A320 FLT CREW REPORTS DISCOVERING BRAKE WEAR PINS ON PREFLIGHT THAT INDICATE BRAKES WORN BEYOND LIMITS. CONTRACT MAINTENANCE AND COMPANY ATTEMPT TO FUDGE THE SIGNOFF AND MAINTENANCE RELEASE.

Date: 2008-09 · Aircraft: A320 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW REPORTS DISCOVERING BRAKE WEAR PINS ON PREFLIGHT THAT INDICATE BRAKES WORN BEYOND LIMITS. CONTRACT MAINTENANCE AND COMPANY ATTEMPT TO FUDGE THE SIGNOFF AND MAINTENANCE RELEASE.

Narrative

ON PREFLT INSPECTION WE DISCOVERED THE L INBOARD MAIN LNDG GEAR (#2 BRAKE) WHEEL BRAKE WEAR PINS WERE NOT VISIBLE AND WORN TO THE LIMIT. CLOSER INSPECTION REVEALED THE AFT WEAR PIN WORN BELOW THE GUARD AND THE FORWARD PIN BARELY PROTRUDING PAST THE GUARD. MAINT CTL WAS CONTACTED VIA PHONE IN ZZZ STATION OPS AROUND XA40 FOR A PLANNED XB17 DEP. MAINT CTL CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE LEGAL TO DEPART IF EITHER WEAR PIN WAS WORN BELOW THE LIMIT WITHOUT MAINT ACTION. (MY QUESTION WAS IF WE COULD LEGALLY DEPART WITH 1 OF 2 PINS ABOVE THE LIMIT.) ZZZ STATION WAS ADVISED OF THIS ISSUE AS WELL. MAINT CTL DISPATCHED CONTRACT MECH TO EVALUATE BREAK WEAR PIN MEASUREMENT. MECH ADVISED THE COCKPIT THE BRAKES WERE 'OK.' PLTS WERE NOT CONVINCED MECH TRULY MEASURED THE WEAR PINS AND DIRECT QUESTIONS WERE ASKED OF THE MECH TO INCLUDE 'DID YOU ACTUALLY MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF BRAKE PIN SHOWING' AND 'WHAT DID YOU USE TO MEASURE THE PIN.' WE WERE UNABLE TO GET A CLEAR; CONCISE; AND/OR STRAIGHT ANSWER AFTER ASKING THE QUESTIONS MULTIPLE TIMES. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE FORWARD PIN WAS NOT PROTRUDING BUT THE AFT PIN WAS 'PLUS.' PER OUR VISUAL INSPECTION THIS WAS OPPOSITE OUR OBSERVATIONS AND CAPT RETURNED TO #2 BRAKE WITH MECH TO VERIFY HIS FINDINGS. AS THIS OCCURRED; A MAINT RELEASE CAME ACROSS THE PRINTER STATING THAT THE BRAKE PINS WERE MEASURED AT 1/32 MEASUREMENT AND OK TO CARRY FORWARD WHICH INFERS THAT THE MECH HAD ALREADY CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND TOLD THEM THE PIN WAS LEGAL. UPON VIEWING THE BRAKE PINS WITH THE CAPT; THE MECH AGREED THAT AFT PIN WAS IN FACT BELOW GUARD AND BEYOND LIMIT AND THAT FORWARD PIN WAS BARELY PROTRUDING AS VERIFIED WITH A STRAIGHT EDGE (THE CAPT'S IDENT BADGE). CAPT AND MECH CALLED MAINT CTL AND ADVISED FINDINGS/EVALUATION. BRAKE DEACTIVATION; REMOVAL OR REPLACEMENT WERE THE ONLY OPTIONS PER MAINT CTL WITH AFT PIN WORN BEYOND LIMIT. FORWARD PIN WOULD REMAIN AS A CARRIED FORWARD AT 1/32 DUE TO ITS ALREADY HAVING BEEN LOGGED. PLTS REVIEWED WT PENALTY AND FIELD CONDITIONS AND AGREED TO TAKE ACFT WITH #2 BRAKE DEACTIVATED AND DEFERRED. THE AUTOBRAKES WERE THEN ALSO DEFERRED DUE MEL FOR BRAKE DEACTIVATION. MECH DEACTIVATED #2 BRAKE AND TESTED HYDS PER MAINT CTL INSTRUCTIONS. DISPATCH CONFIRMED PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS WHICH REQUIRED A RWY 7L DEP DUE 3 KT TAILWIND ON RWY 25R WHICH WAS DEPARTING RWY AT THE TIME. ZZZ ATC ACCOMMODATED 7L DEP REQUEST. LNDG PERFORMANCE FOR ZZZ1 ARR ALSO CALCULATED TO BE WITHIN LIMITS. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CONTRACT MECH WHO EVALUATED THE BRAKES IN ZZZ DID NOT APPEAR TO MEASURE THE BRAKE WEAR PIN WITH ANY INST WHATSOEVER. THE PLTS ADVOCATED FURTHER INSPECTION AFTER THE MECH TOLD US OBSERVATIONS IN REVERSE OF VISUALLY OBSERVED PIN WEAR WHICH WAS SEEN AT BELOW LIMITS. AN ATTEMPT TO ADMINISTRATE THE CONCERN WAS NOT ACCEPTED AS A LEGAL DISPATCH WITH AN OBVIOUS PIN WORN BELOW LIMITS WHICH ACCORDING TO MAINT CTL WAS A 'NO-GO ITEM.' THE MAINT RELEASE WHICH APPEARED AFTER THE INITIAL INSPECTION FROM THE CONTRACT MECHS STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE PINS WERE MEASURED AT 1/32. THIS WAS UNTRUE AND WHEN ASKED TO VERIFY THOSE FINDINGS WITH THE CAPT THE STORY CHANGED. INACCURATE OR FALSE INFO WAS GIVEN TO CLEAR THE MAINT RELEASE FOR OUR ACFT. THIS IS NOT SAFE NOR ACCEPTABLE. ADDITIONALLY; SOMEONE FROM THE ZZZ STATION CALLED OVER A COMPANY MECH FROM ELSEWHERE ON THE ARPT WHERE HE WAS WORKING ON A WDB WHICH HAD DIVERTED INTO THE STATION AFTER AN ENG FAILURE IN THE DAY OR TWO PRIOR TO OUR FLT. THIS MECH WAS CALLED OVER TO OUR GATE LONG AFTER THE DEFERRAL AND DEACTIVATION WORK WAS UNDERWAY TO; AS HE PUT IT; 'GET US OUT OF TOWN.' AS A PLT; SAFETY IS MY FIRST AND PARAMOUNT CONCERN. BEING GIVEN AN AIRWORTHY AND LEGAL ACFT IS A REQUIREMENT IN THE DAILY OP OF OUR WORK. WHEN A MECHANICAL ISSUE CHALLENGES THAT NEED; IT MUST BE DEALT WITH HONESTLY AND WITH INTEGRITY FOR US TO OPERATE SAFELY AND LEGALLY. OPERATIONAL COORD NOTE: ENRTE TO ZZZ1; DISPATCH ASKED IF CAPT WOULD ACCEPT ACFT IN PRESENT CONDITIONS FOR SECOND LEG TO ZZZ2. CAPT ADVISED ACFT WOULD BE REFUSED FOR SECOND LEG DUE TO TROPICAL STORM WX IN ZZZ2 WITH HIGH XWINDS AND RAIN WHICH COULD EXCEED THE MEL RESTRS FOR THE BRAKE DEACTIVATION. THIS REFUSAL WAS OVER 2 HRS 20 MINS PRIOR TO ARR AT ZZZ1. WHEN WE ARRIVED THERE WAS NO MAINT ACTION DONE UNTIL THE CREW BEGAN ASKING AROUND FOR IT TO OCCUR. THE GATE AGENT WAS NOT AWARE THERE WOULD BE ANY INBOUND ISSUE OR DELAY AND OPS ALSO WAS OUT OF THE LOOP. THE ACFT #2 BRAKE WAS REPLACED AT ZZZ1 PRIOR TO SECOND LEG TO ZZZ2. LACK OF FLT OPS COORD WITH ZZZ1 MAINT PRIOR TO OUR INBOUND ARR RESULTED IN 2 HR 17 MIN DELAY. SOMEONE SHOULD LOOK INTO HOW THE PROCESS FAILED FROM THE POINT OF DISPATCH ENTERING THE REFUSAL. OUR PROCESS ISN'T WORKING.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.