CL65 CREW FOUND NIL BRAKING ON TXWYS LEADING TO THE RAMP AREA. ACFT LOST CTL WHEN ATTEMPTING A TURN INTO THE RAMP.

Date: 2003-12 · Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model · Phase: taxi

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|ground-event-encounter-loss-of-aircraft-control|ground-excursion-ramp|inflight-event-encounter-other-unknown|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence|other-nil-breaking-action

Synopsis

CL65 CREW FOUND NIL BRAKING ON TXWYS LEADING TO THE RAMP AREA. ACFT LOST CTL WHEN ATTEMPTING A TURN INTO THE RAMP.

Narrative

LANDED PLN RWY 14 FOLLOWING A VISUAL APCH. ALTHOUGH ASOS RPTED WIND WAS 200 DEGS/7 KTS; THE MFD DISPLAYED WIND OF 230 DEGS/30 KTS ON FINAL; WHICH REMAINED UNCHANGED DURING THE TOUCHDOWN AND ROLLOUT. BRAKING ACTION WAS FAIR TO GOOD; ALTHOUGH REVERSE THRUST WAS REQUIRED NEARING THE RWY END DUE TO PATCHES OF ICE. EXITED RWY ON TXWY A AND PROCEEDED N TO THE RAMP. I OBSERVED THE TXWY TO BE 100% CONTAMINATED WITH SNOW AND ICE. TAXI SPD WAS APPROX 5 MPH OR LESS. STEERING WAS ALMOST INEFFECTIVE AND BRAKING ACTION WAS NIL. PATH TO THE RAMP WAS THEN E ON TXWY B FOLLOWED BY A L TURN N ONTO THE RAMP. THE RAMP WAS ALSO 100% CONTAMINATED WITH CLR ICE COVERED BY LOOSE SNOW. LARGE RADIUS TURNS WERE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN STEERING EFFECTIVENESS. UPON ENTERING THE RAMP; THE ACFT BEGAN TO YAW TO THE L. BRAKES AND STEERING WERE COMPLETELY INEFFECTIVE. I DEPLOYED BOTH THRUST REVERSERS IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE ACFT. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT SLOWED TO PERHAPS 1 OR 2 MPH; IT CONTINUED IN A FORWARD AND L YAWING MOTION AND FAILED TO STOP BEFORE THE NOSEWHEEL CONTACTED A SMALL (4 INCH) SNOW BANK. THE ACFT THEN CAME TO REST AND I STOWED THE THRUST REVERSERS. THE LONGITUDINAL AXIS WAS ALIGNED ABOUT 45 DEG COUNTER-CLOCKWISE FROM THE RAMP TAXI LINE. WE CONTACTED RAMP PERSONNEL WHO RPTED THAT THE ACFT WAS UNOBSTRUCTED AND RECOMMENDED REVERSER THRUST. I ATTEMPTED THIS BUT THE ACFT FAILED TO MOVE. I THEN DECIDED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGS; OFFLOAD THE PAX; AND SECURE THE ACFT. I EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PROX OF VEHICLES TO THE ACFT AS I DID NOT WANT ONE TO SLIDE INTO THE PLANE AND DAMAGE IT. A SAND TRUCK ARRIVED TO TREAT THE AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE CABIN DOOR SO THAT A VAN COULD BE SAFELY DRIVEN TO THE ACFT. THE PATH FROM THE CABIN DOOR TO THE VAN WAS ALSO TREATED WITH SAND. UPON EXITING THE ACFT I ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SLIPPED AND FELL. WALKING AROUND THE ACFT TO INSPECT IT WAS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE ACT OF CLOSING THE ACFT DOOR FROM OUTSIDE WAS DIFFICULT AS I COULD ONLY APPLY A VERT FORCE TO IT WITHOUT SLIPPING ON THE ICE. THE NEXT DAY THE RAMP WAS DEICED; AND I DETERMINED THAT ALL WHEELS WERE ON WET PAVEMENT. COMPANY MAINT APPROVED A PWR BACK PROC. ONCE THE NOSEWHEEL AREA WAS FREE OF SNOW THE PWR BACK PROC WAS SUCCESSFUL. THE CAUSE OF THIS MISHAP WAS AN ICE CONTAMINATED RAMP AND TXWYS WHICH MADE ACFT CTL IMPOSSIBLE. A L QUARTERING TAILWIND CAUSED THE ACFT TO YAW WHICH COULD NOT BE STOPPED DUE TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT FRICTION APPLIED BY THE NOSEWHEEL TIRES. AN UNUSUALLY HVY AFT CARGO LOAD OF 2000 LBS CONTRIBUTED TO THE LACK OF NOSEWHEEL STEERING EFFECTIVENESS. THIS ARPT IS UNCTLED AND RAMP CONDITIONS ARE NOT RPTED. RWY MU VALUES ARE USEFUL BUT DO NOT DESCRIBE THE AMOUNT OF CONTAMINATION; AND TXWY AND RAMP AREAS ARE UNRPTED. IN ADDITION TO MEASURING MU VALUES ON TXWYS AND RAMP AREAS; I SUGGEST THAT FIELD CONDITION RPTS SIMILAR TO THAT MADE IN CANADA BE IMPLEMENTED. THESE RPTS TYPICALLY DESCRIBE THE TYPE AND AMOUNT OF CONTAMINANT IN DETAIL; FOR INSTANCE; 'RAMP CONTAMINATED WITH 30% PACKED ICE AND SNOW; 10% CLR ICE; REMAINDER CLEAN AND DRY.' THIS TYPE OF RPT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR DISPATCH TO ANTICIPATE CONDITIONS AND DETERMINE IF THE FLT CAN BE COMPLETED SAFELY. FAILURE TO TREAT THE RAMP OR TXWYS WITH EITHER SAND OR DEICE FLUID WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT IN AN ACFT ACCIDENT.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.