ALB LCL CTLR OBSERVES B727-200 TAXI ACROSS RWY 28; REQUIRING CTLR TO CANCEL TKOF CLRNC OF BE58.

Date: 1999-10 · Aircraft: B727-200 · Phase: taxi

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|conflict-ground-conflict|less-severe|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|ground-incursion-runway

Synopsis

ALB LCL CTLR OBSERVES B727-200 TAXI ACROSS RWY 28; REQUIRING CTLR TO CANCEL TKOF CLRNC OF BE58.

Narrative

RWY 28 ACTIVE; ACR X LANDS RWY 1; BE58 (ACFT Y) TAXIED INTO POS RWY 28. ACR X TOLD TO TURN L ON TXWY B; S ON TXWY A; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28 ON LCL CTL FREQ. ACR X GAVE PIREP ON FINAL; TURNS OFF RWY 1. I TALKED TO ARR RWY 28; A HELI; N PAD. I DID A RWY SCAN. ACR X 'APPEARED' TO HOLD SHORT. CLRED BE58 FOR TKOF. ACR X CALLED ME ON GND CTL TO CHK IN GOING TO THE RAMP. HE WAS XING RWY 28 (THE ACTIVE RWY). I CANCELED TKOF CLRNC OF THE BE58 IMMEDIATELY. TOLD ACR X HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28. HIS REPLY 'THERE ARE 3 IN THE COCKPIT. WE DIDN'T HEAR THAT (APPROX).' IF HE HADN'T HEARD THAT; THEN HE HAD NO TAXI INSTRUCTION TO MOVE WHEN HE EXITED THE RWY; LET ALONE CROSS THE ACTIVE. I DIDN'T REQUEST A READBACK OF THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTED RIGHT AWAY; BUT I KNEW HE COULDN'T CROSS THE RWY WITHOUT MY PERMISSION. NEVER ASSUME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 451154: THIS INCIDENT INVOLVED MY ACFT XING AN ACTIVE RWY AT ALB. A LNDG WAS MADE ON RWY 1. RWY 28 WAS ALSO BEING USED; BUT I OPTED FOR RWY 1 WHICH IS LONGER. AN ILS APCH WAS CONDUCTED THROUGH RAIN WITH SOME LOSS/GAIN OF AIRSPD DUE TO GUSTY WINDS. ON SHORT FINAL THE RAIN CEASED AND WE WERE VMC BUT THE GUSTY XWIND MADE FOR A HIGHER THAN NORMAL STRESS AND WORKLOAD SIT. MY LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. I TURNED OFF AT TXWY B. MY FO INITIATED A CALL TO 'TWR' IMMEDIATELY UPON TURNING OFF. AS HE SPOKE WITH 'TWR' ABOUT WX CONDITIONS AND GAVE A PIREP; I CONCENTRATED ON TURNING ONTO THE PARALLEL TXWY; STOWING SPOILERS; ETC. AT THIS POINT IN TIME A COMBINATION OF DISTRACTING FACTORS OCCURRED: 1) MY NEED TO GET SETTLED DOWN AFTER A SOMEWHAT HECTIC AND TENSE APCH AND LNDG. LET'S SAY THE ADRENALINE LEVEL WAS HIGHER THAN NORMAL. 2) THE FO'S LONGER THAN NORMAL CONVERSATION WITH TWR WHICH INCLUDED A PIREP. 3) THE NORMAL AFTER LNDG DUTIES AND CONCERNS WHICH INVOLVE TAXIING AND FINDING THE TERMINAL AND CORRECT GATE. 4) SOME FATIGUE CAUSED BY AN EARLY MORNING WAKE-UP ADDED TO A DAY MADE LONGER BY DELAYS. 5) FORGETTING THAT RWY 28 WAS ALSO IN USE -- A SIT I HAD NEVER BEFORE ENCOUNTERED AT ALB. WE ARE USUALLY TOLD TO TAXI TO THE GATE AFTER LNDG THERE. 6) A SHORT DISTANCE/TIME BTWN TURNOFF OF RWY 1 AND THE POINT WHERE THE TXWY CROSSES RWY 28. 7) FREQ BLOCKAGE WHICH PREVENTED US FROM HEARING TWR TELL US TO 'HOLD SHORT' OF RWY 28. WE HAVE BECOME USED TO HEARING SPECIFIC 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTIONS AT EVERY ARPT USING MORE THAN 1 RWY. MOST ARPTS' CTLRS BECOME AUDIBLY IRRITATED WHEN A 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTION IS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED. SOMEHOW ALL OF THESE LISTED FACTORS COMBINED CAUSED ME TO BELIEVE WE HAD IN FACT RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC FROM TWR TO THE TERMINAL. I REMEMBER LOOKING DOWN RWY 28 AND NOT SEEING AN ACFT; SO I CROSSED AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. GND CONTACTED US THEN TO SAY WE HAD BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28. NO REQUEST WAS HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED BY ME OR BY MY CREW. MY ASSUMPTION THAT THE FO RECEIVED CLRNC TO THE GATE DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH TWR PROVED TO BE INCORRECT; AS I DISCOVERED LATER. A CESSNA (BE58) AT OR NEAR THE END OF RWY 28 HAD BEEN GIVEN TKOF CLRNC CLOSE TO THE TIME WE CROSSED RWY 28. HE DISCONTINUED HIS TKOF EARLY IN HIS ROLL. I NEVER SAW THE ACFT AND WAS UNAWARE OF IT UNTIL WE WERE FULLY ACROSS RWY 28. NEITHER MY FO NOR MY SO GAVE ANY INDICATION OF THE NEED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28. I DON'T KNOW WHY TWR WOULD CLR THE CESSNA FOR TKOF WITHOUT RECEIVING AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM MY ACFT.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.