AN ACR B727 CREW HAS A FLT CANCELLATION DUE TO A #3 GENERATOR FAILURE; BUT LATER THE FLT IS DISPATCHED UNDER THE SAME FLT NUMBER AND DEPARTS WITH 1 LESS FLT ATTENDANT THAN THE MINIMUM REQUIRED; BUT WITH NO PAX. THIS WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE OPS SPECS AND THE OPS MANUAL.

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WE WERE ORIGINALLY DISPATCHED AS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED REVENUE FLT WITH APPROX 56 PAX AND A FLT ATTENDANT CREW OF 3; AND SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XA11. AFTER EXTENSIVE DEICE AND ANTI-ICE PREFLT PREPARATION; THE PAX WERE BOARDED AND THE ACFT ENGS WERE STARTED AT THE GATE DUE TO APU AIR AND ELECTRIC BEING INOP. ENG START WAS AROUND XA41. WHEN #3 ENG WAS STARTED; THE #3 GENERATOR FAILED WITH A DIFFERENTIAL FAULT. MAINT BOARDED; AND AFTER DIAGNOSING THE PROB; THE REPAIRS WERE FINAL AROUND XE25; PENDING PAPERWORK. ALL THE CREW EXCEPT 1 FLT ATTENDANT HAD RETURNED TO CHK THE STATUS OF THE FLT AT XE15. I; AS CAPT; BEGAN REQUESTING A NEW RELEASE; AND ASKED THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS TO LOCATE THE ONE WHO HAD NOT YET RETURNED. IN STATION OPS; THE CLERK TOLD ME THAT WE WOULD BE TAKING CARGO BUT NO PAX. THE FLT HAD BEEN CANCELED AND WE COULD NOT TAKE PAX; AND ONLY CARGO. AFTER RETURNING TO THE ACFT; I LEARNED FROM ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT THE THIRD FLT ATTENDANT WAS STILL MISSING. I IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE STATION PERSONNEL THAT 1 CABIN CREW MEMBER WAS NOT YET AT THE ACFT. AT ABOUT XE45; I BEGAN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CREW MEMBER MIGHT NOT RETURN WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME; AND CHKED MY OPS MANUAL TO VERIFY THE REQUIRED FLT ATTENDANT COMPLEMENT. THE MANUAL STATED THAT 'A MINIMUM NUMBER OF 3 FLT ATTENDANTS IS REQUIRED ON EACH TYPE (B727) ACFT DURING PAX OPS.' A NOTE REF ON THE NEXT PAGE STATES 'FOR EQUIP POSITIONING FERRIES; NON REVENUE PAX MAY BE CARRIED SUBJECT TO STANDING AUTH BY THE FLT OPS DIVISION. FLT ATTENDANTS ARE NOT REQUIRED IF 19 OR LESS SUCH PAX ARE CARRIED.' THEREFORE; AFTER READING THE PREVIOUS STATEMENTS; I UNDERSTOOD THE LITERAL MEANING TO BE NO FLT ATTENDANTS IN ANY NUMBER WERE REQUIRED FOR THE FLT; AND RELATED MY FINDINGS MINS LATER TO BOTH THE OTHER 2 COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS AND BOTH THE FLT ATTENDANTS WHO WERE PRESENT. THE SO HAD TAKEN THE TIME TO CHK THE ROUTING OF OUR AIRPLANE AFTER IAH AND FOUND THE AIRPLANE WAS NEEDED THERE SOON AFTER OUR PROPOSED ARR FOR A FLT TO DEN. I THEN CONVEYED MY INTENT TO THE STATION THAT I WOULD PLAN TO PROCEED WITHOUT THE THIRD FLT ATTENDANT IF HE WAS NOT TO APPEAR FOR DUTY AT THE TIME OF DEP. WE WAITED LONG ENOUGH TO FULLY DE-ICE THE ACFT AGAIN AND I MADE THE DECISION TO DEPART WITHOUT THE THIRD FLT ATTENDANT. BASED UPON THE SEEMINGLY STRAIGHTFORWARD TEXT OF THE OPS MANUAL; THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT WE WERE LEGAL TO PROCEED; SINCE THE FLT HAD ALL THE APPEARANCES TO ME OF A REPOSITIONING FERRY WITHOUT PAX. UPON GATE ARR AT XH35 IN IAH; THE FLT WAS MET BY THE HOUSTON BASE B727 CHIEF PLT WHO HAD RETRIEVED ERRONEOUS INFO FROM THE SYS COMPUTER SHOWING 56 PAX ABOARD. HE SEEMED RELIEVED TO FIND THAT HIS DATA WAS IN ERROR; AND I EXPLAINED THE REASON FOR LEAVING ORD WITHOUT ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS; AND HE BID US FAREWELL TO OUR LAYOVER HOTEL. IT WAS NOT UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY FROM MY HOTEL ROOM WHEN I CALLED SYS CTL TO NOTIFY CREW SCHEDULING OF A POSSIBLE RE-CREW THAT I WAS TOLD THERE MIGHT BE A BREACH OF THE OPS SPECS AND A LIKELY FAA VIOLATION FOR FLT WITH ONLY 2 FLT ATTENDANTS. I WAS TOLD THAT THE FLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED AS A FERRY FLT PREDICATED ON HAVING LESS THAN 3 FLT ATTENDANTS. I RELATED MY DEPENDENCE UPON THE OPS MANUAL PAGES AS REF AND THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY FURTHER REQUIREMENT; AND WAS TOLD THAT I 'MISINTERPED' THE SPECS. IT TOOK ME ALMOST AN HR TO FIND ANY OTHER REF TO THIS PARTICULAR SIT. A PARTIAL REF WAS FOUND UNDER NON SCHEDULED OPS; AND A MORE DETAILED REF WAS UNDER NUMERICAL DESIGNATION OF FLTS. HOWEVER; NONE OF THESE REFS APPLIED EXACTLY TO THE SIT ON THIS FLT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: A LATE REALIZATION THAT THE CREW MEMBER WAS REALLY NOT GOING TO SHOW UP FOR DUTY PLACED A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF PRESSURE ON MY MAKING A SHORT-TERM DECISION. THERE WAS NO WARNING NOTE IN THE OPS MANUAL LEADING THE READER TO POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS OF WHAT APPEARED AS A VERY SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD VERBIAGE. UPON LATER FINDING THOSE EXCEPTIONS POSTFLT; THEY WERE NUMEROUS AND COMPLEX. THERE WAS EFFECTIVELY NO 'SMOKING GUN' TO SUGGEST THAT I OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COUNCIL FROM THE FLT DISPATCHER. THE NEED OF GETTING THE EQUIP BACK INTO REVENUE SVC WAS ALSO CREATING PRESSURE FOR MAKING A TIMELY DECISION. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: MY COM WITH DISPATCHES HAS USUALLY BEEN QUITE OPEN AND RESPONSIVE TO SUGGESTIONS AND ADVICE. ALTHOUGH THE OPS SPECS REF TO WHICH I REFERRED IN THIS INSTANCE GAVE NO WARNING ALERTING ME TO POSSIBLE FURTHER RESTRS; I HAVE LEARNED TO ERR MORE TO THE SIDE OF ENCOURAGING THE DISPATCHER TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE PART IN MY DECISION-MAKING OF FUTURE FLTS; EVEN WHEN IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE REQUIRED. IMPORTANT REF DOCUMENTS SUCH AS OUR FLT OPS MANUAL SHOULD BE INDEXED WITH ADDITIONAL CARE. THE SECTIONS REFED ABOVE SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND AMENDED SO AS TO LEAD THE READER IN AREAS OF EXPANDED REF; AND LEAVE NO DEAD-ENDS. WHENEVER SYS CTL AND THE STATION MGR ARRANGE TO CANCEL A FLT FOR PAX BOARDING PURPOSES; THE INTENDED TYPE OR STATUS OF THE FLT SHOULD BE CLRLY COMMUNICATED TO THE CAPT; BY WHATEVER MEANS IS READILY AVAILABLE; SO AS TO REMOVE ANY RESULTING AMBIGUITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT SAID THAT HE DID NOT CALL THE DISPATCHER WHILE HE WAS CONSULTING THE OPS PERSONNEL AND HIS OPS MANUAL BECAUSE HE AND THE DISPATCHER HAD ALREADY ARGUED ABOUT HIS DECISION TO HAVE THE GENERATOR REPLACED BEFORE DEPARTING. HE LATER DISCOVERED THAT THE OPS PERSONNEL CONVINCED THE DISPATCHER THAT THE FLT WAS NOT; IN FACT; CANCELED AND COULD THEREFORE BE SHOWN AS A FLT COMPLETION FOR FAA RECORD KEEPING PURPOSES. HOWEVER; IF THE FLT WAS OPERATED UNDER ITS OLD NUMBER AND NOT SHOWN AS A POSITIONING OR A MAINT FERRY THEN ALL OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE REQUIRED TO BE ON BOARD REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO PAX. THE DISPATCHER WAS APPARENTLY UNAWARE THAT THERE WERE NO PAX SINCE THE CHIEF PLT'S INFO WAS THAT THE PAX WERE STILL ON BOARD. THE RPTR'S COMPANY HAS DECIDED TO NOT XREF THE OPS MANUAL OR ISSUE A BULLETIN CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT AT THIS TIME. THE CAPT IS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE THE XREFING DONE WHEN THE NEXT ANNUAL ISSUE FLT OP MANUAL IS PUBLISHED. THE CAPT WAS REQUIRED BY THE CHIEF PLT TO BE LINE CHKED BY THE TRAINING DEPT.