B727-200 CREW HAD AN INADVERTENT ENG SHUTDOWN IN ZME CLASS A AIRSPACE.

Narrative

DURING CLBOUT APPROX 70 NM N OF MEM PASSING THROUGH FL200; THE #2 ENG FAILED FOR NO APPARENT REASON. I DIRECTED THE FO TO ASSUME THE PF DUTIES; AND DECLARED AN EMER. I BEGAN WORKING THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WITH AN IOE STUDENT; AND INSTRUCTOR (FE) WAS ABOARD. WHILE RUNNING THE CHKLIST; I NOTICED THE #2 FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCH ON THE FE PANEL WAS OFF. THE #2 ENG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESTARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE CREW WAS CONFIDENT THE ACFT WAS MECHANICALLY SOUND AND ELECTED TO PROCEED TO THE SCHEDULED DEST. ATC WAS ADVISED; THE INFLT EMER WAS TERMINATED; AND THE FLT PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY TO MKE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 498239: DURING CLBOUT; THE #2 ENG FAILED FOR NO APPARENT REASON. WHILE RUNNING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS; IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE #2 FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCH ON THE FE'S PANEL WAS IN THE 'OFF' POS. THE ENG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESTARTED. THE CREW DISCUSSED AND WAS SATISFIED THERE WAS NOT A PROB WITH THE ACFT AND ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO THE SCHEDULED DEST. THIS WAS THE FIRST NIGHT OF IOE FOR THE FE ACTUALLY WORKING THE PANEL. DURING IOE; THERE IS USUALLY AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF HAND ACTIVITY AND CLUTTER ON THE FE DESKTOP WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS TYPE OF EVENT. ADDITIONALLY; ALTHOUGH GUARDED; THE DESIGN OF THE FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCH GUARDS DOES MORE TO OBSTRUCT VIEW OF THE SWITCH POS THAN IT DOES TO PREVENT INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF THE SWITCH. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE TOUGH TO DIMINISH THE ASSOCIATED RISKS OF IOE; THE PROB WITH THE SWITCH GUARDS COULD EASILY BE ADDRESSED.