A B727-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE AFTER #8 LEADING EDGE SLAT ACTUATOR WAS REPLACED AND THE REQUIRED INSPECTION WAS SIGNED BY AN UNAUTH PERSON.
Synopsis
A B727-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE AFTER #8 LEADING EDGE SLAT ACTUATOR WAS REPLACED AND THE REQUIRED INSPECTION WAS SIGNED BY AN UNAUTH PERSON.
Narrative
ON AUG/SAT/99; I ARRIVED AT WORK AND WAS ASSIGNED SHIP XYZ WITH A #8 SLAT INDICATION PROB. THE ACTUATOR HAD BEEN REPLACED ON THE PREVIOUS SHIFT TRYING TO CORRECT THE PROB. THE SLAT INDICATION STILL WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY. I FOUND A BROKEN WIRE IN THE R WING; REPAIRED IT AND CORRECTED THE PROB. THE MECH WHO INSTALLED THE ACTUATOR AND THE INSPECTOR BOTH SIGNED BOTH THE INSTALLATION AND THE RII (REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM) IN THE CORRECTIVE ACTION BLOCK IN THE LOGBOOK. THE WORK CARDS WERE ALSO SIGNED. THE LEAK AND OPS CHKS WERE NOT CLRED. I SIGNED OFF THE LOGBOOK AND MADE THE MISTAKE OF SIGNING THE RII BLOCK ON THE WORK CARD (AN INSPECTOR ONLY BLOCK). THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH NO PROBS. I DID PERFORM THE LEAK AND OPS CHK AND DOCUMENTED THAT ON THE LOG SHEET BUT DID NOT HAVE AUTH TO SIGN THE RII BLOCK ON THE WORK CARD. THE LATE NIGHT SHIFT INSPECTION DEPT FOREMAN NOTICED THAT THE RII ON THE LEAK AND OPS CHK HAD NOT BEEN CLRED AND CONTACTED THE FOREMAN ON DUTY AT THE ACR TECHNICAL CTR. THE ACFT WAS ROUTED BACK TO ZZZ FOR INSPECTION AND PROPER SIGNATURE. I WAS THE LEAD MECH IN CHARGE OF ACFT XYZ AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. CLOSER ATTN SHOULD HAVE BEEN PAID TO THE JOB INSTRUCTION CARDS AFTER THE MAINT WAS COMPLETED.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.