A B727-200 ON DSCNT AT 11000 FT INCURRED AN OFF IDLE STALL ON 1 ENG WHEN ADVANCING THRUST LEVERS. ENG NOT IDENTED. ITEM NOT ENTERED IN LOGBOOK.

Date: 2001-07 · Aircraft: B727-200 · Phase: descent

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|other-no-log-book-report-on-engine

Synopsis

A B727-200 ON DSCNT AT 11000 FT INCURRED AN OFF IDLE STALL ON 1 ENG WHEN ADVANCING THRUST LEVERS. ENG NOT IDENTED. ITEM NOT ENTERED IN LOGBOOK.

Narrative

AT 11000 FT MSL; I THOUGHT MSP APCH CTL SAID 'I NEED THAT 170 SPD NOW.' I THOUGHT IT WAS FOR OUR ACFT; SO I RETARDED THE THROTTLES AGGRESSIVELY TO IDLE. I HAD FO CONFIRM CALL. ATC SAID IT WAS FOR ANOTHER ACFT; SO I PUSHED UP THE THROTTLES AGGRESSIVELY. AS I DID; WE STARTED TO GET A RUMBLE/COMPRESSOR STALL. I PULLED ALL 3 ENGS BACK A BIT. RUMBLE STOPPED. I TRIED TO DETERMINE WHICH ENG IT WAS. NO LUCK; EXCEPT #1 EPR NEEDLE WAS BOUNCING ABOUT 1/2 NEEDLE WIDTH. SO I PUSHED UP 2 AND 3 NO PROB. AS A PRECAUTION; I HAD THE FO OPEN THE #1 ENG ANTI-ICE. THE #1 EPR WAS NOT BOUNCING ANYMORE; CLOSED #1 ENG ANTI-ICE AND PUSHED UP #1 THROTTLE. NO FURTHER PROBS. FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED. WE TOLD THEM THAT IT WAS NOT A PROB; JUST A MINOR COMPRESSION STALL ON THE ENGS. AS IT WAS A PLT-INDUCED PROB AND NO REAL PROB WITH THE ENG AND WE WERE NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH ENG IT WAS; WE DID NOT PUT IT IN THE LOGBOOK. THE NEXT CAPT TO FLY THE ACFT AND I TALKED ABOUT IT ON THE PHONE. THE FOLLOWING DAY I FOUND OUT THAT THE OUTBOUND CAPT TALKED TO INBOUND FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEY TOLD THEM TO BE CAREFUL AS THE ENGS HAD PROBS. I FURTHER FOUND OUT THAT 'SOMEONE;' NOT ME; WROTE UP THAT THE #2 ENG HAD COMPRESSOR STALLS ON ARR INTO MSP. I ASSUME IT WAS THE OUTBOUND CAPT. BUT; HE DID NOT PUT AN EMPLOYEE NUMBER ON LOGBOOK WRITE-UP. IN HINDSIGHT; I COULD HAVE WRITTEN UP; 'PLT INDUCED COMPRESSOR STALLS ON ARR AT 11000 FT; WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH ENG. ALL OPS NORMAL PRIOR TO AND AFTER PLT INDUCED COMPRESSOR STALL DUE TO RAPID THROTTLE MOVEMENT.' I GUESS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION DUE TO CONFUSION AND WOULD HAVE CLRED THE AIR FOR OUTBOUND CREW AND MAINT.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.