FO OF A319 MAKES NUMEROUS AUTOFLT MANAGEMENT AND MENTAL ERRORS ON APCH CULMINATING IN MANUALLY DESCENDING WHILE THE AUTOTHRUST SYSTEM WENT TO CLIMB THRUST AS PROGRAMMED. FLAP OVERSPEED RESULTS.

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I WAS THE PF. ARR AND DSCNT WENT SMOOTHLY AS PLANNED. APCH CTL HAD US ON A VECTOR FOR THE ILS RWY 22L. WHEN APCH ASKED US IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT; I LOOKED UP AND SAW A RWY WHERE I EXPECTED IT TO BE WITH THE APPROPRIATE APCH LIGHTING SYS AND I GAVE THE CAPT A THUMBS-UP. HE TOLD ATC THAT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND THEY CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO GO DIRECT ROUGE INTXN (7.5 MI OUT ON THE RWY 22L LOC) AND I INDICATED THAT I DID. ONCE WE WERE SET UP DIRECT ROUGE; OUR AUTOMATION MODES WERE: THR IDLE (180 KTS SELECTED) OP DES (2300 FT SELECTED); AND NAV (DIRECT ROUGE). I ALSO ARMED APCH MODE AND ACTIVATED AUTOPLT #1 (ARMED LOC AND GS MODES). SOMEWHERE AROUND THIS TIME; WE HAD SELECTED FLAPS 1 DEG. A FEW SECONDS LATER; IT APPEARED TO ME THAT WE WERE APCHING THE CTRLINE TO FINAL APCH TO THE RWY. SINCE I WAS AWARE THAT DTW WAS CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS APCHS TO PARALLEL RWYS AND ALSO THAT THE AIRBUS IS CAPABLE OF OVERSHOOTING THE COURSE CTRLINE; I PULLED THE HDG KNOB AND BEGAN TURNING THE ACFT TOWARD THE RWY TO HELP PREVENT A POSSIBLE OVERSHOOT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE CAPT ASKED 'WHERE ARE YOU GOING?' I LOOKED DOWN AT MY NAV DISPLAY AND REALIZED THAT WE WERE STILL SEVERAL MI FROM OUR RWY CTRLINE; AND WHAT I HAD THOUGHT WAS OUR RWY WAS IN FACT A RWY AT ANOTHER ARPT (WILLOW RUN) WHICH RAN ALMOST PARALLEL TO OUR RWY (LAW OF EXPECTATION). UPON REALIZING THIS; I SELECTED A HDG THAT WOULD TAKE US BACK TO INTERCEPT THE LOC TO OUR RWY; THIS TIME RIGHT ABOUT THE FAF (HULKA). AT THE END OF THIS MANEUVER; MY AUTOMATION MODES WERE: SPD (STILL 180 KTS); VS-700 (MODE REVERSION 2300 FT STILL ARMED); AND HDG WITH LOC AND GS STILL ARMED. NOW ON OUR WAY TO INTERCEPT THE TRUE RWY (A LITTLE SHAKEN BY THE EVENT); I SAW THAT WE WERE GOING TO INTERCEPT THE LOC JUST INSIDE THE HULKA FIX ABOVE THE GS; SO I ASKED FOR FLAPS 2 DEGS AND SPUN THE ALT KNOB TO A HIGHER ALT THAN WE WERE; THUS PREVENTING A LEVELOFF BEFORE INTERCEPTING THE GS. I BELIEVE IT WAS RIGHT ABOUT THIS POINT THAT I PERFORMED THE MOST INEXPLICABLE ERROR: INSTEAD OF SELECTING A HIGHER VS (STILL AT -700); I PULLED THE ALT KNOB. I BELIEVE AT THE TIME THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN THAT I HAD ALREADY SELECTED A HIGHER ALT. I WAS EXPECTING THE AUTOMATION TO GO TO THR IDLE; OP DES. IN FACT; IT WENT TO THR CLB; OP CLB. AT PRECISELY THIS TIME; THE ACFT FLEW THROUGH THE LOC COURSE AND FELT LIKE IT WAS LEVELING OFF; SO INSTEAD OF FIGHTING WITH THE FCU; I SIMPLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN MANUALLY NAVING THE ACFT TO THE RWY. THE CAPT ASKED ME 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING NOW?' (COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE) TO WHICH I REPLIED 'I'M JUST GONNA FLY IT TO THE RWY.' LOOKING BACK; I GUESS I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT HIS CONCERN WAS; BUT NOW I KNOW THAT WHAT WE WERE DOING WAS DSNDING SOMEWHAT RAPIDLY WHILE THE AUTOTHRUST WAS STILL IN THR CLB MODE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY; WE WERE GETTING THE CONTINUOUS REPETITIVE CHIME; FLASHING MASTER WARNING LIGHTS; AND THE AIRSPD WAS WELL INTO THE BARBER POLE. IT WAS ONLY THROUGH THE CAPT'S QUICK THINKING IN SELECTING A LOWER AIRSPD (130 KTS) THAT WE DIDN'T GO FURTHER INTO THE OVERSPEED REGIME. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE MANAGED TO GET THE ACFT ON PROFILE AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ACFT WAS WRITTEN UP AND INSPECTED. THE NEXT DAY; THE MECH WHO PERFORMED THE INSPECTION TOLD ME THAT HE HAD FOUND NO DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE INCIDENT. I CAN EASILY SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST EMBARRASSING MOMENT IN MY SHORT YET REWARDING CAREER AT ACR X. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT A LONG DAY OF COMMUTING; TAKING A BADGE TEST; RUNNING ERRANDS; AND HAVING MANY THINGS ON MY MIND CONSPIRED AGAINST ME TO MAKE A STRING OF RUDIMENTARY AND EASILY AVOIDABLE MISTAKES; RESULTING IN THE EXCEEDANCE OF AN ACFT LIMITATION. I TAKE 100% RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS OCCURRENCE. IN THE DAYS (AND NIGHTS) FOLLOWING THIS EVENT; I HAVE THOUGHT OF MANY THINGS I COULD HAVE DONE TO HAVE PREVENTED THIS OCCURRENCE: 1) XCHK MY NAV DISPLAY. IF I HAD ONLY DONE THIS; THE ACFT WAS SET UP PERFECTLY TO NAV TO ROUGE; INTERCEPT THE LOC AND GS. ALL I WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE DONE WAS CONFIGURE THE ACFT. HAD I LOOKED AT MY NAV DISPLAY; I WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE RWY AT WILLOW RUN WASN'T OURS AND NOT STARTED US DOWN THE PATH. 2) SET A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC OUTSIDE THE MARKER. THE FAF (HULKA) IS THE LAST POINT ALONG THE LOC COURSE WHERE YOU KNOW THE ALT OF THE GS (2300 FT). IF I HAD SIMPLY GONE OUTSIDE OF HULKA; I WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT AS LONG AS I MADE IT TO 2300 FT BEFORE HULKA; I WOULD INTERCEPT BOTH THE LOC AND GS THERE AND WOULD HAVE HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO CONFIGURE. 3) BE ABSOLUTELY POSITIVE WHAT THE RESULTS OF EACH ACTION WILL BE BEFORE I DO IT. IF I WOULD'VE TAKEN 1 SECOND TO CONSIDER WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN I PULLED THE ALT KNOB; I WOULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING DIFFERENT; SUCH AS SELECTING A HIGHER VERT SPD; DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT; OR EVEN GOING AROUND WHEN THE APCH STARTED GETTING UGLY. 4) PAY ATTN TO MY FMA'S. WHEN I PULLED HDG TO LINE UP ON WILLOW RUN; I KNEW THAT VERT MODE WOULD REVERT TO VERT SPD AT WHATEVER OUR VERT SPD WAS AT THE TIME (-700). IF I HAD LOOKED AT MY FMA'S IMMEDIATELY AFTER WRONGLY PULLING THE ALT SELECTOR; I WOULD'VE SEEN THE THR CLB OP CLB AND KNOWN THAT WAS NOT WHAT WE WANTED AND REACTED ACCORDINGLY (FIX FCU OR DISCONNECT AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES). UNFORTUNATELY; AT THE TIME; I WAS FIXATED OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AND ON THE RWY.