B757 Captain reports rejecting takeoff for cabin door message at around 100 knots.
Synopsis
B757 Captain reports rejecting takeoff for cabin door message at around 100 knots.
Narrative
This was day three of a 6-day trip for the Captain; the first leg of a 3-day trip to ZZZZ as a crew. A normal departure briefing was conducted with the highest threat stated as the crew's first flight together; flying the B757 (normally B767ER) and taxi challenges present at JFK. Standard abort criteria over 80 KTS was briefed; fire; engine failure; unable or unsafe to fly. After an hour of taxiing the aircraft was cleared for takeoff full length on Runway 31L. Winds were estimated 330 at 20+ KTS. Temperature was estimated at -2C. Runway was dry. At around 100 KTS; I rejected the takeoff for an EICAS right Aft Entry Door message. The First Officer notified the Tower that the takeoff was being discontinued; I made a PA to the passengers. Aircraft control was normal and the aircraft was taxied off the runway at about the mid-point. Doors and brakes were checked and a decision was made to taxi to the parking stand. The Quick Reference Handbook was reviewed for post abort procedures. Brake indications were checked with readings mainly 1 and 2. At the parking stand; Maintenance completed a high energy brake check. Mechanics found a door sensor out of tolerance and the item was deferred. After a telephone call to Operations the crew received approval from the Duty Pilot and Chief Pilot to continue the flight. Perceptions; judgments; decisions: Normal temporal cues were accelerated on this takeoff because of increased performance due to light weight; significant headwinds and low temperatures; giving the perception that we were significantly early in the takeoff roll when we had the door message. The decision to abort; I considered it unsafe to continue the takeoff based on the EICAS message; Right Aft Entry Door. The added safety margin of a long 14;572 FT runway; with a significant headwind and sub-zero temperatures were contributing considerations. I believe that the quality of simulator training for the abort event prepared the crew to perform effectively. Given that this was the first leg of this crew pairing; crew coordination in this evolution was smooth and efficient.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.