FLC OF B727 HAS LONG TKOF ROLL LATER FOUND TO BE CAUSED BY THE ANTI-ICE VALVES BEING OPEN DURING TKOF. THEY BARELY MADE IT ABOVE THE TREES AT THE RWY END. NEW HIRE SO LEFT VALVES OPEN AT PREFLT.

Date: 1997-07 · Aircraft: B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model · Phase: takeoff

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|other-unspecified

Synopsis

FLC OF B727 HAS LONG TKOF ROLL LATER FOUND TO BE CAUSED BY THE ANTI-ICE VALVES BEING OPEN DURING TKOF. THEY BARELY MADE IT ABOVE THE TREES AT THE RWY END. NEW HIRE SO LEFT VALVES OPEN AT PREFLT.

Narrative

CREW ELECTED A FLAPS 5 DEGS TKOF AT REDUCED THRUST. PERFORMANCE NUMBERS INDICATED PLENTY OF 'PAD' AND CREW FELT COMFORTABLE WITH MARGIN. TKOF ROLL PROVED EXTREMELY LONG; WITH 'V1; VR' CALLOUTS OCCURRING UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE TO RWY END. NORMAL ROTATION; NORMAL GEAR RETRACTION; BUT ACFT SEEMED TO BARELY CLR TREES AT END OF RWY. LATER; IN FLT; ENG ANTI-ICE WAS CALLED FOR; AT WHICH POINT IT WAS DISCOVERED THE ANTI-ICE VALVES WERE ALREADY OPEN; THUS ACCOUNTING FOR POOR TKOF PERFORMANCE. THE NEW HIRE SO HAD LEFT VALVES OPEN ON ORIGINATION PREFLT; AT DULLES INTL ARPT. ALL 3 PLTS (ON FIRST LEG FROM DULLES; AND SECOND LEG FROM HARRISBURG). MISSED THE 'OPEN' POS OF VALVES ON PRE- AND POSTFLT CHKLISTS. ATTRIBUTE PART OF THIS TO POOR DESIGN OF SWITCHES (WHEREIN NO LIGHTS COME ON TO INDICATE VALVE POS; UNLESS A ROTARY SWITCH IS SELECTED TO 'ON;' AND THEN THE LIGHT ONLY INDICATES FULL OPEN OR FULL CLOSED). OBVIOUSLY; MOST OF THE BLAME LIES WITH THE CREW; SEEING WHAT WE EXPECTED TO SEE. POOR CRM IS ALSO PARTLY TO BLAME. HAVING FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ONCE BEFORE; AND HAVING BEEN ACTUALLY YELLED AT FOR ASKING FOR AN APCH BRIEF DURING A PERIOD OF MICROBURST ALERT; I WAS WARY OF PUSHING (OR EVEN ASKING) FOR ANY GUIDANCE. IN SELECTING THE FLAPS 5 DEGS OPTION; I SOLICITED THE CAPT'S INPUT. ALL HE SAID WAS; 'A TAILSKID STRIKE WILL MEAN MORE THAN JUST 30 DAYS OFF...YOU'LL GO BACK FOR RETRAINING.' AS TAILSKID STRIKES ARE USUALLY DUE TO POOR PLT TECHNIQUE; I TOOK HIS RESPONSE AS A NON RESPONSE. ADDITIONALLY; ON TKOF ROLL; WHEN THE AIRSPD DIDN'T ACCELERATE AS IT SHOULD; BELIEVE POOR CRM/CLR CONTRIBUTED TO LACK OF CORRECTIVE RESPONSE. AS THE THROTTLES BELONG TO THE CAPT; I BELIEVED HE FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE TKOF PERFORMANCE. STILL; I WAS NOT. BUT I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING (SUCH AS 'SET MAX THRUST') AND I ATTRIBUTE THIS TO MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH THIS CAPT. PREVIOUSLY; HE SAID I MADE HIM FEEL I QUESTIONED HIS JUDGEMENT AND (BY ASKING FOR THE MICROBURST BRIEFING) I ACTED LIKE I WAS THE INSTRUCTOR AND HE THE STUDENT. SO; I WAS EXTREMELY HESITANT TO OPENLY QUESTION HIS JUDGEMENT OR APPEAR TO CHALLENGE HIS AUTH. WHAT DID I LEARN? WHO CARES ABOUT EGO WHEN SAFETY IS COMPROMISED. AND; TOUCH THE SWITCHES TO VERIFY POS (AND ADVOCATE; ADVOCATE; ADVOCATE!).

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.