ACR FLC LANDS WITH TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS; RESULTING IN LONG LNDG AND ROLLOUT; EXACERBATED BY RUBBER DEPOSITS ON RWY.

Date: 1999-05 · Aircraft: A320 · Phase: landing

Anomalies: inflight-event-encounter-unstabilized-approach

Synopsis

ACR FLC LANDS WITH TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS; RESULTING IN LONG LNDG AND ROLLOUT; EXACERBATED BY RUBBER DEPOSITS ON RWY.

Narrative

ON A SCHEDULED FLT FROM MIA TO CCS. UPON ARR INTO THE CCS AREA; WE WERE HELD HIGH AND SLOW. WE WERE HELD TO 200 KIAS MAX WITHIN 40 MI OF THE ARPT. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27 WITH A RPTED SURFACE WIND OF 270 DEGS AT 10 KTS; WITH A SHORT TURN IN TO BASE LEG. AT 1800 FT MSL I NOTICED THAT THE ACFT FMC WAS SHOWING WIND OF 080 DEGS AT 21 KTS. AFTER TURNING FINAL; I REALIZED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND CLOSING RAPIDLY WITH THE RWY. I MANUALLY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT; CALLED FOR FULL FLAPS AND INCREASED MY RATE OF DSCNT. I CROSSED THE THRESHOLD AT APPROX 75 FT (RWY IS 12000 FT). AT 20 FT I CLOSED THE THROTTLES AT THIS POINT. THE ACFT WAS LIGHT AND IT CONTINUED TO FLOAT LIKE I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED BEFORE. AFTER FLOATING EXCESSIVELY LONG; I LOWERED THE NOSE AND FORCED THE MAINS TO MAKE CONTACT. THE ACFT DID NOT RESPOND TO BRAKE APPLICATIONS NORMALLY; BUT REVERSE WAS WORKING AND THE ACFT WAS DECELERATING. THE ANTI-SKID SYS WAS RELEASING MORE THAN NORMAL DUE TO THE TIRES SKIDDING ON THE RUBBER DEPOSITS ON LAST 3000 FT OF RWY. SMOKE CAME OFF THE TIRES; SO THE TWR DISPATCHED A FIRE TRUCK IN CASE WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. WE TURNED OFF AT THE END WITHOUT INCIDENT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER CLRING THE RWY WE NOTICED THE WINDSOCK WAS STICKING STRAIGHT OUT TO THE W; INDICATING THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND WITH A TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: PIC HAS APPROX 300 HRS IN TYPE AND SIC APPROX 200 HRS IN TYPE. WE WERE HELD HIGH; TURNED ONTO A SHORT FINAL; AND CLRED TO LAND WITH A TAILWIND. HVY RUBBER DEPOSITS ON THE RWY COMPROMISED THE ACFT'S BRAKING ACTION. LANGUAGE BARRIER PLAYED A SMALL PART DUE TO HAVING INSTRUCTIONS REPEATED AND TAKING AWAY VALUABLE TIME TO GET THE ACFT DOWN EARLIER. IN RETROSPECT; I SHOULD HAVE GIVEN MYSELF MORE TIME BY CALLING FOR AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR A NORMAL LNDG. I FEEL THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO ASK BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT WE WILL ALTER THE TFC FLOW OR IT IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO GET THE POINT ACROSS IN A STRANGE LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT. AND FINALLY; I SHOULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT I WAS HIGH. THE REASON I ELECTED NOT TO DO SO EARLY IN THE APCH WAS BASED ON 2 THINGS: I HAD 12000 FT OF RWY AND A (I THOUGHT) 10 KT HEADWIND. I HAD FLOWN THE ACFT IN AND OUT OF SHORT RWYS FOR 3 MONTHS PRIOR AND I WAS VERY CONFIDENT OF ITS ABILITY TO GET ON THE GND AND STOP IN VERY SHORT DISTANCES. COMBINE THE TAILWIND AND REDUCED BRAKE EFFECTIVENESS AND SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.