A CRJ CREW DEPARTED WITHOUT DISPATCH FUEL QUANTITY; NOTICED THE DISCREPANCY ENRTE BUT CONTINUED TO THE DEST WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER.

Date: 2005-08 · Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model · Phase: cruise

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

A CRJ CREW DEPARTED WITHOUT DISPATCH FUEL QUANTITY; NOTICED THE DISCREPANCY ENRTE BUT CONTINUED TO THE DEST WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER.

Narrative

WE WERE ENRTE. WHEN THE FO PERFORMED THE ITEMS ON THE CRUISE CHKLIST HE SAW THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE AMOUNT OF FUEL WE EXPECTED TO HAVE. OUR FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT WE HAD EITHER A FUEL GAUGE PROB OR A FUEL LEAK. WE MONITORED THE FUEL FLOW AND DETERMINED THAT THE GAUGES WERE WORKING PROPERLY AND FUEL WAS BEING USED AT A NORMAL RATE. WE DISCUSSED DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVERTING; BUT WE CALCULATED WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL TO CONTINUE TO ORD AND LAND SAFELY WITH APPROX 2000 LBS ON BOARD SO WE CONTINUED. WE DID NOT DECLARE MINIMUM FUEL BUT DISCUSSED DOING SO IF WE RECEIVED EXTENSIVE VECTORING. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AT ORD WITH APPROX 1900 LBS OF FUEL. IN EVALUATING THE SIT AFTERWARD; WE CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE LOW FUEL SIT WAS THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF DISPATCH FUEL WHEN WE LEFT CVG. IN TRYING TO RECONSTRUCT WHAT HAPPENED; WE REACHED THESE CONCLUSIONS: 1) THE FO NOTICED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN FUELED BUT THEN SAW A RAMP AGENT BEGIN TO FUEL THE ACFT. WE PROBABLY ASSUMED THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FUEL WAS BEING ADDED. 2) FUEL WAS ADDED; BUT NOT THE CORRECT AMOUNT. WE FLEW THE ACFT ON THE PREVIOUS FLT AND CALCULATED AFTER THE FACT THAT WE WOULD HAVE HAD APPROX 3500 LBS ON LNDG AND APPROX 5000 LBS FOR TKOF TO ORD. 3) WE PROBABLY BECAME DISTR BY A JUMPSEATER; THE FLT ATTENDANT DEALING WITH SOME PAX SEATING ISSUES; AND SOME LAST MIN PAX AND BAGS. 4) WE HAD BEEN FOCUSING ON THE FMS WT PAGE DUE TO LAST MIN PAX AND CARGO WT CHANGES. SO; WHEN THE FO CHKED THE FUEL DURING THE STARTING ENGS CHKLIST; HE MOST LIKELY LOOKED AT THE FMS FUEL QUANTITY INSTEAD OF THE EICAS FUEL NUMBERS. I BELIEVE I DID THE SAME THING. PREVENTIVE MEASURES INCLUDE: NEVER ASSUME. VERIFY; ESPECIALLY FUEL QUANTITIES. BE AWARE OF DISTRS AND BE EXTRA DILIGENT WHEN CHKING IMPORTANT DATA. BE SURE TO LOOK AT; SEE AND PROCESS FUEL QUANTITY INFO PROPERLY AND THEN CHK AGAIN.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.