A CARJ RECEIVES A TCAS RA TO AVOID TFC THAT THE CAPT; PNF HAS A VISUAL ON. THE CAPT TAKES OVER AND INITIATES A CLB TO AVOID THE VISUAL TFC.

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SAV ATIS/ASOS WERE NOT AVAILABLE. DURING TAXI OUT; WE BECAME AWARE THAT THE CTLR ON DUTY WAS WORKING GND; CLRNC; TWR; APCH AND DEP -- ALL ON DIFFERENT FREQS. WE WERE CLRED TO 10000 FT. AFTER TKOF; AT APPROX 3500 FT; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO STOP CLB AT 4000 FT. WE PROMPTLY LEVELED OFF AND THE CAPT POINTED OUT THE TFC AT 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 2000 FT ABOVE. I CONFIRMED THAT I HAD TFC IN SIGHT AND WE OBSERVED THAT TFC APPEARED TO BE ON A PARALLEL COURSE. THE CAPT CALLED TFC IN SIGHT AND ATC ASKED IF WE COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. I AGREED WITH THE CAPT THAT WE COULD AND WE BEGAN THE CLB. IN THE CLB PITCH ATTITUDE; I COULD NO LONGER SEE THE ACFT; BUT THE CAPT WAS CLOSELY WATCHING IT. AT APPROX 5500 FT; ATC ASKED 'ARE YOU SURE YOU HAVE TFC IN SIGHT? HE'S PRETTY WORRIED.' A MOMENT LATER HE ADDED 'YOU GUYS ARE IN CONFLICT.' AT THE SAME TIME THE TCAS GENERATED AN RA. IT COMMANDED A DSCNT. SINCE I DID NOT HAVE THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT; I IMMEDIATELY REDUCED THRUST TO IDLE AND FOLLOWED THE TCAS GUIDANCE FOR A 1500-2000 FPM DSCNT. I ALSO TURNED SLIGHTLY R OF COURSE AWAY FROM THE OTHER ACFT. WHILE I WAS COMPLYING WITH THE RA; THE CAPT (WHO STILL HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT) OBSERVED THAT ACFT BEGIN A STEEP DSCNT WHICH WOULD PUT US BACK IN CONFLICT. HE THEN COMMANDED 'CLB; CLB!' SINCE THIS INSTRUCTION CONFLICTED WITH THE RA AND I COULD NOT SEE THE OTHER ACFT; I OFFERED A XFER OF CTL. CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT; BEGAN A CLB AND WE CLRED THE CONFLICT. FACTORS AFFECTING: NIGHT; HIGH CTLR WORKLOAD; OTHER ACFT APPEARED TO NOT HAVE TCAS; THEREFORE HIS EVASIVE MANEUVER ACTUALLY WORSENED THE SIT. SINCE BOTH OF US WERE ON DIFFERENT FREQS WE COULD NOT HEAR EACH OTHER COMMUNICATE EITHER. IN THE FUTURE; I AM UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT A CLRNC TO REMAIN VISUAL AND CLB OR DSND AT NIGHT. THIS ALSO DISPLAYED A POTENTIAL FAULT IN THE TCAS SINCE RA'S MAY BE INACCURATE WHEN USED TO AVOID NON-TCAS EQUIPPED ACFT WHO ARE ALSO TAKING EVASIVE ACTION. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THIS EVENT. IN THE END; THE CAPT'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CTL; DISREGARD THE TCAS AND MANEUVER US OUT OF DANGER SAVED US. I BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR DID A DIS-SVC BY EVEN OFFERING A CLB TO 2 ACFT WHO WERE ON CONFLICTING COURSES. HIS WORKLOAD (AT LEAST 5 SEPARATE FREQS) CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 631118: DURING OUR CLB WE RECEIVED AN RA TO DSND. THE FO WAS FLYING AND HAD LOST CONTACT WITH THE ACFT AND STARTED TO DSND. I HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND IT LOOKED TO ME THAT WE WOULD REMAIN CLR IF WE CONTINUED THE CLB.