B727 AND A300 REQUIRED TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION WHEN TURNING FINAL TO RWYS 18 AT MEM.
Synopsis
B727 AND A300 REQUIRED TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION WHEN TURNING FINAL TO RWYS 18 AT MEM.
Narrative
ON ARR AT MEM; WE PERFORMED AN EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DEVIATED FROM OUR ASSIGNED VECTOR TO AVOID HITTING ANOTHER ACFT. OUR ACFT (A B727) HAD BEEN CLRED TO FLY HDG 170 DEGS. OUR VECTOR TOOK US ACROSS FINAL FOR RWY 18R. ABOUT THE TIME WE CROSSED FINAL FOR RWY 18R; THE ZME CTLR SAID 'YOU WILL BE #2 FOR THE R; BEHIND TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK; DO YOU HAVE THAT TFC?' (THE FO WAS PF AND THE CAPT WAS PNF.) THE CAPT RESPONDED 'I HAVE THE TFC (Z) AT 12 O'CLOCK; BELAY THAT; I HAVE ADDITIONAL TFC (Y) COMING TO 12 O'CLOCK; IS THAT OUR TFC TO FOLLOW?' APCH DID NOT ANSWER HIS QUERY. APCH DID MAKE A CALL TO ANOTHER ACFT; BUT NOT TO US. SENSING THE URGENCY IN THE CAPT'S VOICE; I HAD LOOSENED MY LAP BELT AND CLRED FOR TFC AS WELL. THE AIRBUS (Y) APPEARED TO BE ROLLING OUT ON FINAL FOR RWY 18L. WE HELD OUR VECTOR OF 170 DEGS FOR A MOMENT MORE; THEN AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME I STATED; 'WE'VE GOT TO GO R.' THE CAPT TOOK THE ACFT AND DEVIATED R; AND THE AIRBUS DEVIATED L. AT NO TIME DO I RECALL BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 18R. THE FO LANDED THE ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 469203: PART OF THE REASON FOR US BEING SO FAR L OF CTRLINE (BESIDES THE VECTOR) WAS PROBABLY DUE TO OUR TRYING TO KEEP OUR INTERVAL IN SIGHT. ALSO; THE APCHS WERE BEING DONE TO THE S RWYS. WE DON'T OFTEN USE THE S RWYS AND ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE VISUAL CUES THAT COULD HAVE HELPED US OUT. A LOT WAS 'GOING ON' AND I WAS DEFINITELY PREOCCUPIED WITH KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON THE AIRBUS. I WAS UNEASY WITH THE SIT AND WAS GETTING READY TO BRING OUR ACFT TO THE R WHEN THE AIRBUS MADE AN ABRUPT TURN TO THE L. APCH CTL WAS NOW ASKING WHAT RWY WERE WE LINED FOR. I INFORMED THEM WE WERE CORRECTING BACK TO THE R. I DO NOT FEEL THIS SIT SHOULD BE CALLED A NEAR MISS. LUCKILY; I HAD THE AIRBUS IN SIGHT AND SAW THE SIT DEVELOPING AND I HAD A WAY OUT (TO THE R). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 469613: FLT Y WAS NW OF THE ARPT ON A VECTOR OF 140 DEGS FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 18L AT MEM (CAT IIIB EQUIP CHK). A HDG OF 170 DEGS WAS ASSIGNED JUST PRIOR TO LOC INTERCEPT. THERE WAS NO AUDIBLE ILS SIGNAL AND THE CAPT (PNF) QUESTIONED APCH CTL ON THE STATUS OF THE LOC. THE LOC SIGNAL WAS ACTIVATED JUST E OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE ON A 170 DEG HDG; AND A R TURN OF APPROX 15 DEGS BROUGHT THE ACFT BACK TO COURSE AND CAPTURED THE LOC. ACFT WAS ON COURSE; WAITING TO CAPTURE THE GS; WHEN THE FO (PF) OBSERVED A B727 (X) AT HIS 4 O'CLOCK POS. THE B727 WAS LEVEL WITH OUR ACFT AND APPEARED TO BE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH US. HORIZ DISTANCE WAS ESTIMATED TO BE BTWN 1000-2000 FT. THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND MADE A TURN OF APPROX 45 DEGS AWAY (TO THE L) AND INFORMED THE CAPT OF THE SIT. (THE REASON FOR THE EVASIVE ACTION WAS BASED ON THE APPARENT COLLISION COURSE OF THE 2 ACFT MORE THAN THE INITIAL HORIZ DISTANCE OBSERVED). ON THAT HDG; WE OBSERVED THE B727 IN A TURN BACK TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 18R FINAL APCH COURSE. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO TURN BACK TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 18L LOC. BOTH ACFT LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 469415: AFTER LNDG; SPOKE TO OTHER CREW WHO SAID THEY DID FLY THROUGH LOC OF RWY 18R BECAUSE THEY WERE ON A VECTOR ASSIGNED BY TRACON. RPT BY THE COMPANY INDICATES CTLR ERROR AND INVESTIGATION IS IN PROGRESS. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT MEMPHIS ENJOYS ABSOLUTELY OUTSTANDING ATC SVCS WITH ALL FACILITIES. THIS INCIDENT APPEARS TO BE ISOLATED. OTHER CAPT DID NOT THINK RPT WAS WORTHY OF CLASSIFICATION AS A NMAC; ALTHOUGH THIS CAPT DISAGREES. SOMETHING DID IN FACT BREAK DOWN IN THE TRACON. I DO QUESTION THE OTHER CAPT ALLOWING HIS ACFT TO GET THAT CLOSE TO CTRLINE OF RWY 18L KNOWING PARALLEL SIMULTANEOUS APCHS WERE IN USE AND THE CONDITIONS WERE VFR. I FEEL HE SHOULD HAVE MANEUVERED MUCH EARLIER REGARDLESS OF HIS ASSIGNED VECTOR. ADDITIONALLY; OUR TIMETABLE FOR INSTALLATION OF TCASII NEEDS TO BE ACCELERATED. TCASII COULD HAVE HELPED THIS SIT. THE FO ON MY FLT ACTED PRUDENTLY EXHIBITING OUTSTANDING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; AIRMANSHIP AND CRM SKILLS.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.