ERJ700 FLT CREW HAS MULTIPLE EICAS MESSAGES AND DECLARES EMER AND LANDS.

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WHILE ENRTE FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 SPDA FAIL EICAS MESSAGE APPEARED. FLT CREW REFERRED TO THE QRH; AND THE MESSAGE WAS LISTED AS A 'CREW AWARENESS' EICAS MESSAGE. FLT CREW TOOK NOTE; AND BEGAN MONITORING NEAREST SUITABLE ARPTS; JUST IN CASE ADDITIONAL FAILURES OCCURRED. APPROX 3 MINS AFTER THE SPDA FAIL CREW AWARENESS MESSAGE APPEARED; THE RECIRCULATION FANS (#1 AND #2 FORWARD CARGO) STOPPED FUNCTIONING. NO ADDITIONAL EICAS MESSAGES APPEARED. FLT CREW REVIEWED ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO SEE IF ANY ADDITIONAL INFO COULD BE GATHERED FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER INDICATIONS. ALL ELECTRICAL BUSSES EXCEPT FOR AC #2 AND DC ESS #2 WERE AFFECTED. ALL OTHER BUSSES HAD 'UNK' INDICATIONS ON APPROX 50% OR MORE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FLT CREW CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT LOSE ADDITIONAL SYS; AND BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE EMER. NO FURTHER MALFUNCTIONS NOTED FOR APPROX 20 MINS. JUST AFTER THE FLT CREW HAD THE DISCUSSION ABOUT ZZZ2 NOW BEING THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT; 3 EICAS MESSAGES CAME UP. THEY WERE AS FOLLOWS: CARGO AFT FIRE SYS FAIL; CARGO FORWARD FIRE SYS FAIL; AMS CTL FAIL. CAPT XFERRED FLT CTLS AND COMS TO FO AND REFED QRH. CAPT REFED THE CARGO (FORWARD OR AFT) FIRE SYS FAIL CHKLIST IN THE QRH. THIS CHKLIST SAID TO 'LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.' AS ZZZ2 HAD BEEN DETERMINED AS THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT; THE FLT CREW REAFFIRMED THAT FACT; CONSIDERING THE DSCNT REQUIRED AFTER PASSING OVER THE MOUNTAINS. THE FLT CREW ALSO COMMUNICATED WITH THE DISPATCHER THROUGH THE ACARS; AND THE DISPATCHER AGREED THAT ZZZ2 WAS THE NEAREST SUITABLE. DIRECT ROUTING WAS REQUESTED FROM AND GRANTED BY ATC. (ROUTING WAS LATER UPDATED TO DIRECT ZZZ3 DIRECT ZZZ2 TO ALLOW FOR DSCNT PAST THE MOUNTAINS.) FLT CREW DECLARED EMER; AND GAVE NATURE OF EMER TO ATC. ARFF WAS REQUESTED ON THE RWY. CAPT THEN INITIATED THE AMS CTL FAIL CHKLIST FROM THE QRH. WX WAS VFR; AND ICING CONDITIONS WERE AVOIDED PER THE QRH. DSCNT TO 10000 FT OR SAFE ALT WAS LISTED AS THE NEXT ACTION IN THE QRH. DSCNT TO MVA WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED. DSCNT WAS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY. NO FURTHER MESSAGES PRESENTED UNTIL LNDG GEAR WAS LOWERED; AT WHICH TIME BRAKE CTL FAULT WAS PRESENTED. CAPT ACCOMPLISHED THIS CHKLIST; AND THE FOLLOW-ON FLT CTL/BRAKE MALFUNCTION PRELIMINARY LNDG CHKLIST. BLEED #1 OVERPRESSURE AND BLEED #2 OVERPRESSURE CAUTION MESSAGES APPEARED DURING THIS TIME AS WELL. WE ELECTED TO ABANDON THE APCH AND CIRCLE VISUALLY AT 6000 FT (FAF ALT) TO ALLOW TIME TO COMPLETE ALL CHKLISTS. BLEEDS WERE SELECTED OFF; LEFT OFF FOR 1 MIN AS PER QRH PROC. BLEEDS WERE THEN SELECTED 'ON;' ONE AT A TIME. WHEN THE MESSAGES BLEED #1; (#2) OVERPRESSURE MESSAGES STAYED ANNUNCIATED; THE BLEEDS WERE ONCE AGAIN SELECTED 'OFF' PER THE QRH. THE XBLEED WAS ALSO PUSHED OUT; PER THE QRH. THE NEXT ITEM ON THE CHKLIST WAS TO REDUCE THE ASSOCIATED THRUST LEVER TO IDLE. AS BOTH ENGS WERE AFFECTED; THE CREW DETERMINED THAT IT WAS PRUDENT TO KEEP THE ENGS OPERATING; AND NOT CONTINUE TO THE 'ENG OUT PRELIMINARY LNDG CHKLIST;' AS PRESCRIBED BY THE BLEED #1 (#2) OVERPRESSURE CHKLIST FROM THE POH. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF APPLICABLE CHKLISTS WE COMPLETED A FLAPS FULL LNDG PER QRH PROCS. UPON TOUCHDOWN ENG #1 NO DISPATCH; ENG #2 NO DISPATCH; ENG #1 REV TLA FAIL; AND ENG #2 REV TLA FAIL MESSAGES APPEARED. THRUST REVERSERS WERE NOT AVAILABLE DURING ROLLOUT. WHEEL BRAKES AND GND SPOILERS FUNCTIONED NORMALLY. CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT STRAIGHT AHEAD ON THE RWY. WE THEN SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG TO ALLOW ARFF CREW TO INSPECT THE CARGO COMPARTMENTS. FOLLOWING SHUTDOWN OF THE #2 ENG WE ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS THE CONDITION OF THE ACFT SYS; BUT NO INFO WAS AVAILABLE ON ANY EICAS SYS PAGES. ALL ITEMS ON ALL OF THE BLOCK DIAGRAMS APPEARED AS YELLOW DASHES. AFTER IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT THE ACFT APPEARED SAFE WE ATTEMPTED TO TAXI TO THE TERMINAL; BUT WERE UNABLE TO ENGAGE THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING. WE AGAIN STOPPED THE PLANE AND REQUESTED A TUG TO PULL US TO THE GATE. AT THIS TIME WE KEPT THE #1 ENG RUNNING AS ITWAS THE ONLY AVAILABLE PWR SOURCE. WE DECIDED AGAINST STARTING THE APU SINCE NO ELECTRICAL INFO REGARDING BUS OR BATTERY STATUS WAS AVAILABLE. UPON REACHING THE GATE THE GND CREW APPLIED EXTERNAL PWR TO THE PLANE; AND THE CAPT SELECTED IT ON AND SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. WHEN THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN THE GND PWR DID NOT COME ON LINE AND THE ACFT WENT DARK. WE TRIED TO RESELECT THE PWR BUT IT WOULD NOT COME ON. SINCE IT WAS BRIGHT DAYLIGHT WE SHUT THE PLANE DOWN WHILE THE LAST PAX DEPLANED. THE RAMP THEN INFORMED US THAT THE RAT HAD DEPLOYED WHEN WE SHUT THE ENG DOWN.