PREFLT DISTR IN COCKPIT CONTRIBUTED TO MULTIPLE PROGRAMMING AND COCKPIT SETUP ERRORS.

Date: 1998-12 · Aircraft: A320 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|other-unspecified

Synopsis

PREFLT DISTR IN COCKPIT CONTRIBUTED TO MULTIPLE PROGRAMMING AND COCKPIT SETUP ERRORS.

Narrative

WHILE PROGRAMMING THE FMGC FOR OUR DEP OUT OF REAGAN NATIONAL ARPT; DC; WE WERE BOARDED BY AN FAA INSPECTOR CONDUCTING A ROUTINE CHK ON HIS WAY OUT TO SFO. THE INDIVIDUAL TALKED CONSIDERABLY DURING OUR PREFLT DUTIES; THUS CAUSING DISTR TO BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF. THIS MANIFESTED ITSELF IN THE FOLLOWING: ON THE CAPT'S INITIAL SETUP FLOW; HE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PWR XFER UNIT FOR THE 2 INDEPENDENT HYD SYS WAS NOT IN THE ARMED POS. WE BOTH FAILED TO NOTICE THAT OUR #2 VOR CIRCUIT BREAKER HAD POPPED AFTER OUR INITIAL VOR CHK. WHEN OUR FINAL WTS HAD BEEN VERIFIED; I ENTERED THE CALCULATED GROSS WT WHERE I SHOULD HAVE ONLY ENTERED THE NEW ZERO FUEL WT. THIS RESULTED IN A COMPUTER GENERATED GROSS WT OF OVER 15000 LBS ABOVE OUR ACTUAL GROSS WT. ONCE THE PTU WAS NOTICED TO BE UNARMED IT WAS QUICKLY PLACED IN THE ARMED POS. UNLIKE THE B757/767 THE PTU BEING DISARMED IS NOT AS BIG OF A DEAL. IN FACT; IT CAN BE DISPATCHED THAT WAY SINCE SHOULD A HYD SIT ARISE; OUR ENG AND SYS MONITORING COMPUTER (ECAM) WOULD DIRECT US TO SIMPLY TURN IT ON. ONCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE #2 VOR WAS OTS; WE QUICKLY INFORMED THE CTLING ATC AGENCY IN COMPLIANCE WITH FARS OF OUR DOWNGRADED NAV CAPABILITY. HOWEVER; THIS DID NOT AFFECT OUR FLT SINCE WE WERE NAVING OFF OF THE IRU- DME SYS. NOR WOULD IT HAVE PREVENTED US FROM MAKING ANY APCH INCLUDING A CAT III AUTOLAND. THE GROSS WT ERROR WOULD NOT AND DID NOT AFFECT SAFETY OF FLT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THRUST REQUIRED FOR TKOF IS NOT BASED ON ACFT GROSS WT BUT ON OUTSIDE AIR CONDITIONS. MAX TKOF THRUST WAS USED ANYWAY. 2) V SPDS ARE MANUALLY DERIVED AND MANUALLY INSERTED INTO THE FMGC. THE COMPUTER CANNOT NOR WOULD NOT CHANGE; ENTER; OR MODIFY THE V SPDS. OUR V SPDS WERE BASED ON THE CORRECT GROSS WT. 3) OUR FLAP SETTING WAS DERIVED FOR DATA THAT WAS OBTAINED USING THE CORRECT GROSS WT BEFORE THE PROGRAMMING ERROR OCCURRED. REGARDLESS; ALMOST EVERY A320 DEP FROM DCA REQUIRES A FLAPS 3 DEG TKOF -- ANY OTHER SUGGESTION WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND UNDOUBTEDLY DISCOVERY OF THE PROB. IN CLOSING; A MORE WITHDRAWN AND QUIET APCH BY FAA JUMP SEATERS WOULD HELP IN ELIMINATING DISTRS.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.