ZME CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING DEP PROCS FROM AVL ARPT DURING NON TWRED HRS.

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I WAS WORKING ZTL SECTOR 44 BEFORE AVL APCH OPENED. ACR X REQUESTED CLRNC TO CLT. CLRED THE ACFT AVL DIRECT SUG AND THE SHINE 5 TO CLT; CLB AND MAINTAIN 7000 FT. WHEN ZTL TAKES AVL APCH AIRSPACE IT IS NON-RADAR BELOW 6000 FT MSL. DID NOT ASSIGN A RWY TO DEPART (AND DON'T THINK WE CAN). ACR X RPTED AIRBORNE; CLBING TO 7000 FT AND 'RWY HDG.' I DIDN'T THINK ANYTHING OF THE 'RWY HDG' COMMENT BECAUSE IT AGREES WITH THE SPECIAL DEP PROCS AT AVL (BOTH RWYS). AFTER A FEW MINS I SAW THE ACFT ABOUT 10 MI NW OF AVL; LEVEL 7000 FT; CALLED 'RADAR CONTACT' AND CLBED THE ACFT. THE PLT RESPONDED TO THE CLRNC AND THEN ASKED 'DO YOU STILL WANT US ON RWY HDG?' AT THIS TIME THE ACFT WAS TOUCHING THE CORNER OF AN AREA IN WHICH THE MIA WAS 7900 FT. I NEVER ASSIGNED THE ACFT RWY HDG; ONLY 'DIRECT SUG.' THE DEP PROC RWY 34 IS RWY HDG TO KEANS LOM; CROSS KEANS 'AT OR ABOVE 5100 FT BEFORE CLBING TO MEA ON COURSE.' KEANS IS ONLY 5.5 MI FROM AVL AND THIS ACFT WAS WELL BEYOND KEANS. THE AVL 2 DEP DOES SAY FLY RWY HDG TO 10000 FT AND EXPECT RADAR VECTORS LEAVING 4500 FT. BUT IT WASN'T ASSIGNED; AVL TWR/APCH WAS CLOSED AND WE DON'T HAVE RADAR COVERAGE BELOW 6000 FT (AND SOMETIMES HIGHER TO THE NW). THIS NEXT ACFT OUT (ANOTHER ACR) DID THE EXACT OPPOSITE. HE TURNED ON COURSE PRIOR TO KEANS AND PRIOR TO REACHING 5100 FT. I FIRST SAW HIM ON RADAR AT 5200 FT ABOUT 5 MI SW OF KEANS. (YES; SOMETIMES WE'LL GET A HIT OR TWO ON RADAR BELOW 6000 FT.) THERE'S A 6000+ FT OBSTACLE ABOUT 10 MI SW OF KEANS AND A 6400+ FT MOUNTAIN JUST BEYOND THAT. THESE 2 INSTANCES ARE TYPICAL OF ACR OPS AT AVL WHEN THE TWR IS CLOSED. THERE ARE DOZENS OF OTHER INCIDENTS FOR EVERY INCIDENT THAT IS RPTED. IN INCIDENT AFTER INCIDENT IT IS CLR THAT THE ACR PLTS DO NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE NOT IN RADAR CONTACT AND THAT THEY ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH NON RADAR PROCS. BOTH ARRS AND DEPS. I ONCE HAD AN ACR ASK FOR A VECTOR TO ODF (FOOTHILLS VOR TO THE SW) AFTER JUST DEPARTING RWY 16 AVL. I HADN'T CALLED HIM RADAR CONTACT YET. I ADVISED THE PLT THAT HE WAS NOT IN RADAR CONTACT AND SUGGESTED HE MIGHT WANT TO FLY DIRECT TO THE BRA NDB (PER THE DEP PROC) UNTIL HE WS HIGH ENOUGH TO GET INTO RADAR COVERAGE AND/OR RECEIVE A SIGNAL FROM ODF. FROM HIS REPLY IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THE DEP PROC AND DIDN'T REALIZE HE WASN'T IN RADAR CONTACT. ON ANOTHER NIGHT; AN ARR ADVISED HE COULDN'T SHOOT THE ILS TO RWY 34 BECAUSE THE TAILWIND WAS TOO STRONG. HE REQUESTED ILS RWY 16 BUT WE DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SWITCH THE APCH. WE ARE STUCK WITH WHICHEVER ILS THE TWR LEFT ACTIVE WHEN THEY CLOSE. SO HE SHOT THE APCH TO RWY 34. THE APCH PLATE SAYS 'NIGHT CIRCLING NOT AUTH.' SO WHICH DID HE DO? LAND WITH AN EXCESSIVE TAILWIND OR CIRCLE?' THERE ARE A MYRIAD OF FACTORS AT WORK BUT THEY ALL ADD UP TO 1 THING: WHEN THE TWR IS CLOSED; OPS AT AVL ARE UNSAFE AS COMPARED TO THE LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT PAX HAVE -- AND EXPECT -- IN THE REST OF THE NAS. THE FASTEST; EASIEST; CHEAPEST AND BEST SOLUTION IS TO INCREASE THE HRS OF OP AT AVL TWR/APCH CTL TO COVER ALL ACR OPS.