B727 CREW CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINES FOR RWY 35C ON TXWY EL AT DFW WITHOUT CLRNC.

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OUR FLT LANDED ON RWY 35R AND WAS CLRED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35C. ON THE WAY TO THIS CLRNC LIMIT; WE RECEIVED ANOTHER CLRNC WHICH WAS PARTIALLY STEPPED ON BY ANOTHER TRANSMISSION. I BEGAN TO READ BACK WHAT I HAD 'HEARD' -- CLRED TO CROSS RWY 35L; CONTACT GND ON 65. AS I STARTED READING THIS BACK; I REALIZED THIS DID NOT INCLUDE A CLRNC TO FIRST CROSS RWY 35C. THE CAPT WAS TAXIING AND APPARENTLY HEARD A CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 35C BECAUSE HE WAS NOT STOPPING TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35C. HE THEN REALIZED THERE WAS A DISCONNECT BETWEEN WHAT HE HEARD AND WHAT I HEARD AND STOPPED THE AIRPLANE. THE AIRPLANE; HOWEVER; HAD ALREADY CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF RWY 35C WHEN IT STOPPED AND THIS CAUSED AN ACFT ON FINAL TO RWY 35C TO BE SENT AROUND. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO CROSS RWY 35C AND 35L TO TAXI TO THE RAMP. THERE IS TOO MUCH PRESSURE TO CROSS TOO MUCH TFC AT DFW. THE FREQUENCIES ARE TOO CROWDED AND IF YOU MISS A CALL; IT TAKES TOO LONG TO GET A WORD IN OVER THE CTLR'S SERIES OF CALLS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 543960: HEAVY RADIO TFC A MAJOR C0NTRIBUTOR. STOP/GO LIGHTS AT ALL INTERSECTIONS WOULD PRECLUDE THIS SORT OF CONFUSION AND COM BREAKDOWN. MULTIPLEXED RADIO FREQUENCIES THAT ARE 'CLIP PROOF' WOULD BE ADVISABLE AS WELL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: WHEN THE FO WAS HESITANT WITH THE CROSSING CLRNC THE CAPT STOPPED TO CONFIRM THE CLRNC TO CROSS. BY THAT TIME IT WAS TOO LATE. THE TWR HAD A CLR VIEW OF THE AREA AND INITIATED A GAR FOR THE ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 35C. THE CREW COULD NOT GET A WORD IN EDGE WISE; EVEN TO INFORM THE TWR THEY WERE OVER THE LINE. THE PLT QUESTIONS HAVING SO MUCH TFC THAT THE ACFT ARE NOT ABLE TO COM WITH THE TWR. HE CONTACTED THE TWR SUPVR WHEN HE GOT TO THE GATE. THE SUPVR HAD NOT HAD TIME TO REVIEW THE TAPES. THE PLT HAS HEARD NOTHING SINCE.