A CL65 FO RPT ON THE USE OF HIS ACFT ON 2 FLTS WITH AN OPEN MAINT WROTE-UP FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 AND RETURN.
Synopsis
A CL65 FO RPT ON THE USE OF HIS ACFT ON 2 FLTS WITH AN OPEN MAINT WROTE-UP FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 AND RETURN.
Narrative
EVENT: CL65 OPERATED PART 121 WITH UNRESOLVED MAINT DISCREPANCY. ON SEP/THU/04 I WAS THE FO ON FLT ABBA ZZZ-ZZZ1 AND FLT ABCB; ZZZ1-ZZZ OPERATED BY COMMUTER X. I ARRIVED AT THE GATE; ALONG WITH MY CAPT; APPROX 40 MINS PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED DEP TIME OF XA35. I BEGAN MY NORMAL PREFLT DUTIES INCLUDING WALKAROUND; RECEIVING ATIS AND CLRNC; PROGRAMMING THE FMS; PERFORMING COMPANY ACARS FUNCTIONS; ETC. WHILE PERFORMING MY COCKPIT PREPARATION DUTIES; THE CAPT HAD THE ACFT MAINT LOG OPENED AND I NOTICED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN OPEN WRITE-UP. WHILE I DIDN'T LOOK CLOSELY AT THE ENTRIES; I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE 2 ITEMS LISTED ON THE 'DISCREPANCY' SIDE OF THE PAGE; WHILE ONLY THE SECOND OF THESE 2 ENTRIES HAD A CORRESPONDING 'CORRECTIVE ACTION' REMARK NEXT TO IT. I MADE A STATEMENT TO THE CAPT REGARDING THIS AND HE REPLIED THAT BOTH OF THE DISCREPANCIES HAD BEEN RESOLVED BY THE 'CORRECTIVE ACTION' REMARK NEXT TO THE FINAL DISCREPANCY AND THAT THE ENTRY INDICATED THE ACFT WAS OK TO RETURN TO SVC. I ACCEPTED THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT TAKING CARE TO EXAMINE THE ENTRIES MYSELF. FLTS ABBA TO ZZZ1 AND THE RETURN FLT ABCB TO ZZZ WERE OPERATED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON OUR RETURN TO ZZZ; WE WERE MET BY THE BASE MGR AND A MAINT TECHNICIAN. THEY INFORMED US THAT WE HAD JUST OPERATED BOTH FLTS WITH AN OPEN MAINT WRITE-UP. THE MAINT TECHNICIAN TOLD US THAT DISPATCH HAD BEEN CALLED 2 HRS PRIOR TO DEP TIME AND INFORMED THAT THE ACFT WAS BEING REMOVED FROM SVC. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE 'CORRECTIVE ACTION' STATEMENT INDICATING THAT THE ACFT WAS OK TO RETURN TO SVC HAD NOT BEEN SIGNED. THERE WERE NUMEROUS FACTORS THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE. THE FIRST IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS INVOLVED DISPATCH. AFTER RECEIVING THE PHONE CALL FROM MAINT INFORMING THEM THAT THE ACFT WAS BEING REMOVED FROM SVC; DISPATCH NEGLECTED TO FIND ANOTHER ACFT OR CANCEL THE FLT. INSTEAD; THE DISPATCHER ISSUED RELEASES FOR BOTH FLTS USING THAT ACFT. NEXT; THE CAPT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DISCREPANCIES HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY CORRECTED. FINALLY; AS FO; I NEGLECTED TO BACK UP THE CAPT BY FAILING TO ACTUALLY EXAMINE THE ENTRIES TO ENSURE THE WRITE-UPS HAD BEEN PROPERLY RESOLVED. INSTEAD; I SIMPLY RELIED ON HIS STATEMENT THAT THEY HAD BEEN PROPERLY RESOLVED; WHICH WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION. TO A LESSER DEGREE; I THINK THE FACT THAT MAINT ENTERED THE REMARK 'OK TO RETURN TO SVC' CONTRIBUTED TO THE OCCURRENCE. WHILE THEY PERFORMED THEIR JOB PROPERLY AND DID NOT PUT A SIGNATURE NEXT TO THE STATEMENT; ENTERING THE REMARK DOES CREATE AN ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR A MISTAKE TO BE MADE. ANOTHER SECONDARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT WE WERE DEALING WITH 2 MEL ITEMS LISTED ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE. WE SPENT TIME REVIEWING THE PROCS TO DEAL WITH THESE ITEMS; WHICH MAY HAVE LED US TO GLOSS OVER THE ADDITIONAL ENTRIES IN THE AML. I MADE THE INCORRECT AND FOOLISH ASSUMPTION THAT THE 2 WRITE-UPS IN THE AML WERE LIKELY THE 2 MEL ITEMS LISTED ON THE RELEASE.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.