A B727-200 FLC MADE A TKOF IN EXCESS OF THE MAX ALLOWABLE WT FROM FLL. THE RPTR IS CONCERNED THAT THE OVERWT TKOF DID NOT USE A 'WET' RWY CORRECTION AND FAILING THAT WOULD NOT APPLY STANDING WATER CORRECTIONS.

Narrative

AT XA00Z AUG/XA/99; I RPTED FOR DUTY AS FO ABOARD B727. TSTMS AND RAINSHOWERS HAD PASSED THROUGH THE AREA AND WERE FORECAST TO CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE EVENING. WHEN I ARRIVED; THE FIELD WAS UNDER HVY RAINSHOWERS. ANTICIPATING A MAX WT PERFORMANCE LIMITED TKOF ON RWY 9L FOR PORT OF SPAIN; TRINIDAD; I CALLED DISPATCH TO PURSUE AN UPDATED INTERP REGARDING THE RWY ANALYSIS IN USE BY COMPANY. THE QUESTION REGARDING RWY 9L IN FLL INITIALLY CAME UP AS THE RESULT OF A TKOF DECISION MADE JUN/XA/99 OUT OF MIA. ON THAT RAINY MORNING; ANOTHER B727 HAD TAXIED INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 12; THEN DECLINED TKOF CLRNC -- REQUESTING FULL LENGTH RWY 9L INSTEAD. THE NIGHT BEFORE IT HAD RAINED 10 INCHES. IT WAS RAINING AT THE TIME. WHILE TWR HAD NOT PROVIDED A RWY CONDITION RPT; THE RWYS WERE OBVIOUSLY WET. OUR FLT WAS OFFERED RWY 12 AS SOON AS THE OTHER B727 TAXIED OUT OF THE WAY. WITHOUT PROMPTING FROM THE CAPT; I DECLINED; REMINDING TWR THAT OUR FLT REQUIRED FULL LENGTH RWY 9L. THE CAPT CHASTISED ME FOR REFUSING RWY 12 AGAINST HIS WISHES (EVEN THOUGH WE HAD JUST FINISHED DISCUSSING THAT THE RWY ANALYSIS DID NOT SUPPORT IT; EVEN ON A DRY DAY; EVEN IF WE BELIEVED THE WTS RPTED BY RAMP PERSONNEL). THE CAPT INSISTED I RADIO BACK TWR AND ACCEPT RWY 12. I DEMURRED. AFTER A BRIEF BUT INTENSE DISCUSSION; FINALLY DEPARTED FULL LENGTH RWY 9L USING NEARLY ALL AVAILABLE RWY BEFORE FINALLY BREAKING GND. RWY 9L IN MIA IS 1330 FT LONGER THAN MIA RWY 12. CLRLY; HAD WE TAKEN RWY 12; THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AN ACCIDENT. HOWEVER; MY REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RWY 12 BECAME THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT BY THE CAPT WHICH WAS INVESTIGATED BY ACTING CHIEF PLT. I WAS EXONERATED FOR MY ACTIONS THAT DAY; BUT IT WAS A PROFOUNDLY UNCOMFORTABLE EXPERIENCE -- ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE COMPANY'S PROTRACTED PATTERN OF PUNITIVE BEHAVIOR TOWARD ME AS A RESULT OF MY EFFORTS PERTAINING TO FLT SAFETY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE (DUTY TIMES; HAZMAT AND WT AND BAL); AND THE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF PLT EMPLOYEES -- MYSELF AMONG THEM. THE NEW (ACTING) CHIEF PLT SEEMED INTENT ON MAKING A DIFFERENCE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS INVESTIGATION; HE STATED; 'NOT ONLY DID YOU DO THE RIGHT THING; BUT I WOULD HAVE DONE THE SAME THING MYSELF. I HAVE IN FACT; WALKED OFF AN ACFT WHEN A CAPT REFUSED TO GET IT DEICED.' FLCS; THE TRAINING DEPT AND DISPATCH PERSONNEL CONSIDER ALL RWYS 'DRY' FOR PERFORMANCE PLANNING PURPOSES UNLESS THERE EXISTS A CONTAMINATION RPT THAT CONTAINS THE SPECIFIC WORDS; 'STANDING WATER.' I HAVE NOTED THAT SOME B727 PERFORMANCE MATERIALS STIPULATE A 7000 LB WT REDUCTION AND A 13 KT REDUCTION TO THE MAX WT V1 SPD FOR RWYS THAT ARE '...WELL SOAKED WITH WATER BUT DO NOT HAVE LARGE AREAS OF ACTUAL STANDING WATER.' AS OF AUG/XB/99; SUCH QUESTIONS HAD GONE UNANSWERED BY FLT OPS; TRAINING; MGMNT; DISPATCH AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL. GND CTL RPTED THAT THE DELAY WAS DUE TO 'PLT DISCRETION' REGARDING CONDITIONS AT THE FIELD AND WX IN THE VICINITY. I ASKED IF A RWY RPT WAS AVAILABLE. 'NO BRAKING ACTION RPTS HAVE BEEN MADE. A RWY INSPECTION RPT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE.' THE GND CTLR THEN OFFERED THAT IF XXX DESIRED AN IMMEDIATE DEP; WE COULD EXPECT TO BACK TAXI ON RWY 9L INTO POS AND HOLD: 'CONTACT TWR.' BEFORE I COULD SWITCH FREQS; THOUGH THE GND CTLR XMITTED AGAIN ASKING US TO STAY WITH HER AS SHE CONTACTED AN ACFT THAT HAD TURNED ITSELF AROUND ON THE TXWY IN FRONT OF US -- OSTENSIBLY TO NOTE RADAR RETURNS IN THE DIRECTION OF TKOF AND TO GET A BETTER LOOK AT THE RWY. THE GND CTLR THEN CALLED 'RAMP ONE' TO REQUEST A RWY INSPECTION. ONCE THE ACFT WAS OUT OF THE WAY; WAS AGAIN INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT TWR. BEFORE LEAVING THE FREQ; I ASKED GND TO PASS THE RWY RPT TO TWR FOR RELAY TO US WHEN IT BECAME AVAILABLE. TWR INSTRUCTED TO BACK TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 9L. AS WE DID; I NOTED ALOUD THAT THE RAIN INTENSITY HAD INCREASED; THAT THERE WAS DEFINITELY STANDING WATER ON THE RWY; AND THAT IT APPEARED WORST IN THE XGROOVE CHANNELS WORN BY SUCCESSIVE LNDG AND DEPARTING ACFT. NO CONTAMINATION RPT HAD BEEN RELAYED AS YET. IT LOOKED LIKE WE WERE GOING WITHOUT IT. SO; I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WOULD USE A MAX EPR; PACKS OFF TKOF '...FOR THE GRANDMOTHERS; WIVES AND KIDS?' THE CAPT SEEMED TO CONSIDER MY REQUEST; BUT DID NOT ANSWER; NOR DID HE INSTRUCT THE FE'S TO EXPECT A PACKS OFF TKOF. AS ACFT TURNED INTO POS AND HOLD; TWR RELAYED THE RWY CONTAMINATION RPT: 'RAMP 1 RPTS THE RWY CONDITION AS FOLLOWS: 'WET; STANDING WATER; LESS THAN 1/4 INCH;' CLRED FOR TKOF; TURN R HDG ONE ZERO ZERO.' AS TWR BEGAN ITS XMISSION; THE CAPT HAD ADVANCED THE THROTTLES. THE TKOF CLRNC WAS THEN ISSUED WITHOUT PAUSE OR DELAY. THE CAPT HAD RELEASED THE BRAKES BEFORE I COULD REPLY TO THE RWY RPT AND CLRNC. SUDDENLY; I WAS ISOLATED AND OUT OF OPTIONS. NEITHER THE FE; FE TRAINEE; CHK AIRMAN; NOR CAPT SHARED MY CONCERN REGARDING THE WX; RWY CONTAMINATION; OR OVERWT TKOF. DESPITE THE CIRCUMSTANCES; I DID NOT FORCIBLY RETARD THE THROTTLES; STAND ON THE BRAKES OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH THE CAPT'S CHOICE TO TAKE OFF. ACFT USED ALL AVAILABLE RWY. THE CAPT ROTATED WELL INSIDE THE ALTERNATING RED AND WHITE LIGHTS AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY AND THE MAIN WHEELS BROKE GND AT THE LAST POSSIBLE INSTANT. THE ACFT CROSSED THE ARPT BOUNDARY AT LESS THAN 100 FT STRUGGLING TO ATTAIN V2; THEN V2 +10 KTS; WITH THE AIRSPD FLUCTUATING +/-3 TO 5 KTS. ACFT EXCEEDED ACFT PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS AND VIOLATED FAA REGS IN DISREGARD FOR THE MOST BASIC OF AIR SAFETY PRINCIPLES AND CRM. IT TOOK OFF FROM A CONTAMINATED RWY IN AN ACFT THAT WEIGHED 15000 LBS MORE THAN THE MAX SPECIFIED FOR CONDITIONS -- IN CIRCUMSTANCES RIPE FOR WINDSHEAR. MY MISTAKE WAS IN LETTING MYSELF BE INTIMIDATED BY THE PRESENCE OF A CHK AIRMAN -- A CONSUMMATE PROFESSIONAL AIRMAN AND FORMER MIL AVIATOR WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED REMARKABLE CHARACTER; INTEGRITY AND RESOLVE AMID A MGMNT HIERARCHY INTERNALLY CONFLICTED OF MANIPULATION; CTL AND INCOMPETENCE. DUE TO MY DEFERENCE TO THE CHK AIRMAN AND TO ONE OF THE MOST SENIOR CAPTS IN EMPLOY; I DID NOT INSIST THAT THE FLC AGREE TO A PLAN OF ACTION SHOULD THE RWY CONTAMINATION RPT COME BACK WITH THE 'STANDING WATER' TERMINOLOGY INCLUDED. HAD I DONE SO BEFORE THE ACFT TAXIED OUT OF THE RAMP FOR TKOF; I MAY HAVE AVOIDED THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PLACED MY CREW IN THE POS OF RISKING OUR LIVES TO DO SOMETHING ABOMINABLY; UNCONSCIONABLY STUPID -- TAKING OFF OVERWT INTO ADVERSE WX WITH A CHK AIRMAN AND CAPT ALL TOO EAGER TO ONE-UP EACH OTHER IN THEIR DISREGARD FOR REGS; ACFT LIMITATIONS; FLT SAFETY; AND COMMON SENSE.