A CL65 FLT CREW WAS ABLE TO STABILIZE THEIR APCH IN TIME FOR A SAFE APCH AND LNDG AFTER HAVING A PROB WITH THE HEADING COMPATIBILITY BTWN THE FMS AND THE COMPASS HEADING DURING A VISUAL APCH. ONCE ON THE GND CREW REALIZED THEY HAD NOT REFERRED TO THE CHKLIST FOR THE ACFT EQUIP PROB GOING INTO CID; IA.

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I WAS THE CAPT ON A FLT TO CEDAR RAPIDS (CID). WE DEPARTED ON RWY 32 AND RECEIVED THE EFIS COMP MON MESSAGE; WHICH IS A VERY COMMON MESSAGE TO RECEIVE WHEN DEPARTING FROM RWY 32. ONCE WE RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR AND FLAPS; WE PUT THE AUTOPLT ON AND ADJUSTED THE CAPT'S DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE BY PUSHING THE SLEW TOGGLE SWITCH ON THE COMPASS CTL PANEL. WE RECEIVED THE MESSAGE A FEW MORE TIMES DURING THE FLT AND EACH TIME WE CLRED THE MESSAGE BY ADJUSTING THE DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE'S HEADING. I CALLED MAINT CTL TO DISCUSS THE OBSERVATIONS AND MADE AN ENTRY IN THE LOGBOOK. ONCE ON THE GND; THE FO AND I REALIZED THAT I NEVER CALLED FOR THE QRH TO ADDRESS THE EFIS COMP MON MESSAGE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 583184: THIS MESSAGE ALERTS THE CREW TO A DIRECTIONAL MIS-ALIGNMENT BTWN THE FMS AND THE COMPASS HEADING. ON CLBOUT WE RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE AS WELL AS ON THE DSCNT (PRIMARILY DURING THE CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT BELOW 10000 FT) FOR THE VISUAL APCH ON RWY 9 INTO CID. I TRIED TO ADJUST THE DEV TO DETERMINE THE SIDE THE DEV WAS COMING FROM (IE; PF OR PNF); BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE A CLR DETERMINATION DUE TO THE TIME CONSTRAINTS OF THE VISUAL APCH. FURTHERING OUR ISSUE TO DEAL WITH THE EFIS COMP MESSAGE PROPERLY WAS THE EARLY TURN ONTO BASE LEG BY CID APCH ALONG WITH AN UNUSUAL HIGH AIRSPD ASSIGNMENT OF 210 KTS. BY THE TIME I HAD ASKED FOR A SPD REDUCTION AND RECEIVED VISUAL APCH CLRNC; COMPLETED SETTING THE FLAPS AND RUNNING THE LNDG CHKLIST; I NOTICED THAT AT APPROX 700 FT AGL WE HAD PASSED THROUGH THE LOC AND RECEIVED A GPWS 'GS' AURAL WARNING. THE CAPT (PF) MANAGED TO STABILIZE THE APCH AT 500 FT AGL; AS REQUIRED BY OUR COMPANY FOM FOR A VISUAL APCH. IN RETROSPECT; WE NEVER DID CALL FOR THE QRH INFLT.