CRJ200 FO WAS ORDERED TO EXIT ACFT ON TAXIWAY TO VISUALLY CHECK FLAPS AFTER AN ALTERNATE FLAP SETTING WAS MADE.

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CAPT REQUESTS AND DIRECTS FO TO CONDUCT AN EXTERNAL VISUAL CHK OF FLAP SETTINGS DURING TAXI-OUT PHASE OF FLT OPS ON ACTIVE TXWY AT ORD ARPT. I; THE FO; CHALLENGE THE DECISION AND MAKE MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE PIC TO USE DIFFERENT RWY OR CONTACT GND CTL TO LET THEM KNOW OF OUR INTENTIONS WITH NO POSITIVE RESULT. INITIALLY; I; THE FO; CHALLENGE THE DECISION TO EXIT ACFT ON AN ACTIVE TXWY WITH ENGS RUNNING AT IDLE; BUT CAPT CITES FOR HIS JUDGEMENT CALL THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL WHICH STATES; 'TKOF FLAPS MUST BE SET PRIOR TO DEP AND AN EXTERNAL VISUAL CHK MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO DETECT TO ANY TWISTING; SKEWING; OR ABNORMAL DEFORMATION OF THE FLAPS. USE THE INFO PROVIDED IN THE NORMAL/ABNORMAL OUTBOARD FLAP CONFIGN AND OUTBOARD FLAPS GO/NO-GO CRITERIA FIGURES LOCATED IN THIS SECTION. IF ANY ADDITIONAL CHANGE IS NECESSARY; PRIOR TO TKOF; ACCOMPLISH THE VISUAL CHK SPECIFIED BY THE PRECEDING FIGURES...' THIS INTERP OF A COMPANY FLT MANUAL PUTS A FO IN A PRECARIOUS POS. FO'S WANT TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF PIC AND PROVIDE AN IDEAL CRM ENVIRONMENT AS THEY WORK AS A 'TEAM;' HOWEVER; AT THE SAME TIME COMMON SENSE IS ABSENT IN THIS KIND OF DECISION MAKING. THIS KIND OF COMPANY FLT MANUAL INTERP IS A SAFETY HAZARD AND SECURITY RISK. THANKFULLY; NO INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENTS RESULTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE CAPT CITED THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL WHICH STATES THAT A VISUAL CHECK OF TKOF FLAPS IS REQUIRED IF A CHANGE IN FLAP POSITION IS MADE. THE CHECK IS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED DURING PREFLIGHT WITH TKOF FLAPS PRESET; BUT IF A RWY CHANGE NECESSITATES ANOTHER FLAP SETTING; THIS APPARENTLY MANDATES AN 'EXTERNAL VISUAL CHECK.' APPARENTLY SOME CAPTS FOR THIS CARRIER INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT THE FO MUST EXIT THE ACFT FOR THIS CHECK.