ATR-42 FLT CREW REQUESTS AND RECEIVES A MODIFIED TURN TO INTERCEPT THE ILS APCH TO EXPEDITE THE ARR. THE ACFT WAS HIGH; FAST AND NOT CONFIGURED. THE GPWS SOUNDED 'TOO LOW GEAR.'

Narrative

THE SITUATION TOOK PLACE DURING THE APCH SEGMENT OF OUR FLT. THIS WAS THE FOURTH ROUNDTRIP BTWN OAKLAND AND VANCOUVER WE HAD PERFORMED THAT WK; THEREFORE; THE CAPT AND I WERE PREPARED FOR A STANDARD NON-EVENTFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR TRIP. AFTER REVIEWING THE ATIS; WE BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 8R FOR VANCOUVER. ONCE PASSING APPROX 5000 FT; THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CALL APCH AND REQUEST A CLOSE-IN BASE LEG TO HELP EXPEDITE OUR APCH. THE CTLR GRANTED OUR REQUEST AND GAVE US A R TURN TO THE N THAT WOULD SERVE AS OUR BASE LEG. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A SERIES OF STEP-DOWN ALTS TO BRING US TO OUR FINAL LOC INTERCEPT ALT OF 1500 FT. UPON REACHING 1500 FT; WE WERE GIVEN OUR APCH CLRNC. IT WAS CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT THE LOC WOULD BE INTERCEPTED INSIDE OF THE FAF AND WE WOULD BE ABOVE THE GLIDE SLOPE. THEN; BEFORE WE HAD TIME TO DISCUSS OUR COURSE OF ACTION; THE LOC AND GS 'CAME ALIVE.' THE CAPT MADE A STANDARD-RATE TURN TO THE R TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND BEGAN A DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE GS. ALTHOUGH WE WERE ABLE TO CAPTURE AND MAINTAIN THE GS; WE WERE UNABLE TO INTERCEPT THE LOC WITHOUT THE USE OF A TURN IN EXCESS OF 30 DEGS. THEREFORE; WE LEVELED OFF AT 1000 FT AND MAINTAINED OUR LOC INTERCEPT HDG. JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO CALL FOR A MISSED APCH (WHICH I LATER DISCOVERED THE CAPT WAS GOING TO DO AS WELL); THE ARPT CAME INTO VIEW. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT STATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE VISUALLY TO THE ARPT AND HE BEGAN A DSCNT TO AVOID A SCATTERED CLOUD LAYER. AS WE APCHED 500 FT ON A MODIFIED L BASE ENTRY TO RWY 8R; WE PERFORMED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST; HOWEVER; WE WERE UNABLE TO EXTEND THE LNDG GEAR BEFORE RECEIVING A GPWS 'TOO LOW GEAR' ALERT. WITH THE LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETED AND LNDG CLRNC RECEIVED; IT WAS CLR THAT A SAFE LNDG COULD THEN BE PERFORMED. ONCE OUR POSTFLT DUTIES WERE COMPLETE; THE CAPT AND I HAD A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING. DURING THIS DEBRIEFING; WE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS REGARDING OUR FAULTS AS A CREW DURING THE APCH: 1) WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE APCH CLRNC ONCE WE DISCOVERED OUR POS RELATIVE TO THE FAF. 2) WE SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED OUR THOUGHTS REGARDING THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION MORE CLRLY. 3) ALTHOUGH NEITHER OF US FELT THE SAFETY OF FLT WAS JEOPARDIZED; WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH IMMEDIATELY AFTER WE REALIZED A STABILIZED APCH WAS NOT POSSIBLE. FURTHER; WE BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING HUMAN FACTORS WERE: 1) HAVING FLOWN TOGETHER ALL WK WE HAD BECOME OVERLY CONFIDENT IN EACH OTHER'S ABILITIES; LEADING TO OUR FAILURE IN COMMUNICATING OUR COMFORT LEVEL. 2) WE HAD BECOME COMPLACENT AND WERE IN A HURRY TO GET HOME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 683846: I ATTEMPTED TO STAY ON GS AND LOC BUT CONTINUED TO THE N WITH FULL DEFLECTION. AT THIS POINT MY PLAN WAS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND GO MISSED. I ARRESTED THE DSCNT AT ABOUT 1000 FT; MADE A TURN TO ABOUT A HDG OF 130 DEGS -- WE BOTH SAW THE ARPT AND APCH LIGHTS. DUE TO SOME SCATTERED CLOUDS; WE DSNDED TO 500 FT ON A MODIFIED L BASE AT WHICH TIME THE 'TOO LOW GEAR' AND GPWS SOUNDED. THE LNDG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED WITH AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC FROM THE TWR.