A B757 CREW ARRIVED AT THEIR ACFT LOADED WITH PAX AND A MEL'ED APU RUNNING WITH NO FIRE WARNING CAPABILITY; THE REQUIREMENT FOR GND CREW MONITORING IT FOR POSSIBLE FIRE WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH.

Date: 2008-04 · Aircraft: B757-200 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-mel-cdl|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

A B757 CREW ARRIVED AT THEIR ACFT LOADED WITH PAX AND A MEL'ED APU RUNNING WITH NO FIRE WARNING CAPABILITY; THE REQUIREMENT FOR GND CREW MONITORING IT FOR POSSIBLE FIRE WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH.

Narrative

COCKPIT CREW ARRIVED AT AIRPLANE AFTER ORIGINAL SCHEDULED DEP TIME DUE TO CREW REST REQUIREMENTS. UPON ARRIVING AT THE ACFT; THE AIRPLANE WAS ALREADY BOARDED WITH PAX AND FLT ATTENDANT CREW. THE APU WAS RUNNING AND SUPPLYING ELECTRIC TO THE AIRPLANE. THERE WAS NO GPU HOOKED UP TO THE ACFT. UPON REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK; WE DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS A FORM STATING APU FIRE DETECTION INOP (WARNING HORN) MEL ITEM. ALSO UNDER THE MAINT ACTION REQUIRED; THE 'OTHER' CHK BOX WAS MARKED WITH THE STATEMENT; 'QUALIFIED GND MAN WHEN APU IS RUNNING.' I LOOKED UP THE MEL ITEM AND READ; 'APU IS CONTINUOUSLY MONITORED BY QUALIFIED PERSON IN THE COCKPIT AND ON THE GND.' THE FO REMAINED ON THE FLT DECK AND I WENT OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO MONITOR THE APU OUTSIDE AND LOOK TO SEE IF THERE WAS A QUALIFIED PERSON MONITORING THE APU. THE TUG OPERATOR WAS SITTING IN THE TUG WAITING TO PUSH. I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATUS OF THE APU. HE WAS NOT. I ASKED IF HE COULD CALL THE GENERAL MGR. HE SAID HE WAS THE GENERAL MANAGER. I ASKED IF HE STARTED THE APU. HE STATED THAT ANOTHER MAN THAT WAS QUALIFIED STARTED THE APU. I REQUESTED THAT HE CALL THE MAN TO THE ACFT. WHEN THE OTHER MAN ARRIVED; I ASKED IF HE WAS AWARE OF THE APU STATUS. HE WAS NOT. I ASKED HIM WHAT PROC HE WAS TAUGHT TO DO WHEN STARTING THE APU. HE STATED THAT HE WAS TO LOOK TO SEE IF THE APU WAS PLACARDED INOP. IF IT WAS NOT; HE COULD START THE APU. THERE WAS NO INOP STICKER ON THE APU SWITCH; THERE WAS AN INOP STICKER ON THE ENG/APU/CARGO FIRE TEST BUTTON ON THE CTR PEDESTAL; AS PER THE MEL. I DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH HIM AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO OBSERVE THE APU UNTIL WE SHUT IT DOWN PRIOR TO TAXI. IT APPEARS THAT HE WAS NOT PROPERLY OR SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED. IT IS MY RECOMMENDATION THAT WHEN TRAINING STATION PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE APU THAT THEY ARE ALSO TAUGHT PROCS TO DO A FIRE TEST; CHK THE LOGBOOK PLACARDS FOR APPROPRIATE ITEMS AND HAVE A CHKLIST THAT IS MANDATORY TO USE TO START THE APU. HAD THERE BEEN AN APU FIRE; IT COULD HAVE GONE UNDETECTED FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME WITH PAX ON THE AIRPLANE AND NO QUALIFIED PERSON IN THE COCKPIT TO SHUT DOWN THE APU AND USE THE FIRE BOTTLE.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.