B727 ACFT ON COUPLED APCH; FO FLYING; APPEARED AUTOPLT NOT TRACKING LOC ACCURATELY SO AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED WHICH ALSO DISCONNECTED FOR DIRECTORS. UPON RE-ENGAGING AUTOPLT AND FLT DIRECTORS; FO FLT DIRECTOR WAS INACCURATE. CAPT TOOK OVER FLYING THE ACFT DOWN TO LNDG; BUT FLC FORGOT TO GET LNDG CLRNC FROM THE TWR. OTHER DISTRS WERE A NEW FE GETTING IOE AND THE CHK INSTRUCTOR TALKING DURING CRITICAL APCH PHASE.

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THIS EVENT OCCURRED IN THE APCH/LNDG PHASE OF SWF AT APPROX XA50 LCL. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT ON A COUPLED APCH TO RWY 9. AS WE APCHED THE FINAL APCH FIX; IT APPEARED THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT PROPERLY TRACKING THE LOC AND GS SO THE AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED BY THE FO AT THE TIME THAT APCH CTL HANDED US OFF TO TWR. THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT BUTTON ALSO DISENGAGES BOTH FLT DIRECTORS. I RE-ENGAGED BOTH FLT DIRECTORS BUT THE FO'S FLT DIRECTOR WAS NOT GIVING PROPER COMMANDS AND AT ABOUT 800 FT AGL I ELECTED TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY; OTHER THAN NOT HAVING CONTACTED SWF TWR. ON THE LNDG ROLL SWF TWR ASKED IF WE WERE ON THE GND. THE RESPONSE; OF COURSE; BEING AFFIRMATIVE; ALONG WITH THE AWARENESS THAT WE HAD NOT CONTACTED THE TWR. THIS SIT WAS A RESULT OF VERY HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOAD AT APCH/CTL TO TWR HDOF TIME WHICH WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN AUTOPLT AND FLT DIRECTOR MALFUNCTION -- SLOW TO INTERCEPT; AND TRACK THE LOC AND GS. THE SIT WAS FURTHER EXACERBATED BY A TRAINING ENVIRONMENT -- NEW FLT ENGINEER GETTING IOE; AND A CHK ENGINEER WHO SOLICITED UNINTELLIGIBLE INPUT DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT OPERATING AT SWF DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME.