A B757-200 FLIGHT CREW MADE AN ACARS ENTRY INDICATING THAT ONE OF THE TWO LIGHTS IN THE RAT PRESSURE SWITCH WAS INOPERATIVE. MAINT DEFERS ITEM AS SERVICEABLE. MAINT CONTROLLER SAYS 'NO' AND STOPS ACFT AT NEXT STATION.

Narrative

ACFT X ARRIVED IN ZZZ ON FLT X AT XA00 ON MAY/XA/08. AFTER ARR; THE FLT CREW MADE AN ACARS ENTRY INDICATING THAT 1 OF THE 2 LIGHTS IN THE RAM AIR TEMP PRESSURE SWITCH WAS INOP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED AS A MAINT CONTROLLER; HE HAD ACCEPTED THE MECHANIC'S DEFERRAL OF ONE OF THE RAT PRESSURE SWITCH LIGHTS; ON THE BASIS THE RAT WAS STILL FUNCTIONAL. BUT AFTER DEPARTURE; HE REALIZED THAT THE SWITCH LIGHT WAS PART OF THE B757-200'S EMERGENCY RAT SYSTEM AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SERVICEABLE FOR CONTINUED FLIGHT IF NOT FUNCTIONING. SO HE GROUNDED THE ACFT AT THE FOLLOWING DOWNLINE STATION. BUT THAT STATION MANAGER CALLED REPORTER'S MANAGER; WHO OVERRODE THE REPORTER'S 'MUST FIX BEFORE NEXT FLIGHT MAINT ORDER' FOR THE RAT LIGHT SWITCH AND ALLOWED THE ACFT TO CONTINUE AND HAVE REPAIRS ACCOMPLISHED LATER. REPORTER STATED SINCE THEN; HIS CARRIER HAS REVIEWED THEIR INTERNAL MAINT POLICY AND WILL REWRITE THEIR OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION TO SEPARATE A MANAGER'S OVERRIDE OF A MAINT CONTROLLER'S DECISION ON THE BASIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE FROM TECHNICAL. MANAGERS; MANY WHOM MAY NOT COME FROM A MAINT BACKGROUND; WILL HAVE LIMITED OVERRIDE AUTHORITY OF A MAINT CONTROLLER'S TECHNICAL DECISION IN THE FUTURE.