A B727-200 FREIGHTER CREW EXPERIENCES AN ALT EXCURSION WHEN THE FO STARTS A DSCNT FROM HABIT AND AN EXPECTED CLRNC. THE FLC NOTES THIS AFTER 400 FT OF DSCNT.

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THE 6TH EVENING OF A 7 DAY TRIP BEGAN WITH A RE-RTE DLH- IND-MEM IN LIEU OF THE SCHEDULED DLH-MEM; RESULTING IN THE MEM HUB TURN BEING SHORTENED FROM 3 1/2 HRS TO 1 1/2 HRS. AFTER THE HUB TURN; ON THE WAY TO GRR; THE EVENT OCCURRED DURING CRUISE AT APPROX XA10 ON THE SCHEDULED MEM-GRR LEG (AFTER THE HUB TURN) WITH THE FO AS PF. THROUGHOUT THE WK A ROUTINE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED OF INITIATING THE DSCNT APPROX 70-75 DME OUT AFTER RECEIVING ATC CLRNC TO DSND AT PLT'S DISCRETION AT LEAST 30 MI PRIOR. HYPNOTIZED BY THE ROUTINE (NO EXCUSE); THE PF INITIATED AN UNCOORDINATED DSCNT FROM FL330 AT 65 DME FROM GRR. BOTH THE PF (FO) AND PNF (CAPT) WERE INITIALLY DISTRACTED BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE A REPEAT OF A PREVIOUSLY NOTED AUTOPLT PITCH KNOB WRITE-UP. THE PNF REALIZED WE HAD BEGUN DSCNT WITHOUT ATC CLRNC AS HE MADE THE REQUIRED DSCNT RADIO CALL AT 32600 FT. I WAS THE SO ON THIS WK LONG TRIP. AS PER OUR PROCS I STAY ON THE COM RADIOS AS BACK-UP EXCEPT WHEN I NEED TO GET ATIS; MAKE THE TKOF/LNDG DATA CARD AND CALL IN-RANGE TO OUR STATION. I WAS OFF THE RADIO AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE; PERFORMING MY DUTIES TO CALL THE STATION PRIOR TO OUR DSCNT. AS I RETURNED WITH THE CREW; I NOTED THAT THEY WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY CLICKING OFF THE AUTOPLT; LEVELING OFF; TALKING TO ATC; AND THEN CONTINUING WITH THE DSCNT WITH A CLRNC. AFTER IT WAS UNDER CTL; THEY EXPLAINED TO ME THEY HAD BEGUN TO DSND; AND WHEN THE CAPT CALLED IN THE ALT LEAVING; FOR THE NEW ALT; HE REALIZED WE HAD NO NEW ALT TO GO TO. THE ATC CTLR RESPONDED WITH A CLRNC TO DSND TO 11000 FT. ALTHOUGH THE PF (FO) SAYS HE ACCEPTS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DSCNT WITHOUT A CLRNC; I WILL TRY TO ACCOMPLISH ALL MY DUTIES A LITTLE SOONER; IF POSSIBLE. (SOMETIMES OUR RADIOS DON'T PICK UP COM WITH THE STATION THAT FAR OUT.) I ALSO WILL NOT ALWAYS ASSUME THAT THE CREW IS FULLY ALERT; AS OUR FLYING HRS ARE AT PHYSIOLOGICALLY DIFFICULT TIMES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 402665: CALLED ZAU AS BEING 'OUT OF FL330.' AS IS MY HABIT I GLANCED UP AT THE ALT ALERTER AFTER MAKING THE CALL AND SAW FL330 SET. I REALIZED AT THIS POINT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED TO DSND. SO WE IMMEDIATELY KICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND CLBED BACK TO FL330. WE HAD DSNDED APPROX 400 FT AT THE POINT OF CORRECTING. ALTHOUGH A 5-6 HR STINT IN THE COCKPIT DOESN'T SEEM BAD TO THE UNINITIATED; WORKING ON THE 'BACKSIDE' OF THE CLOCK IS DELETERIOUS TO NORMAL XCHKING AND FLOWS. AS COMPANIES FLYING AT NIGHT PUSH HARDER TO 'OPTIMIZE' THE EFFICIENCY OF THE FLT SCHEDULES; THEY DO NOT FACTOR IN ANY COMPENSATION FOR THE BIOLOGICAL CLOCKS OF THE CREWS. 10 HR LAYOVERS; WITH DEBRIEF; SHUTTLE TIMES; HOTEL CHK IN; BODILY FUNCTIONS; EATING AND STRESS/FORCED SLEEP CYCLES; ARE A TICKET TO MORE MISTAKES IN THE COCKPIT. 10 HR LAYOVER EQUATES TO MAYBE 5-6 HRS OF SLEEP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 402847: ALTHOUGH FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR INITIATING A DSCNT WITHOUT CLRNC. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL ESTABLISH A ROUTINE OF XCHKING THE ALT SELECTOR IN ADDITION TO COORDINATING WITH THE PNF PRIOR TO INITIATING ANY DSCNT.