FLC OF AN LGT EXTENDED THE TKOF DISTANCE WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED ON THE TKOF ROLL THE ACFT WOULD NOT FLY AT THE SPDS CALCULATED BY THE WT AND BAL NUMBERS PROVIDED.

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UPON APPLICATION OF PWR FOR TKOF THE EPR'S WERE CHKED AT 1.4 FOR CONFIRMATION OF THE SURGE BLEED VALVES CLOSING ON ALL 3 ENGS. THE VALVES CLOSED NORMALLY. PWR WAS THEN ADVANCED FOR TKOF. NORMAL ACCELERATION OCCURRED UP TO V1; AND VR. AT VR THE CALL FOR 'ROTATE' WAS GIVEN AND AT THAT TIME THE ACFT WAS ROTATED; ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WOULD NOT FLY. THIS CONTINUED UNTIL THE CAPT SAID TO LEAVE NOSE ON GND UNTIL SPD INCREASE SLIGHTLY AND THEN ROTATE 3 DEGS SO AS TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO FLY WHEN ABLE. THIS TKOF WAS NOT A STANDARD TKOF DUE TO (WHAT WE THE FLC MEMBERS BELIEVE) EXCESSIVE BAGGAGE (WT) LOADED IN CARGO COMPARTMENT WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE AND ULTIMATELY RENDERING OUR TKOF CALCULATION UNUSABLE. WE UTILIZED ALL OF THE REMAINING RWY BEYOND VR IN ORDER TO GET THIS ACFT AIRBORNE. ANY SUCH ACTION REGARDING AN ABORT BEYOND V1 WOULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS. THE CAPT'S INVALUABLE EXPERIENCE ON THE B727 AND GUIDANCE REGARDING THE FO'S FLYING THE ACFT PROVED TO BE THE ONLY INGREDIENT WHICH PREVENTED ANY MISHAP. AGAIN; THE USE OF RWY 22R'S FULL LENGTH FOR TKOF WAS THE GND CREW'S INACCURATE HANDLING AND ACCOUNTING OF WT THEY LOADED ONTO THIS ACFT. WE THE CREW RECEIVED INACCURATE WT COUNTS WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DISASTER.