OVERHEATED BRAKES AND A SUBSEQUENT FLT DELAY SUFFERED BY A B757-200 FLT CREW WHEN THE PIC ABORTS THE TKOF AT 100 KTS FOR AN L-4 DOOR WARNING EICAS MESSAGE.

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DURING TKOF ON RWY 25R; I REJECTED THE TKOF FOR A L AFT ENTRY DOOR EICAS MESSAGE. THE FO WAS MAKING THE TKOF. I INITIATED THE REJECTED TKOF AT APPROX 100 KTS. WE DECELERATED TO A VERY SLOW SPD AND CLRED THE RWY. I DID NOT STOP THE ACFT ON THE RWY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THE ADJACENT RAMP WAS WIDE OPEN WHICH WOULD ALLOW EMER EQUIP UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THE ACFT. ORIENTATION INTO THE WIND FOR BOTH SLIDE DEPLOYMENT AND FIRE CTL IF NECESSARY. LASTLY; BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY; BECAUSE OF OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING THE BOARDING PHASE; I FELT AN EVAC WOULD BE PROBABLE; COMMANDED OR NOT. WHEN CLRING THE RWY; THE 'REMAIN SEATED; SIT UNDER CTL;' PA WAS MADE; ALONG WITH A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE REJECTED TKOF. WE WERE INFORMED BY THE TWR OF SOME BRAKE SMOKE; BUT NOT FIRE. THIS WAS VERIFIED BY THE ACFT BEHIND US. THE TWR ADVISED THAT THE RAMP IN FRONT OF THE FIRE STATION WAS AVAILABLE; IF WE WANTED ACCESS TO THEIR BRAKE COOLING FANS. WE THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO ACCEPT. WE FACED INTO THE WIND; ESTABLISHED COMS WITH FIRE/RESCUE; AND SECURED THE ENGS. BRAKE TEMPS CONTINUED TO RISE WHILE PARKED AND REMAINED HIGH UNTIL COOLING FANS WERE ESTABLISHED. WE REQUESTED AN INSPECTION BY ACR MAINT. THE MAIN TRUCKS AND BRAKES WERE INSPECTED; AND WE WERE ALLOWED TO TAXI BACK TO THE GATE WHEN COOLED TO LEVEL 4. ONCE AT THE GATE; THE SECOND RUSH BEGAN TO GET THE ACFT BACK IN SVC. THE L4 DOOR WAS PUT ON MEL. WE WERE TOLD WE WERE GOOD TO GO. WE TOOK THE NECESSARY TIME TO COMPLY WITH QRH BRAKE COOLING CHARTS AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE THE FLT SAFELY. FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE AFFECTED THIS FLT: WX TEMP; 42 DEGS C; LLWS WINDS 180 DESG/14 KTS GUSTING 24 KTS; INBOUND MAINT ISSUE WITH L4 DOOR. BOARDING PROCESS WITH 2 DIFFERENT CREWS (FLT ATTENDANTS CAME FROM INTL GATE; LOSS OF CREW CONTINUITY); CORRECTIVE ACTION ON L4 DOOR WAS ADDRESSED LATE IN THE DEP PROCESS. THIS LEFT MUCH DOUBT WITH THE STATEMENT; 'WE LUBED THE MICRO SWITCH AND YOU ARE GOOD TO GO.' RESIDUAL BRAKE TEMPS (3) ON R MAIN TRUCK FROM INBOUND FLT. 1'S AND 2'S ON L MAIN TRUCK. CONVERSATION WITH PREVIOUS CREW ON MAINT DISCREPANCY. RAMP AND BREAK ROOM CONVERSATION ABOUT ACR AUTH OVERTIME FOR TECHNICIANS TO CLEAN UP EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF MEL'S ON SYS-WIDE FLEET. COMBINATION SIDE-LOAD FROM WIND GUSTS AND DOOR CAUTION MESSAGE DURING TKOF ROLL. THE ABOVE FACTORS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSE FOR A DOOR CAUTION LIGHT. ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT CORPORATE CULTURE REGARDING REJECTED TKOF DECISIONS. I HAVE OPERATED THE ACFT FOR A NUMBER OF YRS AND HAVE SEEN THIS SIT ON THE B757 ON A PRIOR TKOF EVENT; AND RESPONDED TO IT CORRECTLY. I HAVE ALSO RESPONDED CORRECTLY DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING. CONSIDERING ALL THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO DEP AND THE ISSUES WE HAVE BEEN SEEING ON THE LINE WITH THE CONTINUED OBVIOUS PRESSURE ON THE LINE TECHNICIANS TO MOVE THE ACFT; I THINK THE COMBINATION WITH THE ABOVE FACTORS PLACED ME INTO A SPRING-LOADED MODE; MUCH AS WE ARE IN SIMULATORS. IN ADDITION; DURING TKOF ROLL; THERE WERE NORMAL SIDE-LOADING GUSTS. ONE WAS RATHER PROFOUND; WHICH WAS SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE L AFT ENTRY DOOR MESSAGE. THE AIRSPD WAS ACCELERATING RAPIDLY THROUGH 100 KTS. THIS ALL OCCURRED IN A MICROSECOND. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT; AND RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE REJECTED TKOF. ON A POSITIVE NOTE; ALL 123 PAX REMAINED ABOARD. WE COMMUNICATED THE SIT EFFECTIVELY AND APPEASED THEIR CONCERNS.