A First Officer reports on the difficulty to accurately determine if the current versions of the MEL and the NEF were in the CRJ-900 they flew; and whether the existing write-ups were completed properly; per the current version.
Synopsis
A First Officer reports on the difficulty to accurately determine if the current versions of the MEL and the NEF were in the CRJ-900 they flew; and whether the existing write-ups were completed properly; per the current version.
Narrative
We arrived at ZZZ before our report. We got to the aircraft and the crew (including myself and the Captain) did their preflight checks as usual. The aircraft was found by all to be in an airworthy; and 'normal' condition; despite the APU being MEL'ed. The aircraft was closed up; jet bridge removed; and I believe we were out on time. As we prepared for deicing; I got out the handbook to complete the 'Deice Configuration Check' when I realized that the aircraft still had the old version of the handbook and I made the comment to the Captain; 'When do they have to have these documents all updated?' Upon further investigation; I noticed that although the aircraft had the old version of the handbook; it had the new version of the checklist. At this point; we each recalled CRJ9 memo regarding the new revision of the MEL and NEF we are to be operating out of; through faxed maintenance copies in aircraft which haven't been updated. We coordinated with Maintenance regarding the 2 write-ups on the aircraft and found that the MEL'ed item (APU) was in fact deferred properly (although we were missing the current fax copy) and the NEF item regarding the door and wall coverings was NOT documented correctly. With the help of Maintenance; we ensured the aircraft documents were correct; we received the necessary faxes; stored them in the aircraft logbook; and proceeded as normal. As the deicing process continued; the Captain and I were thinking/talking about the issue and we realized; not only had we flown this plane (X) with the write-up earlier on the trip; but we had flown other aircraft throughout the 4-day trip; specifically Y and Z which had things non-safety related items written up in the CDL and NEF and we couldn't remember if they were written up properly using the current revisions of the aircraft documents or not. As I explained earlier; once we discovered the issue in the plane we were in; we ensured all documents were current and correct before continuing; however; we couldn't be sure that the write-ups on the previous aircraft we flew were current. Every aircraft we accepted was written up and complied with per the documents in the aircraft; however; as the memo said; and we found out; that did not mean it was correct. In my opinion; our experience occurred because of 2 reasons: 1) Our failure to accurately determine the current version of the MEL and NEF were in the aircraft we flew and/or the existing write-ups were completed properly per the current version. A contributing factor may be: 1) limited time to accurately look up detailed discrepancies between show times/boarding times and aircraft swaps. 2) I also think; though we as the flight crew are ultimately responsible for all aspects of the aircraft; passengers; crew; etc.; somebody other than the crew needs to specifically be responsible for ensuring an efficient update when revisions come to the aircraft. In my opinion; there are a couple different approaches which could limit issues like this: One suggestion would be to decrease the 'grace period' allowed when major revisions to the aircraft documents are made. As pilots; when we get a company memo; aircraft memo; bulletin of ANY type; and/or commercial chart revision; we are expected to have it documented; and in place; that same day; prior to our trip. We received the memo regarding this update Dec/XA/08; notifying us of these revisions; which becomes effective Dec/XB/08. We discovered our out-of-date info after the effective date; time enough for the effect of a memo received to fade. Updates need to be done in a more efficient manner. Another suggestion: If updating the aircraft documents of this scope quickly is too much work; the new versions should be on board the aircraft in a sealed folder; with a 'do not use until' date on it; and then; on that date; pilots could do a full swap of the necessary documents; quickly and efficiently. My final suggestion; which has the potential to solve many errors/missed items like this; would be to allow us more time to ready the aircraft; especially during a flight or aircraft swap; to accept the aircraft. It is difficult to do everything it takes to get a normal aircraft ready for a normal flight; even more if something is deferred or we need to comb through every detail of the paperwork to ensure it is current and complied with correctly. I understand everything; especially in the airlines; is easier said than done. There is no excuse for us missing this very important step in our preflights; however; with these suggestions; taken to any degree we may be able to avoid similar situations in all departments. Callback conversation with Reporter revealed the following information: Reporter stated they carry their own manuals which include their QRH; the CRJ manual and their company's manual. All require updates; but the issue is when they actually receive the updated documents and the effective dates of the new revisions.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.