B757 FLT CREW HAS DIFFICULTY ACHIEVING XING AND SPD RESTRS ON THE 'MITTS 1' STAR WHICH LEADS TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH AND LNDG AT LAX.

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INBOUND TO CIVET INTXN; WE WERE ASSIGNED A DSCNT TO FL280 WITH PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240 AND A SPD OF 320 KTS OR GREATER WHEN ABLE. WE DID A CRUISE DSCNT TO FL280 AND I PUT .81 MACH ON THE CRUISE PAGE OF THE FMC AND .81 MACH/320 DEGS ON THE DSCNT PAGE FOR PROGRAMMED SPDS. PRIOR TO REACHING TOP OF DSCNT AT FL280; WE WERE ASSIGNED FL220. WE PERFORMED A CRUISE DSCNT TO FL220. DURING THE DSCNT; WE CAPTURED THE DSCNT PROFILE. WE WERE THEN ASSIGNED FL190 AND A SPD OF 250 KIAS. THE CAPT SPD INTERVENED TO 250 KTS AND I DID NOT REPROGRAM 250 KIAS FOR A DSCNT SPD. WE LEVELED AT FL190 AND 250 KIAS. SINCE WE WERE PREVIOUSLY ON THE DSCNT PROFILE AND NOW HAD TO LEVEL OFF; WE NOW WERE ABOVE THE DSCNT PATH. THE CTLR THEN ASSIGNED SOMEONE TO DSND VIA THE MITTS ARR; BUT I DID NOT HEAR THE CALL SIGN. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US TO CROSS CIVET AT OR ABOVE 14000 FT AND DSND VIA THE MITTS 1 ARR. THE TIME IT TOOK FOR US TO RECEIVE THE CLRNC AND START THE DSCNT LEFT US QUITE HIGH ON THE PATH. THE CAPT SELECTED 8000 FT ON THE MCP AND ENGAGED VNAV; SINCE 320 KIAS WAS STILL PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC; THE AIRSPD BUG SLEWED UP TO 320 KTS AND THE ACFT ACCELERATED. I NOTICED THE SPD INCREASE AT APPROX 270 KTS AND MENTIONED OUR ASSIGNED SPD OF 250 KTS. THE CAPT SPD INTERVENED TO 250 KTS; BUT I THINK WE GOT AS FAST AS 290 KTS. IF I WOULD HAVE PROGRAMMED A DSCNT SPD OF 250 KTS; IT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE BUG FROM SLEWING TO 320 KTS. WE WERE NOW HIGH AND FAST. SOMEWHERE BTWN 17000 FT AND 9000 FT WE GOT ON PROFILE AND SPD. (I DO NOT REMEMBER WHERE.) THE ACFT LEVELED OFF AT 9000 FT PRIOR TO JONZZ INTXN SO I ASSUME THAT WE MET THE MITTS XING RESTR; BUT I DO NOT REMEMBER. AFTER JONZZ AND DSNDING TO 8000 FT FOR DENAY; THE CAPT STARTED TO SELECT A LONGER ALT ON THE MCP; BUT CHANGED HIS MIND AND RESELECTED 8000 FT. (WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH.) WE 'ALT CAPTURE' AT 8000 FT AND CROSSED DELAY. I MENTIONED THE ALT CAPTURE AND THE CAPT SELECTED 2200 FT IN THE MCP FOR JETSA. HE THEN SELECTED VERT SPD TO START THE DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE GS. SOMEWHERE WE WERE ASSIGNED A SPD OF 220 KTS OR GREATER AND EVENTUALLY I BELIEVE 170 KTS TO JETSA. WE NOW CONFIGURED AND SLOWED WHILE STILL TRYING TO CAPTURE THE GS. I REMEMBER CALLING 'JETSA 2200' I THINK WE WERE 2500-2600 FT MSL WITH GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 15 DEGS. UNFORTUNATE FOR US WE 'ALT CAPTURE' AT 2200 FT. THE CAPT SELECTED A LOWER ALT AND VERT SPD. AT THIS POINT I WAS THINKING 'WE WERE STILL VMC AND HAD 1000 FT TO BE STABILIZED.' BUT THE ALT CAPTURE AT 2200 FT REALLY HINDERED GS CAPTURE. IT IS NOW QUITE OBVIOUS THAT ONE OF US SHOULD HAVE CALLED 'GAR.' I THINK AT 1200 FT AGL WE HAD FLAPS 25 DEGS; DSNDING AT 1500 FPM AND STILL ABOVE THE GS. SOMEWHERE BTWN 800-1200 FT AGL; I BELIEVE THAT WE SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS; CAPTURED THE GS AND GOT SOMEWHERE CLOSE TO APCH SPD. WE THEN HEARD THE AURAL SOUND AND SAW THE 'SPD BRAKE EXTENSION' EICAS MESSAGE. THE CAPT RETRACTED THE SPD BRAKES AND I COMPLETED THE LNDG CHKLIST. FROM 800 FT AGL TO THE RWY; I BELIEVE EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL. WE TOUCHED DOWN ON SPD WITH NO EXCESSIVE FLOAT. PREPARATION AND BRIEFING THE ARR WAS EXCELLENT AND NOT A FACTOR. WE DISCUSSED DIFFERENT WAYS TO EXECUTE THE ARR AND APCH AND DECIDED ON ONE WAY TO DO IT. I FEEL THE DSCNT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE B757; ME NOT PROGRAMMING 250 KTS FOR THE DSCNT; LATE DSCNT CLRNC BY ATC; AND A COUPLE OF ALT CAPTURES ALL COMBINED TO MAKE THIS AN EXTREMELY CHALLENGING APCH WHICH PUT US IN A SIT WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND AND RETURNED FOR A STABILIZED APCH.