CL600 CREW PROGRAMS FMS INCORRECTLY CAUSING CONFUSION AND A MISSED CLRNC LEAVING SUS.
Synopsis
CL600 CREW PROGRAMS FMS INCORRECTLY CAUSING CONFUSION AND A MISSED CLRNC LEAVING SUS.
Narrative
ON DEP FROM SUS; WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY THE TWR TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG ON DEP FROM RWY 26L. UPON CONTACTING STL APCH; THE CTLR ISSUED PRESENT HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LINDY 2 DEP SID OFF OF STL VOR. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A CLB TO 4000 FT FROM 2500 FT; AND DIRECT VIH VOR; WHICH IS PART OF THE LINDY 2 SID. THE CTLR THEN HANDED US OFF TO STL APCH. CLBING OUT OF 3000 FT; THE PF SELECTED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS DIRECT VIH VOR. HE INSTEAD SOMEHOW SELECTED DIRECT STL VOR. MYSELF BEING THE PNF; BEGAN A PROCESS OF CORRECTING THE SIT. IN THE PROCESS; I MISSED; OR A CLRNC WAS BLOCKED; INSTRUCTING US TO CLB TO 15000 FT AND TURN TO 250 DEG HDG AND INTERCEPT BY THE CTLR. THE CTLR BECAME VERY CURT AND INSTEAD OF REISSUING THE CLRNC; HE CHASTISED ME ON FREQ FOR SEVERAL MINS BEFORE REISSUING THE CLRNC. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND TRIP FOR THE PF. WHEN INTERVIEWING HIM AND REVIEWING HIS TRAINING RECORDS; I WAS ASSURED THAT HE WAS EXPERIENCED AND PROFICIENT WITH THE FMS SYS IN OUR ACFT. THE PF HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMS INCORRECTLY FOR THE LINDY 2 SID AND THEREFORE LED TO AN UNNECESSARY DISTR ON MY PART TO REPROGRAM THE FMS. THIS PLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FURTHER BEFORE ALLOWING HIM TO ACT AS THE PF.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.