A320 CREW ABORTED TKOF AFTER THE #1 ENG HAD A COMPRESSOR STALL. WHEN THE ACFT WAS BEING TOWED TO THE GATE THE TOW BAR BROKE.

Narrative

A320 REJECTED TKOF ATL. ENG SHUTDOWN; TOW BAR; BRAKES. FAA MAINT INSPECTOR ON BOARD; IN COCKPIT JUMPSEAT. FO LEG; FO STATED 'SETTING 50%' AND I CALLED STABILIZED. FO THEN SMOOTHLY ADVANCED THRUST LEVERS TO THE CLB DETENT ALLOWING THE ENG RPM'S TO FOLLOW THE THRUST LEVERS BEFORE ADVANCING TO THE FLEX 48 DEG SETTING. I CALLED THE FMA; 'MANUAL; FLEX; SENSORS' AND WHEN TKOF THRUST WAS SET; I ASSUMED CTL OF THE THROTTLES. APCHING 80 KIAS I CALLED 'THRUST SET.' WITHIN 1 - 1 1/2 SECONDS AND PRIOR TO 100 KIAS (WE NEVER MADE THE '100 KTS' CALL BECAUSE WE NEVER REACHED 100 KIAS) A VERY LOUD BANG SHUDDERED THE AIRPLANE ACCOMPANIED BY AN IMMEDIATE AND EXCESSIVE YAW TO THE L OF CTRLINE. I STATED; 'I HAVE CTL; STOP' AND ASSUMED FULL CTL OF THE ACFT. AS I WAS TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT FOR THE ABORT; I GLANCED AT THE ENG INSTS BRIEFLY TO MAKE AN INSTANT ASSESSMENT. ALL ENG INDICATIONS APPEARED SYMMETRICAL AND WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING PARAMETERS. AS I RETARDED THE THROTTLE LEVERS TOWARDS THE IDLE DETENT; AND THEN REVERSE THRUST WITH 'MAX' BRAKING SELECTED; I CORRECTED BACK TO CTRLINE. FO ANNOUNCED; 'ATL TWR; FLT IS ABORTING THE TKOF ON RWY 26L.' AFTER THE ACFT WAS TRACKING THE CTRLINE; I AGAIN SCANNED THE ENG INSTS AND EVERY PARAMETER WAS STILL SYMMETRICAL AND WELL WITHIN PARAMETERS. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE FO. (THE FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD ESTIMATED THAT WE ONLY DRIFTED 5-10 FT L OF CTRLINE.) WE STOPPED STRAIGHT AHEAD ON RWY 26L AND THE FO ADVISED TWR THAT WE NEEDED TO MAKE A QUICK ASSESSMENT ON THE RWY. AT THAT TIME AN ACR Y FLT ON THE PARALLEL TXWY RADIOED ON TWR FREQ THAT 'ACR X; WE SAW A HUGE FIREBALL COME FROM ACFT L; GOOD JOB.' SINCE THE ACFT UNDERWENT 2 TIRE CHANGES EARLIER IN THE DAY; WE WERE NOT COMPLETELY SURE THAT WE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SUFFERED A BLOWN TIRE(S) IN ADDITION TO; OR CAUSING ANY ENG MALFUNCTION. AFTER WE STOPPED ON RWY 26L ALL 3 OF US ON THE FLT DECK BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE ENG PARAMETERS. THE FAA INSPECTOR; SITTING IN THE CTR AND SCANNING THE ENG INSTS THROUGHOUT THE TKOF ROLL; NOTED THAT HE NEVER SAW ANY ABNORMAL OR UNSYMMETRICAL INDICATIONS EITHER. SUSPECTING AT LEAST A COMPRESSOR STALL; WE WERE PUZZLED BY THE LACK OF ANY OTHER ASSOCIATED INDICATIONS OR ECAM MESSAGES OR ENG VIBRATION. SINCE THE ACFT WAS NOT LEANING TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AND ALL OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL; WE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND TURNED R ONTO B10; THEN POINTED THE ACFT W ONTO TXWY B; BTWN THE 2 PARALLEL RWYS ON THE N COMPLEX. WE DISCUSSED THE ENG INSTS AND WHETHER OR NOT TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. AGAIN; WE NOTED NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS AND THE #1 ENG MATCHED EXACTLY THE #2 ENG INSTS. BEFORE WE TOOK ANY FURTHER ACTION CONCERNING THE #1 ENG; WE CELL PHONED LCL MAINT. WE GOT A HOLD OF MECH MR X WHO WAS WORKING ON OUR ACFT OUT ON THE FBO RAMP ON THE NORTHERNMOST PART OF THE AIRFIELD. I EXPLAINED THE COMPLETE SCENARIO TO HIM AND ASKED WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD SHUT DOWN. AGAIN WE CONFIRMED THAT ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. MR X SUGGESTED THAT WE CONTINUE TO SIT ON TXWY B; ENGS RUNNING AT IDLE UNTIL THE TUG GETS OUT TO THE ACFT. THE FLT DECK CREW MADE NUMEROUS RADIO CALLS AND CELL PHONE CALLS TO A PLETHORA OF MAINT AND MGMNT PERSONNEL WHILE WE WAITED FOR A TUG CONFIRMING OUR CURRENT STATUS AND CONFIGN. WE REQUESTED A MECH TO ALSO COME OUT AND PERFORM A VISUAL INSPECTION FOR ANY DAMAGE BEFORE THE ACFT WAS TOWED. AT XA35; 56 MINS AFTER THE TKOF ROLL WAS STARTED; THE TUG SHOWED UP AND WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. THE MECH PERFORMED HIS INSPECTION AND INFORMED US THAT HE SAW NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF ANY ENG OR GEAR/TIRE DAMAGE. AT ABOUT XA40 WE RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND BEGAN OUR TOW WITH THE MECH RIDING THE TUG ALONG WITH THE ACR X TUG OPERATOR; FOLLOWING ARPT AUTH VEHICLE ESCORT. THE ACFT WAS TOWED WBOUND ON TXWY B TO EITHER DIXIE OR C AND WE WAITED WHILE THE TUG CREW RECEIVED PERMISSION TO CROSS THE INBOARD RWY 26L. WE WERE THEN TOWED ACROSS RWY 26L AND ONTO E7; WHICH IS ONLY A 45 DEG TURN ONTO THE HIGH SPD TXWY. DURING OUR TURN ONTO THE OUTBOARD PARALLEL TXWY E; THE TUG OPERATOR STATED 'CAPT; PLEASE SET YOUR BRAKE; CAPT SET YOUR BRAKE.' I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED A RAPID AND FORCEFUL APPLICATION TO THE BRAKE PEDALS. I ESTIMATE THAT WE WERE UNDER TOW AT APPROX 10 KTS GND SPD JUST PRIOR TO BRAKE APPLICATION. WE CAME TO AN ABRUPT AND RAPID HALT AND JUST AS THE ACFT STOPPED WE HEARD A NOISE FROM UNDER THE NOSE OF THE ACFT. THE TUG OPERATOR ANNOUNCED THAT HIS BAR SNAPPED. THE MECH THEN GOT ON THE HEADSET AND INFORMED US THAT AS THE TOW BAR SNAPPED; THE DRIVER PANICKED AND STOPPED THE TUG INSTEAD OF ROLLING FORWARD. THE MECH STATED THAT HE SLAPPED THE TUG OPERATOR'S BACK AND TOLD HIM TO 'GUN IT' SO AS NOT TO GET HIT BY THE ACFT. THE MECH THEN STATED THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE REMAINING BROKEN PART OF THE TOW BAR THAT WAS CONNECTED TO THE TUG CAME UP AGAINST THE ELECTRICAL CONDUIT AND FACE PLATE ON THE NOSE GEAR STRUT. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE; ONLY SOME COSMETIC DAMAGE AND THAT TOWING COULD BE RESUMED ONCE WE FOUND ANOTHER TOW BAR; APPROX 215 MINS LATER. ANOTHER TOW BAR ARRIVED AND WE CONTINUED THE REST OF THE TOW TO GATE UNEVENTFULLY. I INSPECTED THE NOSE GEAR AND THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME ADDITIONAL SCRATCHES IN THE OUTER SLEEVE OF THE OLEO STRUT. MAINT PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS UPON ARR AND STATED TO OUR CREW THAT THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OR READINGS TO INDICATE ANY PROB WITH THE #1 ENG AT THAT TIME. I TALKED TO MAINT THE FOLLOWING DAY AND LEARNED THAT THEY FOUND 2 COMPRESSOR SECTION BLADES THAT CAME APART AND DAMAGED THE TURBINE SECTION OF THE #1 ENG. THE FAA INSPECTOR THAT WAS ON BOARD THE ACFT; IN THE JUMPSEAT WITH THE CREW DURING THE WHOLE INCIDENT; PRAISED THE CREW FOR THEIR ACTIONS. HE THEN FILLED OUT AN INCIDENT RPT ON THE TOW BAR MALFUNCTION. CREW DUTY DAY ACTUALLY STARTED AT XP30 AND THIS WAS OUR THIRD ACFT AND THIRD ATTEMPT TO DEPART ATL ENRTE TO SFO FOLLOWING AN ACFT CHANGE AND AN AIRBORNE TURN BACK FROM OVERHEAD THE MEMPHIS VOR -- ALL WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD. DESCRIBING ALL OF THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE BROKEN TOW BAR ALLOWS SOME IDEA INTO THE THOUGHT PROCESSES OF THE FLT DECK CREW. WE FEEL THAT THE POOR OR INADEQUATE TRAINING PROVIDED TO THE TUG OPERATOR BY HIS COMPANY DID NOT DETAIL ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN UNDER VARIOUS ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. THEREFORE; HE STOPPED THE TUG IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT AFTER THE TOW BAR SNAPPED RATHER THAN CONTINUING SO AS TO ALLOW ROOM FOR OUR ACFT TO STOP SAFELY. IN ADDITION; INCREASED TUG/ACFT COM TRAINING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO COVER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. THE RAPID ACTIONS BY THE CREW PREVENTED THE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER DAMAGE AND BODILY HARM.