MISCOM BTWN ATC APCH CTLR AND FLC ON APCH CLRNC. FLC DIDN'T SEE OTHER ACFT ON FINAL APCH UNTIL TWR ALERTED THEM TO IT AND GAVE VECTORS TO BRING ACFT BACK TO THE APPROPRIATE RWY.
Synopsis
MISCOM BTWN ATC APCH CTLR AND FLC ON APCH CLRNC. FLC DIDN'T SEE OTHER ACFT ON FINAL APCH UNTIL TWR ALERTED THEM TO IT AND GAVE VECTORS TO BRING ACFT BACK TO THE APPROPRIATE RWY.
Narrative
FLT AB; OF WHICH I WAS PIC; WAS BEING VECTORED BY MSP APCH FOR AN EXPECTED VISUAL TO RWY 29L AT MSP. THE CTLR VECTORED US ONTO A DSNDING L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 29L WHICH CONTINUED SOME 12-13 MI BEYOND THE ARPT. WE WERE THEN TURNED BY APCH (L TURN) TO A HDG OF 040 DEGS AT 4000 FT MSL; AS OUR L BASE. WHILE FLYING BASE; THE CTLR TOLD US TO CONTACT MSP TWR; WITHOUT CLRING US FOR EITHER THE VISUAL OR ILS FOR RWY 29L. WE THEREFORE MAINTAINED OUR ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT. 3 ATTEMPTS BY THE FO TO CONTACT THE TWR WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. I THEN TOOK THE RADIO AND ASKED TWR IF AB WAS CLRED TO JOIN THE RWY 29L LOC. AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE; THE TWR ANSWERED YES. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TWR ORDERED US TO TURN L HDG 270 DEGS TO AVOID TFC AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK (AN ACR JETSTREAM; I BELIEVE) WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED ON FINAL FOR RWY 29R. AFTER COMPLETING OUR TURN TO 270 DEGS; THE TWR CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 29L; AND THE LNDG PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY THEREAFTER. UPON CALLING THE APCH CTL SUPVR; I LEARNED THAT A TRAINEE CTLR HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO DUTY ON THAT SCOPE. THE TRAINEE SUGGESTED THAT HE DID NOT TELL US TO CONTACT TWR ON BASE. OUR CREW BELIEVES HE DID. A REVIEW OF THE AUDIO TAPES WILL SETTLE THAT MATTER. NONETHELESS; WE AS A CREW; MIGHT HAVE DONE SOME THINGS DIFFERENTLY TO PREVENT SUCH A CLOSE MIDAIR ENCOUNTER. THIS WAS MY VERY FIRST DAY AS CAPT. I HAD BRIEFED THE CREW TO THIS FACT; AND REQUESTED THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO ASSIST ME. THEY DID AS MUCH; BUT NONE OF US SAW THE CONFLICTING TFC UNTIL WE WERE ADVISED BY TWR. MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON MY HDG; ALT; AIRSPD; THE LACK OF TWR RESPONSE ON RADIO; AND ON THE RWY ITSELF; WHICH WAS ABOUT TO SLIDE BEHIND US IF WE WEREN'T CLRED FOR AN APCH. ALL OF US SHOULD HAVE PAID MORE ATTN TO POSSIBLE CONFLICTS APCHING FROM OUR R; ESPECIALLY BECAUSE WE WERE AWARE OF SIMULTANEOUS APCHS OCCURRING ON RWY 29R. IN FOCUSING ON OUR ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN PRECISE AND PROPER PROCS; WE NEGLECTED TO SEE AND AVOID! POSTSCRIPT: ON THE MORNING OF DEC/XX/95; I CONSULTED WITH ATC QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MSP. I WAS INFORMED THAT A REVIEW OF ATC AUDIO TAPES SHOWS THAT WHEN AN ACR X FLT WAS SWITCHED TO MSP TWR; WE ANSWERED; AND APPARENTLY SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ PREMATURELY. THIS THEN LED TO THE DELAY IN TWR'S RESPONSE TO OUR CALLS. THIS INFO SERVES TO POINT OUT THE NEED FOR STRICT RADIO VIGILANCE; ESPECIALLY DURING PERIODS OF HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOADS (EG; TKOF; APCH; AND LNDG). ALL THREE OF US WOULD HAVE SWORN THAT WE WERE PASSED TO TWR. I BELIEVE THIS IS THE RESULT OF OUR EXPECTING TO BE PASSED TO TWR DURING THE BASE LEG TO RWY 29L. IN FACT THE ROUTINE NATURE OF THE FLT UP TO THAT POINT; AND GOOD WX PREVAILING AT MSP; MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A FALSE SENSE OF NORMALCY; AND HELPED LULL THE CREW INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. ONCE AGAIN; A FOCUS ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 'SEE AND AVOID;' AND THE MAINT OF STRICT RADIO VIGILANCE WOULD HAVE SERVED TO PREVENT BOTH THIS; AND FUTURE OCCURRENCES OF THIS NATURE.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.