SEQUENCING WAYPOINTS. THAT EXCEPTION WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE TURN INITIATION OVER A WAYPOINT DURING THE PRIOR LEG. THAT TIME I IMMEDIATELY SELECTED A HDG; AND EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL THEREAFTER. ON THE GND; I DISCUSSED THE EVENT WITH A MECH WHO CONSULTED ONE OF OUR IN-HOUSE EXPERTS AT COMPANY HEADQUARTERS. AT THEIR DIRECTION WE CYCLED DATA BASES BACK AND FORTH ALTHOUGH EVERYTHING LOOKED NORMAL BEFORE AND AFTERWARD. REALIZE THAT 'TO' WAYPOINTS ARE NOT DISPLAYED ON THE GND. I ALSO CALLED OUR A320 FLEET CAPT/DIRECTOR WHO SAID HE NEVER HEARD OF SUCH A TURN AND 'TO' WAYPOINT BEARING ERROR. HE ASKED US TO CAREFULLY EXAMINE THE DATA BASE DURING THE NEXT LEG TO SEE IF WE COULD FIND ANY ERRORS. ALTHOUGH EVERYTHING LOOKED NORMAL ON THE GND; AFTER TKOF WE REALIZED THE 'TO' WAYPOINT BEARING ERROR WAS STILL WITH US; ALTHOUGH THIS TIME IT WAS 100 DEGS IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. AFTER THE TURN AT LRP; WE NOTICED THAT NOT ONLY THE 'TO' WAYPOINT BEARING WAS IN ERROR; BUT ALL BEARINGS ON THE PROGRESS PAGE WERE ALSO IN ERROR. I WROTE IT UP AT THE NEXT STOP AND THE MECH (WHO HAD NEVER HEARD OF THIS PROB) CLRED IT BY RESETTING THE IRU'S. NO ONE SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND THE ANOMALY; BUT THEY SAY THEY'LL DISCUSS IT WITH THE MANUFACTURER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS A320 CAPT WITH 6 MONTHS EXPERIENCE ON THE ACFT HAD SIT WITH COMPUTER ANOMALY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN EXPERIENCED BEFORE OR AFTER. THE PROB WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF MAINT TECHNICIANS AS WELL AS THE FLEET CAPT. DATA BASE ERROR WAS SUSPECT; BUT CHKING ALL DATA BASES FOUND NO ERRORS. WHY DID THIS ISOLATED INCIDENT OCCUR WHEN SUBSEQUENT FLTS DID NOT HAVE THE ANOMALY? THE LASER GYROSCOPE INERTIAL REF SYS PROVIDES ATTITUDE; FLT PATH VECTOR; HDG; TRACK; ACCELERATION; GND SPD AND AIRPLANE POS. THE INERTIAL REF SYS DOES NOT NAV; RATHER IT PROVIDES INERTIAL POS INPUT TO THE FLT MGMNT AND GUIDANCE SYS. AFTER INITIAL PWR UP OF THE ADIRS PRESENT POS; LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE MUST BE ENTERED CORRECTLY DURING THE ALIGNMENT PROCESS PRIOR TO EACH FLT. IF THE FLC FAILED TO ENTER THE CORRECT LATITUDE/LONGITUDE; IT WOULD EXPLAIN SUBSEQUENT BEARING ERRORS. THE RPTR CAPT MENTIONED ANOTHER ANOMALY THE ACR HAD WITH THE A320 -- THAT THE AILERON HAD UNEXPLAINED JERKS OR TWITCHES BORDERING ON UNCOMMANDED ROLL. IT WAS DETERMINED TO BE CAUSED BY A RHEOSTAT IN THE SIDESTICK. CHANGING THE SOFTWARE APPEARS TO HAVE CORRECTED THE PROB.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.