A CRJ-200 ACFT R FUEL LOW PRESSURE CAUTION MESSAGE DID NOT APPEAR ON EICAS DISPLAY DURING FIRST FLIGHT OF DAY CHECKS PRIOR TO STARTING 2ND ENGINE.

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DURING TAXI OUT FOR TKOF; R FUEL LOW PRESSURE CAUTION MESSAGE DID NOT APPEAR ON EICAS DISPLAY DURING FIRST FLT OF DAY CHKS; PRIOR TO STARTING 2ND ENG (#2 IN THIS CASE). PER FSM; WE DRY MOTORED ENG (NON STARTED #2) FOR NO MORE THAN 30 SECONDS. R FUEL LOW PRESSURE STILL DID NOT APPEAR. AFTER PARKING THE PLANE ON AN UNUSED TXWY; CREW MADE APPLICABLE PHONE CALLS (MAINT FIRST; THEN DUE TO CONFLICTING GUIDANCE BTWN FMS; MEL; GND TRAINING VERSUS WHAT MAINT TOLD US; CALLS WERE MADE TO THE PROGRAM MGR AND THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE). INPUT FROM EACH SOURCE WAS AS FOLLOWS: MAINT -- FUEL LOW PRESSURE INDICATING SYS DEFERRED PER MEL FOR 10 DAYS. CAN'T TELL IF CHK VALVE FAILED. MEL NOTE: FUEL SYS CHK VALVE TEST (FIRST FLT OF DAY BEFORE ENG SHUTDOWN) IS WAIVED FOR THE INOPERATIVE FUEL LOW PRESSURE INDICATION. GND TRAINING -- STRESSES IN CLASS THAT FAILURE OF THE APPROPRIATE FUEL LOW PRESSURE CAUTION MESSAGE TO ILLUMINATE DURING FIRST FLT OF DAY CHK INDICATES A FAILURE OF THE FUEL FEED CHK VALVE. PROGRAM MGR -- ALTHOUGH WE HAD A FUEL LOW PRESSURE INDICATION SYS FAILURE (WHICH WE AGREED WITH); THERE IS NO WAY TO CONCRETELY DETERMINE THAT THE FUEL FEED CHK VALVE HAD FAILED AS WELL. CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE -- INITIALLY INPUT WAS WE/I SHOULD TAKE THE MECH'S WORD FOR IT AS HE WAS PUTTING HIS LICENSE ON THE LINE BY THE DEFERRAL AND FLY THE ACFT. DUE TO CONFLICTING INFO; PARTICULARLY THE FMS CAUTION; THE MEL NOTE; WHICH SEEMS TO PROVIDE POSTFLT RELIEF; THE INCONCLUSIVE INFO PROVIDED BY THE PROGRAM MGR AND THE RECENT STRESS IN TRAINING ON THIS ISSUE; I FELT IT WISEST TO NOT FLY THE ACFT WITH A POTENTIAL FUEL FEED CHK VALVE FAILURE. BY DEFAULT; AS WE SAT AT THE GATE (AFTER TAXIING BACK IN) WITH APU RUNNING AND ENG OFF; THE R FUEL LOW PRESSURE MESSAGE DID COME ON AFTER 40 MINS. WITH THIS INFO; AND LATER A SECOND CALL TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE; I HAD AN IN DEPTH SYS DISCUSSION WHERE THE PROB WAS EXPLAINED TO MY SATISFACTION. I THEREFORE OPERATED THE FLT AT THAT TIME. TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE; I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING: 1) CHANGE THE CAUTION IN FMS TO READ; 'MAY BE AN INDICATION.' 2) CHANGE MEL NOTE UNDER MEL DELETING 'BEFORE ENG SHUTDOWN.' THE NOTE AS IT IS CAN LEAD THE CREW INTO THINKING THIS IS POSTFLT (NOT PREFLT) RELIEF ONLY. BOTH MYSELF AND MY IOE CHK AIRMAN READ IT THIS WAY. 3) AFTER THE ABOVE 2 CHANGES ARE MADE; CHANGE GND TRAINING ON THIS AREA TO REFLECT CHANGES IN FMS MEL. DURING TAXI FOR TKOF; THERE WAS NO WAY TO DETERMINE THAT A FAILURE TO THE R FUEL FEED CHK VALVE HAD NOT OCCURRED; GIVEN CURRENT GUIDANCE AND SHORT DURATION OF CHK DURING ACTUAL TAXI. IT WAS ONLY BY DEFAULT (SITTING AT GATE WITH BOTH ENGS OFF THAT TRUE FAILURE WAS ACCURATELY DETERMINED; IN OUR; MYSELF AND IOE CHK AIRMAN; OPINION).