AN ACR CAPT TRANSFERRED FLYING TO THE FO AS HE PLANNED FOR A FUEL STOP AND AS THE ACFT ENTERED HOLDING. THE FO EXTENDED THE HOLDING LEG TOO FAR.
Synopsis
AN ACR CAPT TRANSFERRED FLYING TO THE FO AS HE PLANNED FOR A FUEL STOP AND AS THE ACFT ENTERED HOLDING. THE FO EXTENDED THE HOLDING LEG TOO FAR.
Narrative
DURING FLT ENRTE TO ZZZ; A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO MY FLT TO HOLD AT ABC INTXN AS PUBLISHED WITH 10 MI LEGS AT FL290 WITH EFC TIME OF XA05Z; DUE TO TSTMS IN THE AREA. PRIOR TO THESE INSTRUCTIONS WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO XYZ VOR; SO I REPROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR ABC INTXN. I BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE PUBLISHED HOLD ON THE COMMERCIAL CHARTS; AND I XFERRED THE CTLS TO THE FO. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE XFER OF CTLS. WHILE I WAS LOOKING FOR THE INBOUND RADIAL; HE BEGAN TO PROGRAM THE FMS FOR THE HOLD. AFTER HE HAD MADE THE INPUTS; WE REVIEWED THE HOLD. THIS IS WHERE THE MISTAKE WAS MADE. THE FO ACCIDENTALLY PUT IN 10 MIN LEGS INSTEAD OF 10 MI LEGS. I MISREAD THE INFO PARTLY DUE TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE INPUTS ON THE FMS HOLD PAGE; BUT PRIMARILY FROM MY DISTR WITH THE LENGTH OF THE EFC TIME; WHICH IMMEDIATELY INDICATED THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE FLT AS PLANNED. AT THIS POINT; ANOTHER SEQUENCE IN THE CHAIN DEVELOPED AS I WAS DETERMINING; LONG RANGE CRUISE FUEL BURNS; FOR A NEW DECISION FUEL. THE FO INTERRUPTED ME TO GIVE ME HIS TAKE ON THE NEW DECISION FUEL. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED HE WAS NOT 'FLYING' THE AIRPLANE AT THIS POINT; WHILE HE WAS GOING THROUGH THE FLT PLAN. I THEN RESUMED PLANNING FOR A DIVERSION FOR FUEL WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR IT. SIMULTANEOUSLY; I WAS RUNNING THE RADAR TO ENSURE THAT THE CUMULUS BELOW WAS NOT GOING TO BUILD UP AND INTO OUR FLT PATH. AS I WAS FINISHING UP CURRENT PLANS FOR A FUEL STOP IN ZZZ1 I NOTICE THE FMS MAP DISPLAY DID NOT LOOK RIGHT. AT THIS MOMENT CTR; QUERIED US ON OUR LEG LENGTH; THEN STATED WE WERE 25 MI FROM ABC. CTR RECLRED US TO THE INTXN. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER ACFT. I THEN RESTATED TO THE FO THAT HE HAD THE CTLS. HE EMPHATICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. AS THE PIC; THIS INCIDENT WAS MY FAULT IN THAT I DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE FO HAD INPUT THE INCORRECT HOLD; AND THAT I DID NOT PROPERLY MONITOR HIS ACTIONS AS THE PF. ON MY PART; I FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ABOVE ACTIONS DUE TO A HIGH WORKLOAD; AND AN ANXIOUSNESS TO JUST GET THROUGH THE DAY. I BELIEVE THAT THE FO'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS DUE TO HIM BEING EAGER TO PROVE HIMSELF TO ME; THAT HE KNEW HIS STUFF. WITH NO DISRESPECT TO HIM; THIS EAGERNESS TO PROVE ONESELF TO THE CAPT IS A COMMON THREAD WITH FO'S THAT ARE PRODUCTS OF THE VERY EXPENSIVE AND/OR BRIDGE PROGRAM FLT SCHOOLS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE FO WAS DISTR BY WANTING TO OBSERVE MY METHODS FOR DEALING WITH THE SIT. AGAIN; THOUGH AS THE PIC; IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY; AND I WILL TRY TO OBJECTIVELY LOOK AT HOW I RUN MY FLT DECK TO ASCERTAIN IF IT IS NEGATIVELY AFFECTING MY FO'S PERFORMANCE.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.