B757-200 CREW HAD LEADING EDGE SLAT EICAS WARNING WHILE ON FINAL APCH FOR SNA.

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SNA WX; CLR WITH GOOD VISIBILITY AND CALM WIND. WE WERE ON AN IFR RELEASE; NO ALTERNATE. ON APCH INTO SNA; AT 3000 FT MSL AND WITHIN 15 MI OF THE ARPT WE EXTENDED FLAPS 1 AND GOT AN EICAS FLAP LEADING EDGE ASYMMETRY WARNING AND A FLAP LEADING EDGE WARNING LIGHT. WE NOTIFIED SOCAL APCH AND REQUESTED VECTORS SO THAT WE COULD WORK ON THE PROB. THEY BEGAN VECTORING US; CLBED US TO 5000 FT MSL AND ULTIMATELY TO 7000 FT MSL. WE BEGAN THE LEADING EDGE ASYMMETRY CHKLIST; AND UPON REVIEWING IT AND REALIZING THAT IT REQUIRED LESS THAN FULL FLAPS AND A REF SPD ADDITIVE. I DECIDED THAT THE 5700 FT RWY AT SNA WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA. I IMMEDIATELY ASKED THE FO TO CONTACT DISPATCH AND TELL THEM THAT WE NEEDED TO DIVERT AND FIND OUT IF THEY PREFERRED ONT OR LAX. AT THIS TIME; IT WAS VERY BUSY IN OUR COCKPIT. FO WAS ON THE #2 RADIO COMMUNICATING WITH DISPATCH; AND I WAS HANDLING THE FLYING AND ATC COMS. AFTER A FEW SHORT MINS; I ASKED FO WHAT WAS HAPPENING. FO INFORMED ME THAT DISPATCH WAS ATTEMPTING TO PATCH US THROUGH TO THE MATRE CTLR. I ASKED WHY; AND HE SAID THAT THEY HAD ASKED HIM IF WE HAD CONTACTED THEM YET; HE TOLD THEM WE HADN'T; AND THEY SUGGESTED THAT WE NEEDED TO DO SOME KIND OF AIRBORNE TROUBLE-SHOOTING BEFORE MAKING ANY DIVERSION DECISIONS AND BEGAN TRYING TO PATCH US THROUGH TO THEM. WE WERE ON AN IFR RELEASE; AND THOUGH FUEL WASN'T AN ISSUE YET; ATC HAD ASKED AGAIN FOR OUR INTENTIONS; AND IN MY OPINION; THE LA BASIN IS NO PLACE TO DO AIRBORNE TROUBLE-SHOOTING. I INSTRUCTED FO TO TELL THEM WE WERE GOING TO LAND AT LAX; BUT BECAUSE THEY WERE TRYING TO PATCH US THROUGH TO THE MATRE CTR; HE COULD NOT REACH THEM. I TOLD FO TO FORGET DISPATCH COME BACK INTO THE LOOP AND TELL ATC WE WANTED TO LAND AT LAX. WE TRIED AGAIN LATER TO CONTACT DISPATCH; BUT COULD NOT GET THROUGH. ULTIMATELY; WE ASKED LAX OPS TO LET THEM KNOW WE WERE LNDG THERE. DURING THE TIME FO HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET A DECISION OUT OF DISPATCH; ATC HAD ISSUED SEVERAL INSTRUCTIONS; AND FO AND I HAD ALSO BEEN COMMUNICATING BTWN US. THE COCKPIT; AS I SAID; WAS A VERY BUSY PLACE. ATC SUDDENLY TOLD US TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO 250 DEGS. (I THINK.) I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED THE TURN; AND WHILE IN THE TURN; WE GOT A TCASII TA. THE OTHER ACFT; I BELIEVE ANOTHER ACR FLT; HAD US IN SIGHT; AND WE DID NOT GET ANY TCASII RA'S. WE COMPLETED THE TURN AND WITHOUT FURTHER DIFFICULTY; PROCEEDED TO BE VECTORED TO A RWY 25L VISUAL LNDG AT LAX. THE ATC MADE NO BIG DEAL ABOUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMMEDIATE L TURN; AND WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE REQUIREMENT FOR IT. IT IS; HOWEVER; VERY POSSIBLE WITH ALL THAT WAS HAPPENING THAT I MISSED OR MISS SET A REQUIRED HDG ASSIGNMENT FROM ATC. THE LA BASIN IS PROBABLY ONE OF THE WORST PLACES IN THE WORLD TO HAVE TO MAKE A LAST MIN DEST CHANGE; RUN A SYS MALFUNCTION CHKLIST; COMMUNICATE WITH DISPATCH; ARPT OPS; RE-PROGRAM THE COMPUTERS; ACARS; THE RADIOS GET OUT APCH PLATES; AND SO ON. IF I MISS-SET OR MISSED A HDG ASSIGNMENT IN OUR VERY BUSY COCKPIT; IT IS SOMETHING THAT WILL HAUNT ME FOR AVERY LONG TIME. AN 'IMMEDIATE' TURN REQUEST FROM ATC IS A SERIOUS THING. I FEEL THAT OUR DISPATCH SHOULD NOT HAVE TRIED OR SUGGESTED THAT WE TALK TO MAINT BEFORE MAKING A DECISION TO DIVERT. MY REQUEST WAS FOR THEM TO JOIN IN MY DECISION AS TO WHICH OF 2 ARPTS TO DIVERT TO; GIVEN OUR FLAP PROB. THE ADDED TIME AND CONFUSION CREATED BY HAVING FO TIED UP ON THE OTHER RADIO DID NOT HELP. AFTER COMPLETING THE NECESSARY CHKLISTS; WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AT LAX. WE HAD NOT DECLARED AN EMER. LAX MAINT ULTIMATELY REPLACED SOME KIND OF A FLAP SENSOR CTL BOX; AND WE FLEW TO SNA. THERE ARE OTHER FACETS AND FACTORS RELATED TO THIS FLT; ALL OF WHICH INFLUENCED OUR WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT; BUT THE CRUX OF WHAT HAPPENED IS RPTED HEREIN. FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH; ON OUR PREFLT TO LEAVE SNA; WE DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE 2 FLAP WRITE-UPS ON THE STATUS PAGE. THIS TOOK AN HR TO WORK OFF BEFORE WE COULD GET UNDERWAY.