SO RPT REGARDING ENG SHUTOFF SWITCH ACCIDENTALLY MOVED TO THE CLOSED POS CAUSING ENG FAILURE.

Date: 1996-07 · Aircraft: B727-200

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical

Synopsis

SO RPT REGARDING ENG SHUTOFF SWITCH ACCIDENTALLY MOVED TO THE CLOSED POS CAUSING ENG FAILURE.

Narrative

AFTER TKOF PASSING 2500 FT; CLEAN CONFIGN; WE EXPERIENCED A #1 ENG FAILURE. AFTER IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS WERE COMPLETE; WE COMPLETED THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. DURING THE CHKLIST WHEN WE GOT TO #1 ENG SHUTOFF SWITCH IT WAS ALREADY IN THE CLOSED POS. I DON'T REMEMBER BUMPING THE SWITCH BUT; IT WAS DEFINITELY IN THE CLOSED POS. I COULD HAVE ACCIDENTLY HIT IT WHILE INITIATING XFEED; I DON'T KNOW. SINCE WE HAD NORMAL WINDMILLING INDICATIONS WE TERMINATED THE FUEL DUMP AND INITIATED THE INFLT RESTART CHKLIST. A NORMAL RESTART WAS COMPLETED AND AFTER CONSULTING WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT; A NORMAL FLT TO DEST WAS COMPLETED. A POSTFLT MAINT INSPECTION REVEALED NO DAMAGE OR PROB WITH THE #1 ENG. CONCLUSION: THE ENG SHUTOFF SWITCHES ARE GUARDED SWITCHES; YET THIS IS PROOF THAT A GUARD IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH. AS WITH OTHER AIRLINES; THE SWITCHES SHOULD BE DRILLED AND SAFETY WIRED AS WELL AS GUARDED. THIS WOULD PREVENT A MORE SERIOUS PROB NEXT TIME. DURING PREFLT THE SWITCHES ARE NOT CHKED IN THE OFF POS SO; THE ONLY NEED IS TO ENSURE THEY STAY OPEN UNTIL AN EMER NECESSITATES THEM BEING CLOSED -- THE SAFETY WIRE/GUARD COMBINATION WORKS WELL FOR OTHER AIRLINES.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.