ACFT EQUIP PROB. HIGH OIL TEMP ENG SHUTDOWN FAULTY ECAM ACTION.

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HIGH OIL TEMP INDICATION. DECLARED EMER; SHUT DOWN ENG; DIVERTED TO CLE. PROB CAUSED BY CORROSION IN CANNON PLUG OR POSSIBLE WIRE BUNDLE CHAFING. 2 MAN CREW VERY BUSY. WE FOLLOWED ECAM PROC. ECAM SAID NOTHING ABOUT ANALYZING ANY OTHER INDICATIONS; SUCH AS IDG OIL TEMP TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF WARNING. IF IT HAD WE MAY NOT HAVE HAD TO SHUT ENG DOWN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD EXTENSIVE COM WITH HIS ACR TRAINING DEPT CONCERNING THIS ENG OIL HIGH TEMP. THE ECAM (ELECTRONIC CENTRALIZED ACFT MONITORING) ACTION STATES; 'THRUST LEVER IDLE; ENG MASTER SWITCH OFF.' THEN; THE TRAINING PROC CALLS FOR GOING TO THE COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL FOR FOLLOW UP ACTION. THE MANUAL HAS A NOTE THAT STATES; 'IF THIS WARNING IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY OTHER ENG OIL WARNING AND IF THE IDG OIL OUTLET TEMP ON THE ECAM ELEC PAGE IS COOLER THAN THE ENG OIL TEMP; DISREGARD THIS WARNING. (FAULTY SENSOR SUSPECTED.) CONTINUE TO MONITOR ENG OP.' SO; BY FOLLOWING ECAM ACTION AND SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG; AND THEN FINDING IN THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL THAT A SHUTDOWN MAY NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY; RAISES SOME SERIOUS QUESTIONS. THE RPTR'S TRAINING DEPT SAYS THAT; THOUGH THE ECAM ACTION IS NOT COMPLETE; IE; ADDING A NOTE ABOUT THE IDG OIL TEMP; WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL BY BOTH AIRBUS AND THE FAA WHICH IS UNLIKELY. BUT; AS THE RPTR SAYS; WHY EXPOSE THE PAX AND FLC TO AN EMER SHUTDOWN; DIVERSION AND ASSOCIATED RISKS FROM AN ENG OUT; WHEN IT IS NOT NECESSARY? RPTR ASKS ASRS TO CONTACT HIS TRAINING DEPT; BUT WAS ADVISED THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF ASRS ANONYMITY GUARANTEE; ETC.