MEM TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 4000 FT; DISTRACTED BY AN ACR REQUEST TO DELAY ARR FOR WX; ISSUED CONFLICTING VECTOR HEADINGS.
Synopsis
MEM TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 4000 FT; DISTRACTED BY AN ACR REQUEST TO DELAY ARR FOR WX; ISSUED CONFLICTING VECTOR HEADINGS.
Narrative
I WAS WORKING ARR E WITH A LINE OF TSTMS EXTENDING FROM THE NE OF MEM TO THE SW APCHING MEM EBOUND. THE LINE OF TSTMS MADE THE APCH COURSES FOR RWY 18L/C/R UNUSABLE WITH A SW WIND. THE SUPVR DIRECTED THE TRACON TO TAKE ALL ARR ACFT TO RWY 27. NO COORD WAS IMPLEMENTED TO GET ARRS NOT REGULARLY ASSIGNED RWY 27 TO THAT RWY. FIRST; I VECTORED ACFT Z; AND ACFT W (A CRJ2) DSNDING TO 5000 FT FROM THE SOUTHEAST TO RWY 27. THEN I VECTORED ACFT Y; A CRJ2; DESCENDING TO 4000 FT FROM THE NE TO FOLLOW ACFT W. I TOOK HDOFS ON ACFT X (A CRJ2) AT 3000 FT; AND ACFT V (A DC9) DSNDING TO 4000 FT; BOTH ACFT INBOUND FROM THE SW (ACFT I WOULD NOT NORMALLY WORK AT E ARR). I CLBED ACFT X TO 4000 FT TO MAKE SURE THE ACFT STAYED IN THE CLASS B AIRSPACE (MEM HAS HAD A SERIOUS ISSUE WITH ACFT LEAVING THE CLASS B AIRSPACE RECENTLY). I THEN DIRECTED ACFT V TO EXPEDITE THEIR DSCNT TO 4000 FT SO THEY COULD SLOW TO 210 KTS. AT SOME POINT; I TOOK A HDOF ON ACFT U (A DC9) AT 6000 FT FROM DUE W MOVING EBOUND. I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ACFT U DID NOT WANT TO MAKE AN APCH. WHEN ACFT U CHKED IN; HE ASKED ME WHAT THE PLAN WAS. I TOLD ACFT U THAT I WOULD VECTOR HIM AROUND AT 6000 FT UNTIL HE WAS READY TO PROCEED INBOUND TO LAND. ACFT U ASKED IF OTHER ACFT WERE LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT WITH THE WX MOVING IN. I TOLD HIM I WOULD SOLICIT A PIREP FROM THE TWR. I CALLED THE TWR FOR A PIREP; AND THEY SAID THEY HAD A BE20 LNDG AND ROLLING OUT; AND THEY WOULD GIVE ME A CALL BACK WITH ANY INFO THEY COULD GET. THESE 2 CALLS TOOK MORE TIME THAN I WOULD HAVE LIKED AND DELAYED SEVERAL ACTIONS THAT I TOOK. FIRST; I TURNED ACFT Y SBOUND FROM THE NE ABOUT 7 MI LATER THAN I WANTED. THIS MEANT THAT ACFT Y'S BASE WAS ABOUT 5 MI CLOSER TO THE ARPT THAN I WANTED. SECOND; I BELIEVE THAT ACFT Y WAS LEVEL AT 4000 FT AS SOON AS HE REACHED 4000 FT. THESE 2 ITEMS MEANT THAT THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR WOULD HAVE TO WAIT A LITTLE LONGER TO TURN ACFT Y ONTO THE RWY 27 LOC BEHIND ACFT W. FINALLY; I WAS LATE TO SLOW ACFT X; WHICH PUT THAT ACFT INTO CLOSER PROX WITH ACFT Y. PRIOR TO HANDING OFF ACFT Y TO RWY 27 FINAL CTLR; I TURNED THE ACFT TO A 170 DEG HDG TO GIVE THAT CTLR A LITTLE EXTRA ROOM. I VECTORED ACFT X AND ACFT V AS CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF THE CLASS B SHELF AT 4000 FT AS I COULD TO TRY AND BUY MORE TIME FOR THE NEXT CTLR. FINALLY; WHEN ACFT X WAS DUE S OF ACFT Y; I TURNED ACFT X DUE N FOR THE BASE FOR RWY 27. I WAS EXPECTING AT ANY MOMENT FOR ACFT Y TO SHOW A TURN TO JOIN THE RWY 27 LOC. I PLACED ACFT X IN A HDOF STATUS AND ASKED THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR IF HE HAD TURNED ACFT Y. HE WAS XMITTING TO AN ACFT AND TAKING MY HDOF. I LOOKED AGAIN TO SEE IF ACFT Y WAS TURNING AND ASKED THE CTLR AGAIN ABOUT ACFT Y. I DID NOT HEAR THE ANSWER; AS I SAW ACFT Y CONTINUE TOWARDS ACFT X. I TURNED ACFT X TO A 090 DEG HDG AND ASKED AGAIN. ACFT Y STILL CONTINUED TOWARDS ACFT X; SO I TURNED ACFT X TO AN IMMEDIATE 120 DEG HDG AND ISSUED TFC. ACFT X ADVISED THE TFC IN SIGHT; AND I ESTABLISHED VISUAL SEPARATION. ACFT X AND ACFT Y GOT AS CLOSE AS 2.24 MI AND 500 FT. I LATER FOUND OUT THAT THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR HAD USED THE WRONG CALL SIGN WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO TURN ACFT Y TOWARDS THE RWY 27 LOC. THROUGH THE ENTIRE SESSION; I FELT VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WORKING THAT MANY ACFT WITH ALL THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE SITUATION AND LITTLE; IF ANY; COORD TO HANDLE THAT UNCERTAINTY. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT HDOFS AS READILY IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. I WILL ALSO BE SURE TO FOCUS ON MY PRIORITIES; AS I LET ACFT U AND HIS SITUATION DISTRACT ME. I ALSO HOPE THAT THE TRAINING PROVIDED OUR SUPVRS IS MORE THOROUGH. RECENTLY; OUR NEW SUPVRS SEEM TO GET CERTIFIED BASED ON FAMILIARITY WITH THE OP AS OPPOSED TO PROFICIENCY. I BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE MORE EXPERIENCED SUPVRS AT OUR FACILITY WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ON TOP OF THIS SITUATION. UNFORTUNATELY; IT SEEMS THE AGENCY (FAA) IS JUST TRYING TO FILL POS AS FAST AS IT CAN.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.